



RESEARCH PAPER

Non-Traditional Warfare in the South Caucasus: A Case Study of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the strategic evolution of non-traditional warfare in the Abkhazia and south Ossetia conflicts, focusing on Russia's hybrid tactics and their impact on Georgia's political, economic, and security environment. Over time, these conflicts crystallized into frozen disputes, where unresolved territorial status and institutionalized local administrations operate as instruments of strategic leverage. Russia has deployed methodically integrated tactics of hard and soft power to cement control. Practices such as borderization, political co-option, and information work support territorial separation and construct domestic and foreign discourses. Muscovy has leveraged fragmentation, weak institutions, and historical cleavages to influence Georgia's decision-making and hinder Euro-Atlantic integration. This paper implement a theory of Hybrid Warfare, using military and non- military instrument, following a comparative, qualitative approach. Findings show frozen conflicts function as coercive and structural tools, demonstrating the relevance of hybrid warfare. Strengthening institution, countering misinformation, and promoting conflict resolution ae key to reducing strategic leverage.

Keywords: Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Non-Traditional Warfare, Hybrid Strategies

Introduction

The growing prevalence of non-traditional or hybrid warfare, whereby states achieve their strategic interests not only by means of traditional warfare but also a mixture of coercion, political intrigues, economic pressures, information package, and exploitation of identity-based types has occurred in the post-Cold War environment. Such tactics are blurry in that there is no necessity in the plane between war and peace and so, actors can gain their long term benefit without what amounts to wholesome occupation; hence it is central to the new security studies. Such substitutes are critical especially in spheres where bitter historic recollection, weak institutions and ethnic boundaries in demarcation dare on the ways that may be more primordial than less overall deterrence means may not work.

Georgia presents a particularly instructive case for understanding these dynamics. The secessionist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia trace their roots to Tsarist and Soviet imperial governance. In the late 19th century, Tsarist Russia abolished Abkhazia's autonomous principedom and encouraged Georgian settlement, intensifying local grievances and shifting demographics (Suny, 1994). During Georgia's brief independence (1918–1921), South Ossetian uprisings demanding autonomy and land reform were brutally suppressed, leaving thousands dead and villages destroyed (Nodia, 1996; Cornell, 2001). Under Soviet rule, institutionalized divisions reinforced dependence on Moscow: the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was established within the Georgian SSR in 1922, while Abkhazia was downgraded from a union republic to an autonomous republic in 1931, accompanied by policies of Georgianization that reduced the Abkhaz population to just 15 percent by 1959 (Hewitt, 1999; Cornell, 2001). By the late Soviet period, accumulated resentment fueled

renewed mobilization, exemplified by the 1988 "Abkhaz Letter," the Lykhny rally of 1989, and violent clashes in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia (De Waal, 2010; Nodia, 1996; Toal, 2017).

Following Georgia's independence in 1991, these tensions erupted into armed conflict. South Ossetia experienced armed conflict in 1991–1992, culminating in the Sochi Agreement, which introduced Russian peacekeepers and reinforced local economic and security dependence on Moscow. Similarly, Abkhazia witnessed a 1992–1993 war that resulted in the mass displacement of ethnic Georgians and the establishment of a fragile ceasefire under Russian oversight (Cornell, 2001). By the mid-1990s, both regions had become de facto independent entities sustained by Russian military, economic, and political support (Lynch, 2000). The frozen status of these conflicts persisted into the 2000s, with tensions intensifying under President Mikheil Saakashvili's Western-oriented agenda, culminating in the 2008 Russia–Georgia war. Russian intervention in both territories enabled Moscow to consolidate leverage over Georgia by supporting de facto independence, creating conditions that limited Georgia's capacity to reassert authority while leaving the conflicts unresolved (Nilsson, 2021; Menabde, 2017). Russia's strategy has consistently combined military, political, economic, and informational instruments to institutionalize dependency, including the integration of local armed forces into Russian command structures, borderization, and passportization (Sokov, 2005; Nilsson, 2021).

