

**RESEARCH PAPER**

Corruption in the Development Sector and National Projects in Afghanistan under the rule of Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai 2014-2021

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ABSTRACT

This study examines corruption in development institutions and large-scale projects during the government of Mr. Ashraf Ghani. The level of corruption in the then Afghan government was so high that it was clearly visible even in large-scale national projects and reduced the credibility of the government in the eyes of the nation. This research is based on secondary sources and addresses the issue by analyzing books, scientific articles, and other reliable sources through a qualitative study. Based on the studies conducted in this research, it is clear that the lack of transparent monitoring processes, lack of openness of officials, security problems, and external interventions were factors that contributed to the growth of corruption. Establishing an independent monitoring agency for large-scale projects, making related institutions accountable to the nation, and the intervention of neutral international institutions can play an effective role in reducing corruption.

KEYWORDS

Afghanistan, Corruption, Economic, Development Sector, National Projects, Ashraf Ghani, Construction

Introduction

Major development projects during the years of the government of Dr. Ashraf Ghani suffered greatly from corruption and poor management. While the government made efforts to curb it, they were ineffective. The government believed that if infrastructure was built, the economic situation of Afghanistan would improve and the people would be in good conditions in terms of welfare and comfort. For this reason, projects such as road construction, dam construction, energy network development, and water supply projects were prioritized (Kohkan, 2025). Road construction was one of the most important sectors. New roads not only made people's travel easier but also connected provinces far from the center to Kabul. This was very important for the country's economy because it made it easier to transport goods, receive food, travel for patients, and even support local trade. Many people got jobs in the process of building roads, and this in itself was a type of job creation (Bak, 2019).

Literature Review

Corruption increases the fragility of systems and reduces people's trust in governments and, in the end, leads to a widening of the scope of crimes. Therefore, third world countries that are more involved in corruption should try to reduce corruption by using successful global experiences (Bak, 2019). Change of government and governance in many cases can help in the fight against corruption, but only if the change of government is peaceful and not imposed through war, and at the same time is based on the will of the people, not a small group of politicians, opposition parties, and currents involved in the country's developments (Oxford, 2023). The penetration of corruption into all projects, even the Afghan military forces, was clear and had sufficiently mistrusted the nation, and even high-ranking military officials involved in major national projects supported corruption in these projects for their own interests (Vittori, 2021).

To successfully combat weak governance, corruption, and internal illegitimacy, one of the experiences of new governance systems can be effective, and since Afghanistan has not experienced a federal system throughout its history, this type of system can also be effective and useful (Poya, 2025). State building in Afghanistan has a serious need for nation building. Until nation building is carried out in this country, state building cannot be responsive, especially in the long term. For this purpose, the experiences of successful countries must be studied and assistance sought from neutral institutions (Rubin, 2007). Governance in Afghanistan has always been based on individual interests rather than public interests, and during Mr. Ghani's time, evidence shows that national interests were largely ignored, which led to a collapse of the nation's trust in the government (Strand, 2022). The effects of corruption are directly reflected in the economies of nations, and this issue can be very serious in developing countries, as these countries are struggling on multiple fronts (The Borgen Project, 2019). Developing governments must prevent corruption sooner than other governments because the consequences of corruption are more dangerous for them than for other governments and, in the end, lead to a strong crisis that will be impossible to contain, and this crisis benefits the most from the failure of the nation's trust (The Diplomat, 2024). Fighting corruption should be prioritized in major national projects because it prolongs these projects, and nations are more likely to want infrastructure projects to be completed and put into operation on time so that the nation can reap the benefits (UNAMA, 2018). Afghanistan, as a developing country and plagued by corruption, has not been able to make sufficient efforts to combat it, and the scope of corruption has spread across various sectors of the government, which itself indicates the strengthening of this phenomenon (Goodman, 2015).

