



RESEARCH PAPER

**The Problem of Nation-Building and the Federal Paradox of Pakistan:
A Root-Cause Examination**

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ABSTRACT

The process of state-building requires the creation and concentration of authority and emphasis on the role of government in the social, political and economic discourse whereas nation-building, especially, in states with several subnational groups, requires dispersal of power and an emphasis on inculcating responsiveness in the political process. Furthermore, the federal form of government is considered an effective tool to address the heterogeneity and diversification excessively found in the social fabric of plural societies. Various scholars have examined the problems and challenges faced by the process of nation-building during the early history of Pakistan nevertheless they did not pay due attention to the pre-1947 attempts by the Punjabis to attain an independent Dominion status, efforts by the Hindu and Muslim Bengalis to retain a United Bengal, resistance in the North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) to join Pakistan and reluctance of the Balochis to merge their territories into Pakistan; all of these instances establish that the ruling elite in Pakistan, since the very beginning, had to move rationally, with delicate care, wisdom and caution, to effectively address the multifaceted challenge of national integration. Based on this background, this study analyses the problems of federalism and regional autonomy in Pakistan and their impact on the political development and nation-building since 1947. It concludes that successive installation of authoritarian and suppressive regimes at the centre and their subsequent application of force to preferably achieve the state-building failed to bring the desired results in the past, hence, currently, somewhat moderate application of the coercive apparatus of the state to handle or suppress the subnational tendencies is the need of the hour.

Keywords: Pakistan, Regional Autonomy, Problem of Federalism, Nation-Building

Introduction

The purpose of this research work is to contribute an original analysis and explanation to the study of the problem of federalism and regional autonomy in Pakistan through a scientific and empirical investigation. It is about the problem of federalism and its repercussions on the problem of regional autonomy in Pakistan while it is not about the working of federalism in Pakistan. Had it been about the working of federalism in Pakistan then this study would have become irrelevant and unjustified as we do not agree with a number of former studies (Callard, 1968; Choudhry, 1969; Ahmad 1970; Chaudhri, 1968; Wilcox, 1963) which have taken as granted that there had been some type of federal arrangement in Pakistan and then they discuss the working of federalism and federal provincial relations under several constitutions introduced in Pakistan. Contrary to this, our contention is that the five constituent units of pre-1971 Pakistan and the four units of post-1971 Pakistan never agreed upon some type of federal arrangement and, leaving alone the successful or unsuccessful working of federalism, they could never reach consensus in

evolving a federal structure for the country. Well, one may ask the question then what about the unanimously agreed upon Constitution of 1973? The answer to this question is very clear and simple. Firstly, according to the representatives from the smaller provinces of Balochistan and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) who participated in the formation of this Constitution, the federal structure was not final, was agreed upon as a temporary arrangement to be improved on subsequently to meet the actual and adequate demands of the smaller provinces. Secondly, the Bhutto regime even before the promulgation of the Constitution of 1973 resorted to the use of coercion and force in suppressing the potential political leadership from the provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP where the Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had a little political following and support. During the entire period of Bhutto regime, Balochistan did not have a representative government and, for the best part of that period, it remained under army occupation. Hence, the political leadership from Balochistan believed that the 1973 Constitution was never implemented as far as Balochistan was concerned (Muzaffar, et al. 2018; Hussain, 1989). Another point of difference between this study and the above mentioned former studies is that whereas the former studies have looked at the feelings of regionalism and the demand for regional autonomy in Pakistan as a potential danger for the process of nation building and national integration, the contention of the instant study is that the recognition of the feelings of regionalism and a needful response to the demand of regional autonomy can help creating national integration in Pakistan and can facilitate the process of nation building as well (Jathol, et. al., 2024). To be brief, the emphasis of the instant study is to analyze the nature of the problem of federalism in the light of its background, and to discuss different factors which, one way or the other, had some impact on this problem.