Over the subsequent decades, these conflicts evolved into entrenched frozen disputes, through which Russia systematically leveraged hybrid strategies to institutionalize its influence. Military deployments and permanent bases deterred reintegration efforts while projecting Russian power deep into the South Caucasus. Passportization had created a sense of dependence and also provided a legal reason behind any intervention, which also weakened the Georgian sovereignty. The system of borderization (that was introduced with fences, border checkpoints, and administrative boundaries) assisted in dying off the physical and mental boundary. Meanwhile, the politics of political co-option and information were employed to establish and frame Georgia as destabilizing, high-separatist-legitimacy and consolidated information attachment to local requirements of the strategic needs of Moscow. In these activities Russia was able to ensure that Georgia would remain dispersed as regards its politics, strategic as well as its strategic confinement and susceptibility to repetitive duplicity.

Not only direct separatism business involved Russia, it is also a component of the deeper policy of guaranteeing local supremacy, denying Georgian Euro-Atlanticization, and having control over strategically critical routes, including the energy route to the Black Sea-Caspian. Muscovy turned Abkhazia and South Ossetia into lasting weapons of influence by seizing internal divisions and internal dispute and using them against the institutions in those territories. Because of the unsolved situation in these territories, Russia is able to control randomized escalations, and continue to create pressure on the domestic and foreign policies of Tbilisi, and the structural geopolitical control without particularly a complete war.

This paper aims to discuss the way Russia has used hybrid war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to establish influence in the South Caucasus and its resulting consequences to the sovereignty, internal politics and Euro-Atlantic acculturation of Georgia. It, in particular, explores historical and ethno-political contexts which contributed to the rise of secessionist wars, and examines how Russia has utilized military deployments, passportization, borderization, economic dependency, political co-option, and information operations to organize influence and make de facto rule. The aims of the research are threefold, namely to the extent that examines the historical background and development of the abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts- (2) to examine the extent to which the role of the hybrid politics of Russia were in shaping these frozen conflicts and (3) to ascertain the overall implications of the said strategies on the governance of Georgia, the political climate in the region and its

future integration into the communities in Euro-Atlantic countries. In achieving these objectives, the paper shall obtain a holistic view of the role of the non-traditional warfare as a sustainable instrument of geopolitical bargain in the post-Soviet South Caucasus.

Literature Review

The Abkhazia and South Ossetia crises are the prime examples of non-traditional or hybrid warfare in the post-Soviet South Caucasus that ought to ensure other states a lesson of how they can achieve constant strategic effect other than trying to use conventional military operations. The policy and scholarly sources denote that the conflict of this caliber utilizes a blend of military, political, economic and informational devices the result of which ranks existence extremely deep into a region far beyond a battle-field. The material regarding The sustained Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia unambiguously serves as an incentive against Georgian reintegrating, as well as an avenue, in abundance of the resource of Russian influence on the region at large (Menabde, 2017). These measures have institutionalized de facto separation, converting both regions into frozen conflicts that function as levers of influence. Through these measures, Moscow constrains Georgia's sovereignty while shaping the regional strategic environment to its advantage. By providing Russian citizenship to residents, controlling local proxies, and maintaining permanent bases, Russia reinforces political allegiance and territorial separation without resorting to conventional occupation (Sokov, 2005; Nilsson, 2021). demonstrate the evolution from episodic interventions to a durable, structured strategic posture.

While much of the literature emphasizes contemporary hybrid strategies, historical and domestic drivers remain central to understanding these conflicts. Russian interventions exploited vulnerabilities rooted in Soviet-era status changes, demographic manipulation, Georgianization policies, and nationalist mobilization, linking local grievances and identity politics to broader geostrategic tactics (Hewitt; Nodia; Freedman). Studies also highlight humanitarian and governance consequences, including displacement, repatriation obstacles, and restrictions on international monitoring (Human Rights Watch; Kazemzadeh; De Waal), which illustrate the tangible impacts of these strategies on local populations.