Corruption in large projects is like corruption in people's homes because the people monitor these projects, so the extent of corruption is clear to them and ultimately leads to public dissatisfaction (United Nations Development Programme, 2025). Afghanistan did not suddenly become tainted with corruption after 2001. Rather, this process had a long-term beginning, but various factors, including wrong policies, the emergence of regional powers, foreign interventions, and lack of transparency in foreign aid, accelerated it (Wardak, 2019). Corruption is like a chain that causes other problems such as incompetence, lack of uniform implementation of laws, the growth of terrorist groups, and internal crises that ultimately reduce the lifespan of governments and cause their decline (Brown, 2017). Corruption was one of the major factors in the collapse of the system in Afghanistan, as it had infiltrated almost all sectors of Mr. Ghani's government and had rotted the system from within. This corruption reached its peak when it spread to major national projects (8AM Media, 2024). Studies show that corruption in the late Republic of Afghanistan was stronger than the structure of the system. In many cases, the government was unable to combat it and it even affected major national projects (Murtazashvili, 2022). The extent of corruption in Afghanistan could not be measured, but its consequences were clear to everyone, leading to the collapse of the 20-year-old republic and the people no longer standing with Mr. Ghani's corrupt and rotten government (Kheladze, 2024). The Afghan people could no longer tolerate a corrupt system, especially after the government halted major infrastructure projects. This was why anti-government groups grew and the people did not stand by the government in fighting them (Khushal, 2022). The Afghan government's efforts to curb corruption have been insufficient, and it appears that the government indirectly supported corruption as high-ranking government officials were also implicated in corruption (McDevitt, 2016). The government did not take serious measures to combat the two phenomena of corruption and terrorism, and the consequences were not very good for the government and the nation, ultimately leading to the tragedy of 2021 (Shah, 2021).

Instead of providing services, government service institutions had become places of transactions, and even project work positions were being sold. There was no longer any transparency in the hiring process, and everything had become commercial and for sale (Murtazashvili, 2021). Studies show that corruption during the government of Mr. Ghani had grown rapidly in all government departments and had even affected public benefit and

large-scale projects, which reduced the people's trust in the government of Mr. Dr. Ashraf Ghani every day. Moreover, corruption had become a very serious problem that instead of fighting it, the government was imposing its demands on the people, and in many cases, corruption was funded and supported by government officials and local power islands.

Material and Methods

In this study, corruption in large-scale projects and development institutions in Afghanistan is discussed and examined through a qualitative research design. The qualitative research design proposes a comprehensive background study, identifying and interpreting the underlying factors. Through this, researchers can use nuance, depth of perspective, and diversity to articulate the issue with a deep and accurate understanding (Creswell, 2013). With a proper understanding of the issue, one can reach its roots and factors and easily identify who, which departments, and which parts of the government are involved in corruption, as well as identify the victims and develop a solution to combat it by studying the background, similar cases, and analytical studies. This study focuses on secondary data, and by comparing Afghanistan with Rwanda, more efforts have been made to use Rwanda's successful experiences in rebuilding and repairing the government that has lost trust in the public eye. In order to better, more accurately, and analytically express the issue, a six-step framework was used, and this approach helped to express the issue in an understandable and clear way (Braun & Clarke, 2019).

Large Contracts

The main problem was that the money provided was not spent professionally and properly. The designs were poor, the standards were not met, and in some cases projects were carried out merely to consume the budget rather than to solve the problems of the people.

Road Construction

The Republic Road, a road funded by the World Bank and located near our house in District 10 of Kabul next to Wazir Akbar Khan Hill, connects the airport and Makroyan. Despite the large amount of money spent, this road was not constructed according to the required standards. The width of the road is too small and does not have sufficient traffic capacity. Even after the demolition of people's houses to build this road, it still faces problems and obstacles. Payments by powerful individuals to prevent the destruction of their properties were another problem that both increased corruption and hindered projects, and the government ignored these issues in order to protect the interests of individuals and their own populations (World Bank, 2017). The implementation of this project changed shape several times due to political interference and individuals with the population, causing it not to be implemented according to plan, and this is in fact what the Taliban government has also confirmed and is trying to restart this project (The Diplomat, 2024).