Beside this, this study also discusses the problems of federalism which are linked with the problems of underdevelopment in a country like Pakistan. Though, federalism sometimes has been advocated (Elazer, 1972; Kausar, et. al., 2019). in underdeveloped countries both on economic and political grounds, still, there are strong arguments against its suitability for such countries. The economic argument is often advanced where territories are considered to be too small for separate nationhood as East Bengal was not granted a separate Dominion Status by the British on the grounds that it was too poor and underdeveloped to survive as an independent nation. The political argument is advanced where territories are thought to be either too large or to have too many cultural and ethnic diversities for the successful adoption of unitary government. The economic argument is largely based on the advantages of economic development. It is believed that a larger political unit will be in a better position than a small unit to achieve the economic take off. A larger unit may make maximum possible exploitation of economic resources within an expanded market, facilitate the levelling off of regional economic inequalities and achieve enhanced bargaining power in world markets over the selling of commodities or raising loan. This argument appears to be somewhat confusing and contradictory. On the one hand, it is contended that the smaller and underdeveloped units ought to form a federal union to achieve economic development while, on the other hand, it advocates the maximum concentration of power on the union level to achieve such development which may cause apprehensions among such units about a powerful central authority, and, moreover, comparatively smaller units may fear to be dominated by the larger units in any such union. In Pakistan, the successive regimes invariably have created strong and powerful central governments in the name of economic development through the maximum possible exploitation of economic resources which has been continuously resented by the smaller provinces. The people of the smaller provinces lacking effective participation in decision making structure of the central government have persistently developed feelings of contempt and hatred towards the ruling elite in particular and the province they (the elite) belong to in general. This has not caused only a growing disparity among the smaller provinces but rather has led to a state of political coercion and suppression of the people of these provinces by the central government. The contention of the instant study is that, the

rapid economic development of a particular part of a federation or a particular portion of the population constituting any such federation, at the cost of the rest of the area and people of such federation, is a clear negation and the violation of the basic principles of federalism and hence a potential danger for the existence and maintenance of any such federation. During our investigations, this has been proved to be a truth for the case of Pakistan.

Pakistan is one of those recently emergent countries of Asia and Africa which are facing the problems of political integration, nation building and modernization. Pakistan and some other countries like West Indies Federation and Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland along with the Federal Republic of Cameroon could not survive failing to confront these issues while others such as India had survived but continue facing problems of political integration in her advance towards political community and the emergence of a broad and coherent cluster of political values around national symbols of identity and authority. Many of these new states according to Rupert Emerson are "not nations in being but only nations in hope (Emerson, 1960:94)."

Literature Review

The Chicago group of Writers on developing nations suggests the same problem in the title of a book "Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa" (Geertz, 1967). Another publication "The States of South Asia, Problems of National Integration, which is an edition by A.J. Wilson and D. Dalton, contains several essays on the problems of national integration in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The volume attaches great importance to the study of the problem of national integration in Pakistan and the rest of South Asia. The introductory note of the book reads:

"South Asia presents a mosaic, a congeries of artificial administrative entities left by a departing power. Before independence in 1947 India was one State only to become two with the creation of Pakistan. Even while this happened, the future of India was threatened by the lapse of British Paramountcy. In 1971, Pakistan became two States with the secession of its east wing and the birth of the Republic of Bangladesh. It is not possible to say what is yet in store for the weakened State with its lack of political skills, there are other break-away movements in India and Sri Lanka (Wilson & Dalton, 1982: XIII)."

The survival as a United Sovereign State of what is present day Pakistan has been debated by scholars inside and outside Pakistan. The lecture by Lawrence Ziring delivered at the American Centre Lahore (Pakistan) on 24 November 1983 can be quoted as a prime example in this regard which was published reported in the Daily Jang, London, 25 Nov. 1983. Ziring (1928-2015) was an expert on Pakistan problems and had many links with Pakistan. There, he said that the integrity and survival of Pakistan was very much in danger. Dr. Eqbal Ahmad, during an interview with Mr. Fayyaz Ahmad Hussain in London June 1983 also expressed the same view (Hussain, 1989).

Another book "Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State" suggests that Pakistan is once again at the crossroads of national integration and dismemberment (Ali, 1983), while Benazir Bhutto in her book "Pakistan the gathering Storm" describes Pakistan as a land occupied by its own army and suggests that a bloody freedom movement is awaited in the near future (Bhutto, 1983). Khan (1983) and Cohen (1984) support the same view and conclude that the army rule in Pakistan is a potential threat to its survival and integrity as a single United State. Burki (1986), in a title "Pakistan, A Nation in the Making", suggests that post-1971 Pakistan is still at the starting point of nation building.