Recent scholarship increasingly frames frozen conflicts as dynamic instruments of episodic coercion rather than static outcomes. By calibrating escalations, leveraging information campaigns, and responding to Georgian policy initiatives, Russia actively manages conflict intensity to maintain strategic leverage (Marandici; Bolkvadze). Despite this growing analysis, gaps persist, particularly in comparative studies; much of the literature remains Abkhazia-centric, while South Ossetia is treated as a secondary case. Empirical assessments of passportization, borderization, and economic dependency, as well as the interaction between Russian tactics and local agency, remain limited, leaving questions about how communities negotiate autonomy versus dependence largely underexplored.

Scholars and analysts have also considered counterarguments to the portrayal of Russia as purely coercive. Moscow's discourse emphasizes the protection of ethnic minorities, framing interventions as humanitarian operations to safeguard Abkhazians and South Ossetians, though international observers note that Russian actions often exacerbated insecurity for ethnic Georgians. Russia further invokes the Kosovo precedent to justify recognition, though this analogy is selective and lacks broad international consensus. Additionally, Moscow frames its military presence as peacekeeping, yet the operations have reinforced separatist authority and facilitated borderization, entrenching the division and obstructing reconciliation.

By addressing these gaps, this study applies a comparative lens to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, tracing the effects of Russian hybrid strategies on governance, political

identities, and livelihoods over time. Integrating historical analyses (Hewitt; Cornell) with policy-focused accounts of Russian leverage (De Waal; International Crisis Group; Kalandarishvili), the research moves beyond description to develop a comprehensive understanding of how non-traditional warfare produces durable geopolitical influence and shapes Georgia's sovereignty and trajectory toward Euro-Atlantic integration.

This study employs Hybrid Warfare Theory to analyze Russia's role in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Hybrid warfare explains how states achieve strategic objectives through the deliberate combination of conventional military force with political, economic, and informational tools, often blurring the line between war and peace.

The hybrid model of Russia in the Georgian case has its many dimensions. The less harmful versions are the use of hard-power as manifested in a military operation in Abkhazia, as well as what the author defines as South Ossetia; passportization, borderization, economic co-dependence, political co-option, and information actions are the least harmful ones. All this process makes institutional power undermining the sovereignty of Georgia, and making a direct confrontation of the West impossible through taking the sovereignty under control on the disputable territories.

These wars are also of excessive length because of the existence of hybrid warfare. Appealing to the inner differences of Georgia, flawed state institutions and old scorecards, Russia manipulates and perpetuates frozen conflicts that act as tools of strategic leverage. Statehood of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not confirmed, this permits occasional intimidation, discriminatory rises, and impacts long-term, on the domestic and foreign policy choices made by Tbilisi.

The emphasis on hybrid warfare can serve as a full-scale prism according to which it is possible to recognize the protracted geopolitical implications of non-traditional warfare on Georgia, which involves every agent of such non-traditional warfare and, at the same time, ascribing the importance of non-conventional warfare to its strategic functions.

Material and Methods

In its analysis, the paper assumes a qualitative research design where the basis lies in the comparative case study research, in the case of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The focus of the research is based on three dimensions, which are interrelated: the historical and socio-political context of the conflicts, the usage of hybrid strategies by Russia and the implication on the sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia. The primary sources of data were mostly based on secondary sources such as academic monographs, peer-reviewed scholarly articles, policy pertinent reports, and reliable media sources. The selection of these sources was done with a keen endeavor to get a balanced presentation of both the academic, policy, and empirical point of view. Using the comparative method allowed determining convergence as well as divergences between the two conflicts to show how Russia reshaped hybrid strategy in the different local conditions.