Kamal Khan Dam

Lack of supervision and control of projects makes problems worse and opens the way for corruption, this is what the Kamal Khan Dam project also suffered from, and the government tried harder to trust its counterpart. In addition, this led to waste of money and the project not being implemented according to plan. It can be said that the government in these projects was seeking to gain the benefit of individuals and stakeholders instead of implementing it properly and to the standard (Bak, 2019). This project shows how the then Afghan government pursued ambitious goals in the country's mega projects, but ignored widespread corruption, poor management, abuse, improper implementation, and delays in

their implementation. These issues directly affected the nation's trust in the government, and people always complained about the lack of timely implementation of projects

Energy

The lack of electricity and energy has been one of the major problems of the Afghan people and continues to this day. Instead of focusing on electricity generation projects, the government has been trying to politicize this issue, which has caused serious problems among the people and has prevented electricity from reaching remote parts of the country. On the other hand, the government has been relying more on imported electricity and, despite the resources and conditions for domestic electricity generation, has been importing the largest amount of electricity from Afghanistan's northern neighboring countries. Management institutions have also suffered from poor management and the lack of technical skills of employees has made the problem worse (Khushal, 2022).

Macro-Level Corruption

Corruption in the country's mega projects was so widespread that it had damaged these projects and in many cases caused them to not be implemented on time or even to be stopped. Development funds were usually spent on temporary and one-time matters instead of investing in the country's infrastructure projects or even embezzled. This process accelerated after the formation of the national unity government after 2014, and high-ranking government officials became involved in systematic corruption, and the government's efforts to manage these projects were very few and unsuccessful (Brown, 2017).

The lack of accountability and transparency of the government in major national projects undermines the trust of the people and the government becomes discredited in the eyes of the people. In particular, corruption in road, electricity, dam and other infrastructure projects is very destructive and causes waste of funds. During the tenure of Mr. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan missed many good opportunities and development programs did not progress significantly, which had a very bad impact on governance and government governance. Many factors caused problems in the development plans, including lack of proper management, negligence in monitoring projects, systematic corruption, security problems and power islands (Strand, 2022).

The government was tainted with corruption in all aspects, and it was not limited to just big projects. Almost all the government's political structures were involved in corruption, even government positions were bought and sold, and almost all projects were carried out under this guise. Honest and clean people did not last long in the government, they were tainted with corruption, or they were removed from the scene. Supervisory systems were either paralyzed or were led by corrupt people. It was this instability and the growth of corruption that made countries around the world stop supporting the government of Mr. Ashraf Ghani, and international businesspersons did not invest in unstable Afghanistan and were not willing to accept such a risk. Therefore, the government was in an economic, political, and social dilemma and was forced to surrender.

Project Sustainability

During the era of Mr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, all projects were symbolic and of very poor quality and were not built in a fundamental way, while infrastructure projects should be built with international standards and high quality so that they can meet the needs of the community for a long time. The implemented projects usually stopped working before the specified period, which made the government more humiliated and humiliated in the eyes of the people, and the government spent money on their construction again, which caused the government's expenses to increase. The lack of a balanced policy based on the principles

of transparency can shorten the life of governments and damage the internal legitimacy of the government. Therefore, the government needs to have regular economic programs, proper management, and effective plans to fight corruption, use human and natural capacities, and monitor international aid, in addition to a commitment to transparency. In general, the lack of a sustainable and scientific economic policy, poor management and supervision, and widespread corruption were the main reasons for Afghanistan's failure to properly use international aid, natural resources, and human capacity. Instead of these efforts being implemented on a solid and sustainable basis, they remained scattered and substandard.