The Origin of the Problem of Nation-Building of Pakistan

Pakistan like many other newly emergent countries of Asia and Africa had to face manifold problems of nation building. She shared some problems with these sister countries

while having some specific problems of its own. Pakistan's two wings were separated by a foreign and somewhat hostile territory and its five provinces had distinctive cultures, economies and historical backgrounds. East Pakistan being geographically separated from West Pakistan, it was described as a double country (Weekes, 1964:3). Some scholars (Jahan, 1972; Sayeed, 1967) argue that having ethnic, regional, linguistic diversities, physical separation of two Wings of Pakistan, Viceregal tradition and Islam being *raison d'etre* of the new state, Pakistan had somewhat distinctive problems of nation building than those of other countries. We do not agree with these scholars, nevertheless, we do not intend to suggest that the physical separation of the two Wings did not make the social mobilization a difficult task which is necessary for a common nationhood, but we argue that the case of Pakistan was distinctive only in the sense that Pakistan had India in between its two wings, otherwise, there are a few other countries which also have separated territories. As far as Islam being *raison d'etre* of the state is concerned, we again do not agree with these scholars. However, we have to suggest that this factor needs not to be exaggerated nor it should be over-simplified as we shall argue below that these were not the problems which have threatened the very existence of the state from the very beginning but the real problems have remained untouched and unidentified.

Though, Pakistani society, like many other new societies, is highly fragmented, divided, subdivided and cross cut by horizontal cleavages, yet its distinctive problem of national integration was and is still based on the fact that it inherited five most problematic provinces from British India. Again, it must be made clear that these provinces were not problematic because they had different cultures, languages and economies but they had no willingness to evolve a single national identity among themselves but were forced to join India or Pakistan by the British Government. Individualism and particularism were the basic characteristics of the elite of these provinces. There is strong evidence to suggest that these provinces tried to attain local self-rule for themselves rather than submit to any central authority dominated by All India Muslim League or the Indian National Congress (Jalal, 1985: *passim*). Bhutto seems to be right when he declared that "Pakistan had historically five of the most difficult provinces to govern. The people of these provinces were more individualistic, Society was more tribal, every individual wanted to exercise Veto (See Statements of Z.A. Bhutto, Interviews to the Press, from 20 December 1971 to 13 August 1973, Karachi, Government of Pakistan, n. d., p224).

However, we do not have to suggest that the communal feelings based on Islam did not play any role in the separation of the Muslim majority provinces from the rest of India but it would be an over-simplification of the problem if the Muslim separatism from the Hindu majority should be considered as an *ipso facto* approval or desire by them to form a Union among themselves. We have sufficient evidence to support the view that it was not only the Hindu majority which was feared by the Muslims of India but they also feared that none of the Muslim provinces should dominate the others. It might be relevant to add here that Sindh wanted to be left alone when an All India Union and grouping scheme was being introduced by the Cabinet Mission in 1946. G.M. Syed, a prominent Sindhi leader, demanded an Azad Sindh and not Pakistan. In the NWFP, Dr. Khan Sahib opposed any grouping of the Muslim Provinces and he made it abundantly clear that he wanted a free Pathanistan (Mansergh & Moon, 1977). The Governor of the NWFP informed the viceroy that the Pathans were apprehensive of their domination by the Punjab and he (the Governor) suggested that Jinnah should have talked about Pathanistan rather than Pakistan if he wanted to win the Pathans (See Cunningham to Wavell, 23 March 1946, India Office Library No. R/3/1/105). The Unionists in the Punjab (a non-communal Political Party established by the Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus together) led by Khizar Hayat, till as late as 1947, resisted the communal line of politics and argued that the only answer to the problem was provincial autonomy, states' rights and weak federal centre. Bengal was allowed even by Jinnah to stay out of Pakistan if the Hindus and the Muslims could reach any agreement to establish a free united Bengali state. Balochistan consisted of different types of territories like states, British

Balochistan and the tribal areas and it was not considered as a part of the Indian subcontinent by the Balochis (Khan, 1975b; also see Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo's interview published in the Daily Jang, London, November, 4, 1985) nor by the British Government in India (See Wavell to the King Emperor, January 1944 to Feb. 1947. Letter dated July 8, 1946. India Office Library No. MSSEUR, D 977/1).

Why the Federation...?