The research has realised a number of limitations. Relying on secondary sources can bring interpretive biases of the literature, whereas a limited access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia made it impossible to examine primary interviews or an ethnographical point of view. Besides this, the emphasis on the strategies of the RFS could lead to implications where the role of local actors and control of other international stakeholders is underrated. Although these constraints are used to define the boundaries of the analysis, it does not undermine the validity of the results of the study as a whole.

As the issues of identity, displacement and conflict were considered delicate, the ethical considerations were also followed closely. There was also an attempt to render accounts objectively without indulging into language that might stigmatize communities or

recount the partisan history. International renowned organizations provided the data that documented human rights violation and displacement to be credible and reduce the chances of misinterpretation. The paper does not assume the presence of common collective responsibility as such rather highlights the structural and political processes shaping the conflicts.

Results and Discssion

Hybrid Strategies and Socio-Political Manipulation

The involvement of Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia proves that hybrid warfare is insufficient to achieve the goals without the support of social-political manipulations as being used as the tools of influence. Moscow systematically restricts the sovereignty of Georgia by using military, political, economic, and informational instruments to influence the resolution of the specified strategic situation in its favor (Sikharulidze, 2025). This is a typical gesture of today non traditional war, whereby, coercion, influence, and instability under control are utilized instead of confrontation on the battlefield like in the yesteryear.

This is because, in these territories, the hybrid approaches presents in the form of a mix of proxy forces thematic permanent military bases, passportization, borderization, and discrete missions on the information front. Designed to be acceptable as deniable instruments of influence, proxy groups are created as built-in supports of Russian ongoing leverage even when the overt activity of military forces is diminished (Bolkvadze, n.d.; Kalandarashvili, 2018). These proxies have a two-fold purpose, on the one hand, the commands of Moscow expressed themselves; on the other hand, the military leaders are mediators between Russia as a whole and local communities, which makes possible reconciliation and conflict resolution much harder.

Permanent military bases support the use of proxies by enforcement of hard power and the demonstration of the expenditures of disobeying Russian orders. These enhanced operations after 2008 are the intelligence collection, quick troop mobilization and organizational teams with their local security actors (German, 2006). Their tactical location discourages the possibility of their re-emerging, but also creates a further perception of Russia being able to implement concordance in case it must. A combination of proxies and bases creates a unified Russian facility that does not solely depend on the dominance of the military but introduces the notion into the sphere of governance at the local level.

Passportization and borderizing is also a further form of deepening of Russian influence since the dependence and distance are institutionalized. Moscow allows the Russian citizenship of the original citizens of Chernobokh to win legal points to come in by forging the political allegiances (De Waal, 2018). These physical frontiers such as fences, check point provide further illumination of psychologically normalizations to the divisive on these planes to a notch of inclusive toleration of a permanent position in geopolitical status quo. These policies made up contributed to the development of the multidimensional system of control with the involvement of the political, military and social centers of influence.

The influence of the hybrid strategies is enhanced with the effect of socio-political manipulations. Introduction of loyal elites into the frameworks of the local authorities aids in ensuring the governancy systems perform according to the plan of that of the Kremlin, and the introduction has succeeded in making the local administration as a dual system where local authorities feel both empowered and stifled in collaborating with the Russian government (Marandici, 2022; Bolkvadze, n.d.). Millions of economic subsidies concentrate in the localities, investment in infrastructures and regulating trade connections form asymmetric relations: the elites in the countries do not have choice but power and they are subjected to low level of economic opportunities and other means of livelihood. Moscow is

more monetary and political reliance, which is effective to bring someone into complying rather than to organize independent policy making procedures.

Information operations are another important integrative aspect to this hybrid-socio-political approach. Disinformation campaigns delegitimize Georgian authorities, frame Western engagement as destabilizing, and present Russia as the ultimate guarantor of security and identity (Marandici, 2022; De Waal, 2018). These campaigns extend across multiple platforms, including media outlets, educational curricula, and public discourse, influencing perceptions at both individual and community levels. By shaping narratives alongside institutional control, Russia strengthens the resilience of local governance structures to internal dissent or external intervention.