Role of the Ministry of Finance

In the administrative structure of the Afghan government, the Ministry of Finance plays a key role and is considered one of the most important government departments. This department plays a key role in collecting and managing the country's revenues, so weakness in this ministry means weakness in the entire system and government, because if this department is paralyzed, the government cannot survive. All major projects were financed through this ministry, corruption in this institution directly plays a role in the progress and development of the country, this is what happened during the government of Mr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in Afghanistan, and this department was sufficiently immersed in corruption. One of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance is to prioritize the country's economic needs, and this department tries to make the country self-sufficient in the long term with sound economic policies, but when this department is involved in corruption, there is no hope for the government's self-sufficiency (Shah, 2021). The Ministry of Finance of the then Afghan government was facing more and more problems every day, and the reason for this was the lack of proper management, lack of accountability of officials, lack of transparency in revenues, abuse of power and dozens of other problems that opened the way for corruption and various types of problems. The government of Mr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani, with his selective appointments, added to these crises instead of solving them, and made it impossible for the government to finance its expenses through existing financial resources. Economic stability can only be ensured through proper management of resources and implementation of long-term infrastructure projects, and for this, it is necessary to continuously and systematically monitor the Ministry of Finance so that in this way it can be made free from corruption. Ultimately, Afghanistan lost opportunities that may take years to recover. Despite its critical role and numerous opportunities, the Ministry of Finance during the Ashraf Ghani government failed to achieve the level of professionalism, transparency, and accountability required by a war-torn country in need of development (UNAMA, 2018).

Major Afghan projects

Major Afghan projects such as the Kabul–Kandahar Road, Salma Dam, provincial power grid expansion, Kamal Khan Dam, Herat–Khawaf Railway, and dozens of others were among the programs that, if properly managed, could have transformed the country's infrastructure. However, nearly all of these projects faced serious financial, administrative, and management problems (Bibi & Muzaffar, 2023). On the surface, budgets were allocated, contracts were signed, and foreign institutions provided financial support, but in practice funds were either not released on time, not spent properly, or the projects were left incomplete. In many cases, the budget was spent but the quality of the work was poor, requiring reconstruction later. Failure to address national and major projects in a timely manner caused these programs to be delayed for years. On the other hand, the government did not implement them regularly during the budget process. which in turn caused work to stop, and this stoppage had a very negative impact on the people's psyche and their trust in the government (Brown, 2017).

The Ministry of Finance always stated that the costs of the country's major projects were paid for by institutions and supporting countries, which indicated that Afghanistan had not been able to finance its expenses through domestic resources and economic policies in nearly 20 years of governance and international support. Or the level of corruption was so high that domestic revenues were squandered and caused the government to become economically dependent on supporting governments and institutions. If we look at the economic and strategic position of Afghanistan, it becomes clear that the option of squandering government revenues is gaining more strength. It should be borne in mind that corruption was not limited to the Afghan government, and some international and foreign institutions also played their part in shaping and moving the cycle of corruption in the country, and even played a role in supporting and equipping forces opposing the then Afghan government. In some cases, foreign aid was diverted by internal factors in collusion with external individuals and institutions before reaching this ministry, which further strengthened corruption and made the government's efforts for transparency ineffective.

Taxes are considered the economic lifeblood of governments, and lack of transparency in this sector can have very dangerous consequences for a fledgling government like the government of Mr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani. To curb corruption, serious control and supervision of the tax process must be taken, which was not done in the government of Afghanistan at the time, and people often complained about the waste of taxes by telecommunications companies and other projects, which the government did not pay any attention to. On the other hand, the division of power between Mr. Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah had caused problems in the work process of this department, and the ministry complained several times about the lack of coordination and poor management with the then president. Which caused it to struggle with problems in approving financial laws and large budgets and unable to respond to financial requirements on time (UNDP, 2019).

The government should often make financial decisions in coordination with all stakeholders, but this was not the case under Mr. Ashraf Ghani. There was insufficient coordination between the presidency and the Ministry of Finance. This led to Mr. Ghani making many decisions without consulting the Ministry of Finance, creating a vacuum in the work process, as several issues such as launching projects, selling state assets were not coordinated with this ministry, and administrative matters were not completed properly. This lack of coordination had put the Ministry of Finance in a critical and weak position, and it was felt that this department was symbolic and that economic policies were being managed from within the presidential palace.