It may be asked why these provinces then constituted the Federation of Pakistan? The answer would be that they had a little choice in this regard. It was decided by the All India leadership of the Hindus and Muslims that India was to be partitioned on communal basis and so were to be the provinces of Bengal and Punjab which had large non-Muslim population with a bare Muslim majority. These provinces were given a choice to join Pakistan or Hindustan and nothing else. As it has been discussed earlier that the Muslims were more afraid of Hindu domination than anything else so they joined Pakistan, nevertheless, if given some alternative i.e. self-rule, their choice could have been different than it was under a compulsion of two options. For them, this was a qualified freedom and independence which was fraught with the danger that, even after decolonization, the colonial rule shall survive albeit with the change of masters. The three smaller provinces of the western zone i.e. Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan were apprehensive of the majority of the Punjab, which constituted more than 60% of the population of that zone, as well as its relatively earlier exposure to economic development and political modernity. Bengal had no point to fear from the population of the Punjab but it too was somewhat lagging behind the Punjab in economic and political development so it feared from the domination of Punjab in spite of its (the Bengali) numerical superiority. Leaving aside the fear of domination by other provinces, the historical evidence suggests that these provinces loved their own freedom and were unwilling to share it with others. Sir Agha Khan made the same point once when he had the opportunity to speak to the Viceroy. The Viceroy in his letter to the Secretary of State for India quoted Agha Khan saying that:

"After all there was a certain obligation on His Majesty's Government not to put the Muslim community or other minorities, and the princes, in a worse position than they occupied when the British had come to India. At that time, they had been a separate people with separate interests and a separate culture and those were things which must be safeguarded now. If Great Britain, to take an example from European History, had ever possessed suzerainty over Scandinavia and had after exercising that suzerainty for 150 years decided to relax it, it would have been an outrageous thing were she then to put Norway and Sweden under Denmark, clearly Norway and Sweden in such circumstances would be entitled to go their own way on their own (See Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India dated 27 Feb. 1940. India Office Library NO. MSSEUR 125 F/9)."

Even some of the Englishmen who had some knowledge of the Indian problem suggested the same as Agha Khan. L.S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to the Viceroy in 1945 that:

"The conclusion which I have drawn from that (political and constitutional problems of India) and which indeed was also the conclusion of the Simon Commission and in effect, so far as British India is concerned of the joint Select Committee, is that India cannot have majority controlled Executive at the centre, for that would at once involve Pakistan and no doubt within Pakistan, further secessions (See Letter from Amery to Wavell dated 24 January 1945, India Office Library No. L/PO/10/22)."

We believe that Moon was even clearer about the demands of local self-rule by the people of different regions when, in 1945, he wrote: "An India united otherwise than by consent is an India divided *ab initio* (See Penderel Moon "The Pakistan Nettle" a paper written in 1945 about the constitutional and political problems of India. Quoted from R. J.

Moore, *Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem*, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1983. P.183).”

The point we want to make here is that the Muslim majority provinces formed the federation of Pakistan in 1947 due to the reason that they were not given any third option by the British government except to join Pakistan or Hindustan. In these circumstances, as the 1940 Resolution of the All India Muslim League was the basic creed of the party, which provided autonomous status for the federating units, these provinces opted to form a federation known as Pakistan and thus accepted for themselves a status not less or other than an autonomous federal Unit.

The Complex Construct of Regional Autonomy

But, if the political and constitutional history of Pakistan is carefully examined, then, it appears that after the creation of Pakistan, because of the continuation of the Viceregal system, the hopes and aspirations of the different federating Units to enjoy local self-rule were disappointed which caused a high level of tension among the political elites of these provinces and the elites controlling the central government. This is the reason why the most dominant factor in the constitutional history of Pakistan has been the problem of provincial autonomy. On the one hand, there has been the desire and efforts made by the elites in the provinces to attain the right of local self-rule i.e. provincial and regional autonomy, while, on the other hand, the ruling elites at the centre always attempted to establish a system which concentrated all the powers in the central government and dubbed any demand for provincial or regional autonomy as separatist and anti-state. They suppressed any such movements and demands in different provinces with force instead of responding to them thus jeopardizing the process of nation building which helps to evolve a common political culture and a will to create a national state.