The interplay between hybrid strategies and socio-political manipulation generates a zone of controlled instability. Local communities experience limited mobility, constrained livelihoods, and fragmented social structures, while Georgia's policy autonomy and integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions remain restricted (Cornell, 2001; Nilsson, 2021). The dual strategy exemplifies Moscow's layered approach to modern conflict, in which coercion, influence, and institution-building work in tandem to achieve long-term strategic objectives. By combining hard and soft power instruments, Russia maintains influence without engaging in conventional warfare, showcasing the sophistication of contemporary hybrid operations.

Frozen Conflicts as Instruments of Strategic Leverage

The unresolved status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia illustrates Russia's use of frozen conflicts as deliberate instruments of non-traditional coercion. By sustaining a "neither war nor peace" environment, Moscow combines military presence, political patronage, and economic dependency to maintain strategic leverage while avoiding the costs and risks associated with full-scale annexation or war (De Waal, 2018; Marandici, 2022). Frozen conflicts are therefore not merely unresolved territorial disputes but intentional mechanisms for shaping regional geopolitics and constraining Georgia's domestic and foreign policy autonomy.

Frozen conflicts operate across multiple domains. Militarily, the continued deployment of Russian troops and control over critical infrastructure ensures deterrence against reintegration while maintaining operational readiness for future contingencies. Politically, loyal elites embedded within local administrations enforce Moscow's directives, creating a dual governance system that effectively sidelines Tbilisi in local decision-making. Economically, subsidies, trade dependence, and control over key resources consolidate Russian influence, limiting the capacity for independent policy formulation or local development initiatives (Bolkvadze, n.d.; Kalandarishvili, 2018).

This manoeuvre has expanded in world politics. Through the continued creation of instability, Russia becomes the arbiter and executor, controlling the way the risks and opportunities are viewed in the South Caucasus. This duality makes Moscow more advantageous during the negotiations in that it is able to influence the conflict resolution processes, to prescribe terms of engaging, and to take advantage of structural weaknesses within the foreign institutions (Marandici, 2022; De Waal, 2018). The frozen nature of the conflicts provides the maximum degree of strategic flexibility but reduces the necessity to engage in a real confrontation.

Georgia has a significant impact regarding its consequences. The continuous lack of changes destabilizes the situation within the state, the possibilities of its carrying out major reforms, the security of the borders, and the efficient functioning of the state. The integration processes in NATO and EU that demand consistent control of the territorial boundaries are hindered forcing Georgia to be limited in its policy options. Social and

economic repression in the form of scarcity of movement and limited economic development and reliance on services conducted by the Russian force form local populations in Eastern Europe. In this regard, frozen conflicts are state means as well as mechanisms of protecting the adherence to the populace and systemic power.

Importantly, frozen conflicts also use subsequent tactics on a hybrid and socio-political approach. Dominating operations with military forces and proxies in control enforce operational dominance and control and acquiescent political demand remain stable, and perceptions are prefigured with the use of information operations. This layered system establishes the conditions of self-reinforcement which allows the Russian primacy to persist and the risks of breaking out into conventional war are excluded to the lowest extent possible.

Core to this, the lands of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are intended to act as tools of geopolitical leverage to allow Russia to exert influence, limit the policy choices of Georgia and play the long-term role of establishing a presence in the South Caucasus. This blend of hybridization, social-political maneuvering, and frozen conflict sustenance is an esteemed illustration of a well-to-do coordination of power, sway, and a command, which depicts the self-preserving topography of non-traditional warfare in geopolitics nowadays.