The National Procurement Authority was one of the departments that the government had established to oversee national and major projects, but this department itself was under the influence of the presidency and did not have its independence as it should have. And since the source of corruption was in the presidential palace at the time, this department was also tainted with corruption and it can even be said that it had the opposite effect and caused major projects to fall into the hands of people close to and powerful in the presidency (8AM Media, 2024).

Ignoring the rules in many cases opened the way for political interference, external influence, and arbitrary decision-making, which created new problems in the end. On the other hand, anti-corruption agencies had also become politicized and corrupt, which greatly affected the anti-corruption process and could be said to have driven the final nail in the coffin of the 20-year-old republican system in Afghanistan contributed to the expansion of corruption during the final years of the National Unity Government (Goodman, 2015). The government has lost its credibility in the eyes of the people, and even the government's reports on reducing and fighting corruption were considered false and far from reality. On the one hand, the then Afghan government did not try to curb corruption, and on the other hand, it added to these conflicts by practicing biased politics, while the people knew the main

and fundamental source of corruption was the presidential office. This shows that the fight against corruption was only in words, which Dr. Ashraf Ghani always referred to, but not in practice, and even after the fall of the regime in 2021, reliable sources confirmed that the then Afghan presidency was involved in corruption.

Poor supervision

Political and external interference had rendered all efforts to curb corruption in various government departments almost ineffective, even though these departments had departments such as procurement, reporting, monitoring and accounting. The inefficiency of government departments had increased to such an extent that people had lost their expectations from these institutions and in many cases they turned to the opposition forces and demanded justice and rights from them because they were convinced that the government and government departments could not provide them justice. In many cases, company selection itself became a formal competition in which firms with strong connections or political backing were favored. When such companies lacked technical capacity, supervision alone could not ensure proper results. Reports were often written to absolve responsibility rather than reflect reality, and many were delayed, inaccurate, or designed to flatter officials. Consequently, problems were only identified when projects had already failed, stalled, or required additional funding (Wardak, 2019).

One of the most serious shortcomings was that independent audit institutions either did not exist at all or were politically influenced. When the same institution that awarded the contract ultimately monitored itself, the field for concealing problems and corruption was wide open. This situation shows that even if there is money and a plan, without a strong oversight system that plan will never be implemented properly. Afghanistan is one of the richest countries in the region in terms of natural resources. If the mines of copper, iron, gold, lithium, coal, and precious stones were mined legally and with proper management, they could undoubtedly save the country from financial dependence—a dependence that is itself one of the main roots of corruption. That is, if the government had sufficient domestic resources to finance projects, the need for foreign aid would be reduced, and this reduced dependence could limit many opportunities for corruption. Nevertheless, the reality of Afghanistan has always been different. There was a direct and dangerous connection between natural resources, corruption, and war. The country's mines not only did not become a source of national income, but they also became a war and economic tool for armed groups and mafia networks (Murtazashvili, 2021).

About 50 percent of mining revenues, instead of going into the government budget, went to the pockets of the Taliban, powerful people, smuggling networks, and local influential people. These revenues were collected in the following ways:

1. Bribing local officials
2. Illegal mining by front companies
3. Taxing the Taliban on transit routes
4. Threatening and extorting legal companies

This situation caused mines to turn from a national opportunity into a means of financing war. That is, the more mining was done, the stronger the government became, and the more powerful the armed groups became. The main problem was not just the Taliban. Even within the government structure, monitoring systems were very weak and ineffective. There was no precise mechanism to understand how much was extracted from a mine daily, how much was sold, and where the proceeds went.

When oversight is weak, government officials find opportunities to embezzle, companies instead of answering to the government answer to influential individuals, statistics are falsified, and money that should be spent on national development evaporates and

disappears. In the absence of a transparent and accountable system, personal interests become more important than national interests do. Mining was an opportunity for the people, but for many influential people it was a source of personal income. Everyone tried to get their share of it, even if the result was the destruction of a project, environmental destruction, or poverty of local people. When mining revenues do not reach the government's pockets, the government loses the financial ability to implement large projects. This means that dams are not built, roads remain unfinished, electricity projects are not completed, and the country's dependence on foreign aid continues. In fact, if Afghanistan's natural resources were managed properly, many of today's large projects would be financed with domestic money. Corruption in Afghanistan was not a limited or sporadic phenomenon, but rather operated like an interconnected chain in all sectors. One of the main reasons for the persistence of corruption was the impunity of those who were corrupt. When a government official or employee was openly involved in a case of embezzlement, bribery, or abuse of authority but did not face any legal punishment, a clear message was sent to others: "Corruption does not cost."

Corruption in Natural Resources

This lack of accountability allowed corruption to start from a small point and spread throughout administrative structures, especially in reconstruction projects where there was the most money and the most opportunity for abuse. One of the prominent factors of corruption was that projects were usually entrusted to unskilled and irresponsible individuals. Instead of the criteria for selecting a contractor being competence, experience, or technical capacity, the main criteria were relationships, acquaintances, intermediaries, and political affiliation. In such circumstances, it is natural that projects are implemented with poor quality, the implementation period is prolonged, excess consumption is created, and the final result is not in the interest of the people. When the responsibility for a major project is given to someone who does not understand it properly, the result is only sabotage and hypocrisy. In many large contracts, relationships prevailed over expertise. If a person had a relationship with a minister, an advisor, or the president's office, he could win a multimillion-dollar project even if he had no technical capacity. This type of relationshipism had only one consequence: projects became tools for political and economic bargaining, not a means of serving the people (Schütte, 2015).

Even when supervisors were appointed for projects, they were usually either indifferent, under pressure, or themselves part of the corruption. Because of the weakness of the structure, instead of monitoring the quality of the work, the supervisor only prepared a formal report. The supervisor remained silent due to political pressure, turned a blind eye in exchange for bribes, or was not able to monitor at all. The lack of a strong monitoring system gave contractors the opportunity to use substandard materials, do half-finished work, or take the project money and disappear. Corruption was not just the work of a few individuals but also operated in a network and systematically. From the level of simple employees to the level of high-ranking officials, there was a common understanding that: "If everyone is involved in corruption, then no one will be punished." For this reason, projects that should have brought hope and development themselves became fields of corruption, overconsumption, and ultimately failure. One of the important factors that strengthened the ground for corruption was instability and weakness in the government structure. In practice, no one took the law seriously, and law enforcement was more of a slogan than a practice. When a government system cannot implement the laws fairly and without discrimination, it is natural that people infected with corruption do not feel threatened and continue to work with peace of mind (Chêne, 2016).

The government leadership also lacked the necessary strength. Internal disputes among senior officials caused not only a lack of coordination to move things forward, but also each official used his influence more to maintain his personal position than to provide services. In addition, the gap between the people and the government was widening day by

day. People felt that their voices were not being heard and that they had no role in decision-making. This distrust had reached such a level that people no longer had the motivation to ask questions and demand things, while in a healthy system, people should be able to question the government and demand answers from it. This decline in public trust opened the field for corruption, because when people have no hope, the system also loses its sensitivity to transparency. The government system in Afghanistan functioned in such a way that there was no healthy and safe environment for the implementation of projects. In many cases, powerful individuals, local armed groups, and even some powerful capitalists extorted money from construction and development projects. Every project that was started, instead of proceeding legally and according to the contract, had to pay additional costs to these individuals in order to continue (Murtazashvili, 2022).

This situation not only multiplied the costs of the projects but also seriously questioned the security of investment. When an investor sees that he has to pay illegal concessions in addition to official costs, it is natural that he will stop operating in the country. Even with large budgets and foreign aid, without proper management and an accountable system, real development remains an unattainable dream and the development promises for the people are not fulfilled. Another obvious example of corruption during the national projects era was the payment of money to fictitious individuals. In many cases, names were included in payment lists or contracts that did not actually exist. These fictitious individuals were merely an excuse for embezzlement and misuse of public funds. This type of corruption indicates a severe weakness in audit, monitoring, and accountability systems. When no one checks the existence of a real person and payments are made without careful control, the country's financial resources are easily transferred to the pockets of corrupt individuals or special groups.