Discussion

The examples of the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be taken as the evidence of the sophistication of non-traditional wars strategy and prove that in some cases the hybrid strategies are enough to gain persistent impact without conventional military conflicts. The multi-dimensional approach of the combination of military, political, economic, and informational tools is a well-integrated means of Russia to restrict the sovereignty of Georgia systematically and to gain the maximum leverage in the long-term perspectives. According to historical reading, Moscow has remained cawing on the miserableness of pre-Soviet and Soviet history like minority articulation, Georgization, and institutionalised divisions to elevate its natural asymmetrical oneself. This time superimposition emphasizes the fact that hybrid methods are not just the contemporary methods but also the relections of ancient geopolitical plot designs.

Permanent military bases, proxy forces in local administrations, passportization, borderization, economic dependence, political co-option and selective dissemination of information among themselves exist in a mutually enforcing manner. Military deployments discourages reintegration and existent permanent installations, and is a measure of how expensive confrontation can be, proxy actors make it go on even when overt military action is kept to a minimum. Such dependence is institutionalized in the passportization and borderization racism, and is what constitutes the local loyalties as well as renders the territorial division as ordinary. Asymmetrical dependencies to the freedom of Georgia are created by the presence of economic subsidies and controlled systems of trade connections to structure policy. Russian imposing, information campaigns, delegitimization of the Georgian, and encouragement of compliance among populations at the ground all help to boost information campaigns and include disinformation information campaigns and narrative framing information campaigns. All of these strategies put Georgia into the position where the state finds itself in the holding position, politically, strategy bound and Putin holding economy prisoner.

These interplays can be approached with the right analytical prism to which the theory of Hybrid Warfare can offer good sound. A combination of hard power methods, including an assessment of permanent military presence, and soft power methods, including citizenship policies, economic incentive, and information operations help Russia blur a border between war and peace to bring about the introduction of a long-term presence of influence even in the region of contention. Within this context, frozen cases of conflicts in

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the tools of pressure, which allow occasional bursts, artful interventions, and structural five funding leverage on foreign and domestic policy of Tbilisi.

Both the ambiguous interpretations of the role of Russia are also emphasized in the study. Moscow presents any of its interventions as the means of protect the ethnic minority, and military occupation and passportization of its people look more like a humanitarian operation or a peace-enforcement action. Russian officials use cases like Kosovo to legitimize the acknowledgment, which focuses on the legitimacy of the ethnic self-determination. Although these arguments feature prominently in the Russian discourse, empirical data indicate that these policies have proven to undermine the security of the ethnic Georgians, strengthen excellence of the separatist rule and institution of a long-term reliance that generates a massive disparity between the rhetoric and purpose achievable through such measures. The argument of this antithesis of view supports the analysis, which demonstrates the entwining of how the hybrid forms of operation are in effect and put in place on a base of coercion, legitimizing and geopolitical calculating. Russia exploits internal vulnerabilities in the following ways including political instability, weak governance and lack of proper institution capacity of Georgia by its hybrid strategies. All of these conditions predetermine the asymmetric capability of the hybrid of war and limit Tbilisi to either withstand the crisis of displacement, keep the economy up, or cope with the challenge in the most effective way. The frozen conflict of neither war nor peace creates an order of permanence compelling Georgia to survive in a culture of uncertainty in which strategic freedom is safely pruned away. After all, there is more than just secessionist conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, these countries are the template cases of new warfare overcoming the traditional politics of the region. How unsolved territorial disputes can be intentionally modified into tools of power, making a powerful state be able to impose authority and theoretically control political organization and restrain its neighboring state without actually occurring war have been portrayed as examples of that. Having large historical, military, political, economic, and information background and impacts, the hybrid character of the Russian approach enhances the further scope of applying hybrid approaches in analyzing the modern security issues in the South Caucasus context.

Conclusion

This paper shows that the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the ideal examples of non-traditional warfare in the South Caucasus. The hybrid policy which includes military presence, proxy forces, passportization, borderization, economic dependence, political co-option and information operations has successively subcutted the sovereignty of Georgia and limited the Euro-Atlantic integration into Western space. Muscovite methods By normalizing de facto separatist camps and playing up on historical agonies, ethno-political distinctions, and internal division and fragmentation, Moscow has turned these areas into frozen conflicts, which play everlasting and powerful roles, as a coercive tool, as well as a means of strategic advantage. This analysis has highlighted the fact that non-traditional warfare is one which enables a super state to pursue strategic goals without necessarily having to employ full-scale military conflict, a phenomenon which has rendered war and peace almost indistinguishable. Georgia has demonstrated the asymmetric privilege of hybrid strategies because of its inadequate capability to react, have been aggravated by political instability and incompetent governance. Not only do these conflicts contribute to the long-term insecurity of Georgia: through their mechanisms of displacement, interrupted publicity, and abated socio-economic development under them have become apparent, but they also point to the disability of the small states on the South Caucasus to a principle of geopolitical coercion over time. Finally, the example of Abkhazia and South Ossetia verifies that frozen conflicts are not the standings clashes of territory but the purposeful force of impact in the modern hybrid war. They underline the greater implication that in the confrontation of non-traditional warfare, the small and medium-sized states need to

develop an adaptive design of political, economic, and security poles in order to counter the effect of asymmetric threats on their sovereignty.

Recommendations

The findings of the research reestablish the flawed problems grossly facing Georgia because of the encompassing endeavors of Russia hybrid warfare and frozen wars alongside secessionist stresses in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The prosecution of Georgia needs the grand allegro of the security operations, the diplomatic operations, the economic operations and the institutional operations in securing the sovereignty, developing inner calm, and overpowering the Euro-Atlantic integration. These are suggestions that would focus on resilience, prudenced based planning and collaboration in the national level, regional frontal and in the international area.

- **Strengthen Defense and Security Capacities:** The military preparedness in Georgia can be upgraded in terms of improving the military infrastructural defenses, constructing stronger and sustainable defense against the South Ossetia and Russian -Abkhaz and also investing in the capability of the cyber-crime and intelligence. The coordinated effort of NATO training and reciprocal effort will lead to the enhancement of preparation in the case of the hybrid threat and take prompt action when a spontaneous destabilization event takes place.
- **Promote Balanced Diplomacy and Dialogue:** Although there is a more reasonable way to establish more intimate ties with Euro-Atlantic entities, Georgia should seek more rational forms of communication to Russia in the manner that its promulgation is as limited as possible. Tension in the conflict areas can be restored by the use of programs like the track-II diplomacy, pool of confidence, disciplined forums of conflicts and others.
- **Advance Regional Economic Integration:** The enhanced transportation and trade networks such as middle corridor and black sea connectivity project will decrease the reliance on the routes that are under the dominion of Russia. Included in the strategic partnerships are Turkey and Azerbaijan navigated with the EU which can work on the diversification of the economies besides augmenting the resilience and advancing stability in the borders of the nations.
- **Enhance Governance and Institutional Resilience:** Thereby, they will control the weaknesses found within these countries, such as corruption, polarization by politics and bad democratic contexts, which will ease the legitimacy and internationally acceptable status of its people. Judicial reforms, encouragement of the independent media and transparent elections can be considered as ways of rebuilding state capacity and resilience.
- **Deepen EU and NATO Engagement:** Georgia should continue to seek and attach more EU alliance, interest and extension on the operation with NATO on interoperability programs, missions expansion, and institutional correspondence. The gradual engagement will assist Westernization and deprive the activities of Russian hybrid to lead to security threats.
- **Counter Russian Disinformation and Influence Operations:** There should be thorough strategic response towards the issue of information warfare. Russia could be restricted to spreading its tentacles through societal divides and accusations of lack of legitimacy in the country by implementing media literacy, independence of the press, regulation and tracking of suspicious funding.
- **Invest in Inclusive National Identity Building:** Cultural promotion, minority involvement and socio-economic growth of the areas, like SamtskheJavakheti and Adjara will empower the national cohesion. Inclusive policies will minimize susceptibility to external intervention and make Georgia resistant to hybrid coercion.

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