Considering the experiences of the Ashraf Ghani government, it can be said that the lack of regular and transparent mechanisms was the main pillar of the failure of large projects. The absence of independent audit systems, regular and digitized reporting, and review of contract cycles caused many financial and human resources to be wasted and projects to remain of low quality or incomplete. It seems that the establishment of independent audit offices, transparent reporting systems, and digitization of processes could have reduced a large part of the existing problems. In addition, regular and periodic review of contracts and review of the performance of contractors and project officials would not only ensure the quality of implementation but also restore the trust of the people and international institutions (UNAMA, 2018).

In fact, the experience of Afghanistan shows that even with sufficient financial resources, without transparent and accountable mechanisms, real development cannot be achieved and national projects cannot play their effective role in improving people's lives. For the fight against corruption in Afghanistan to be effective, this effort must become a general and institutionalized culture. That is, every individual, whether a government official or a citizen, must consider this work as one of their personal and professional priorities and focus first on their behavior and performance. The fight against corruption is not limited to laws and regulations but requires a change in attitude and values. When responsible and honest individuals observe transparent and accountable behaviors in their professional and personal lives, people's trust in the government returns and the ground is prepared for sustainable development. In other words, the fight against corruption must start at the individual level and then expand into administrative and institutional structures. Without this cultural and spontaneous change, no legal system or supervisory institution can alone prevent the misuse and waste of resources.

Comparison with countries with high foreign aid

During the Ashraf Ghani administration, Afghanistan received a huge amount of financial assistance, especially from the United States, the European Union, and

international organizations. In other words, the main problem was not a lack of money but structural weakness and the absence of a culture of accountability and transparency. The experience of Afghanistan shows that without a healthy system, money is easily wasted by corrupt individuals and influential circles and even undermines the legitimacy of the government.

Comparative Case Study: Rwanda

After the widespread genocide, Rwanda became a backward country with internal political problems that hampered the country's growth. The economy was destroyed, the government was in disarray, and people's trust in government institutions was almost zero. However, with the passage of time and the establishment of human rights structures and the use of large-scale international aid, Rwanda was able to advance the process of reconstruction and resource management in an orderly and effective manner. This experience shows that even in critical situations and after major humanitarian disasters, with careful planning and transparency, it is possible to gain the trust of the people and international institutions and begin development.

The main reason for Rwanda's success compared to Afghanistan was the establishment of coordination between the political and financial sectors and the conversion of foreign aid into real development. The Rwandan government understood very well that if financial cycles are not transparent and aid cannot be tracked, corruption and abuse would spread. For this reason, one of the important measures of this country was the launch of a digital aid management system. This system allowed any institution that sent financial aid or equipment to see the exact tracking of the consumption and route of its resources. The transparency of this system made even international institutions less concerned about corruption, and cooperation was carried out in a real and effective way.

Another important point was that Rwanda understood that corruption starts in small offices. Therefore, the government tried to reduce the level of bribery and abuse in various offices. Despite the widespread problems, Rwanda was able to create one of the lowest levels of corruption in the African region. This shows that with serious follow-up, even in limited and difficult conditions, a culture of accountability and honesty can be strengthened in the government structure (Malejacq, 2020).

Conclusion

Corruption at any level is a major threat to the government, but this issue becomes even more dangerous when the roots of corruption grow in large projects and these projects are also tainted with corruption. Corruption was one of the major factors in the collapse of the regime in Afghanistan in 2021, and this corruption had infiltrated all layers of the government, which always tried to weaken the government. And this is what happened in Mr. Ghani's government in Afghanistan, causing major projects to face serious obstacles, and since these projects were large and under the public's observation, their slow progress also discouraged the people from the government and caused people to lose their trust in the government.

Recommendations

The analytical findings of this study show that the existence of several institutions overseeing the implementation of large-scale projects, supervision by international institutions, supervision by sponsoring countries, and local public administrations can help in implementing projects and combating corruption. On the other hand, the accumulation of power in one axis should be prevented, which will also accelerate the project, and models from similar countries can be used to combat corruption.

Resources

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