Several earlier studies (Callard, 1968; Choudhry, 1969; Sayeed, 1967; Khan, 1967a; M. Ahmad, 1970; Malik, 1976) have looked at the problem from a different angle with the belief that the demand for regional autonomy and regional sentiments are a potential danger to the achievement of national integration in Pakistan. This work gives a positive dimension to the demand for regional autonomy and argues that the fulfilment of such demands is the pre-requisite for the task of nation building in Pakistan and that the suppression or frustration of such feelings shall jeopardize any such achievement and is bound to cause dismemberment instead of creating national coherence among different ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups demanding equal economic and political rights. On the other hand, if such demands are fulfilled, political modernization and group integration can take place in different regions helping to integrate these different regions into a broader nationalism. Feelings of nationalism could find their place and after a peaceful coexistence of such regions within a broader nationalism, the feelings of regionalism may disappear or at least exist with lower tempo. To quote Almond & Verba "A low tension level of regionalism develops a mixed political culture which buttresses a democratic polity (Almond & Verba, 1963; Fareed, et. al., 2019)." This study differs from the previous studies referred above and argues that the demands and movements for regional autonomy in Pakistan were not movements for separation in the first place but their forceful suppression has converted them into such movements in the past and shall do the same in future. To support this contention, if we look into the historical background of the problem of regional autonomy in Pakistan, we may conclude that the efforts made by different regions to maintain their separate entity and identity are not new and they can be traced back in history well before the British came to India or for that matter before the creation of Pakistan. Here, we do not intend to suggest that any serious study of Indian history has ignored this fact but our contention is that this historical background has not been looked at as an argument to support the demand of provincial autonomy.

The Dysrhythmic Political Development of British India

If the history of British rule in India is carefully examined, it appears that the British occupied different parts of India (only 5 Muslim majority Provinces are relevant for the purpose of instant study) at different times with different methods and in different circumstances. Moreover, they had different types of administrative systems in different areas. For instance, Bengal was the first region where the British established themselves while the Punjab and Sindh were the last provinces to be annexed by them. Balochistan had a different type of arrangements with the British and the NWFP and a part of Balochistan were Afghan territories occupied by the British during the Anglo Afghan wars. All these provinces, before they were brought under the Empire, enjoyed separate entities and identities and they were helped keeping the same by the British during their rule over there. Keeping in view the whole British India, one comes to know that there prevailed a dysrhythmic process of political and economic change and development which was bound to pose a serious challenge to national integration when, after the Raj, these different areas had to form a single national state: Bengal was the only Regulation Province (in which the district administration had less discretionary powers and had to function within a more rigid framework of rules and regulations) among the five provinces which formed Pakistan. Others were non-regulation provinces, (where the district administration enjoyed enormous discretionary powers) while Balochistan was not even a province until 1970. Muzaffar, et. al., (2021). In this regard, it was evident that when the British would leave, a substantial change in the power structure would take place, which, in turn, should threaten the integration of different forces in these areas. The dysrhythmic process of change had deprived the Pakistan provinces of the prerequisites of national integration, political modernization and development i.e. it did not have a national intelligentsia, a national bureaucracy, a national *bourgeoisie* and a national labor class. Secession of the Singapore from the federation of Malaysia (1965) can be quoted as a good example in this perspective as the rest of the regions could not compete with it (Singapore) in the above referred prerequisites for political and economic development. We believe that Jinnah had well foreseen it when, while delivering his Presidential address at the 27th Annual Session of the All India Muslim League, held in Allahabad in April 1942, he declared:

"It must be realised that India was never a country or a nation. India's problem is international in this subcontinent and differences--- cultural, social, political and economic are so fundamental that they cannot be covered up, concealed or confused but must be handled by all as realists (J.U.D. Ahmad, 1970:424)."

Our contention is further supported by the events which took place before 1947 i.e. the attempts by the Punjabis to attain an independent Dominion Status, effort by the Hindu and Muslim Bengalis to retain a United Bengal, resistance in the NWFP to join Pakistan and reluctance of the Balochis to merge their territories into Pakistan. It shall be useful to mention here that, except Sindh, all the Provinces which formed Pakistan were parts of such regions which were divided among different countries. The Punjab and Bengal were divided among Pakistan and India while Balochistan and NWFP were divided among Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. These provinces did not share among themselves anything but a common religion and a common colonial rule albeit with different terms becoming irrelevant after 1947 while they shared many more things across the borders. The Pathans and Balochis shared a common religion with their counterparts in Iran and Afghanistan. Keeping in view these factors, this study argues that Pakistan must be a federation.

The Separation of East Pakistan

The most important event in the history of Pakistan is the separation of East Pakistan. Many authors have written about the event and a wealth of literature is available but the said literature does not present the whole picture. Most of the authors have emphasized the post-Ayub period, the 1970 elections, military actions in East Pakistan by

the Yahya regime, failure of the political dialogue in 1971 and the Indian-Soviet intervention as the chief causes of the said event. The arguments offered by this study are different in emphasis as although these events accelerated the process of dismemberment, yet, they were not the sole cause of such disintegration. This study looks at the problem of Bengali regionalism and sub-nationalism right from the late 1930s when the Bengali Muslim elite began to protest against the non-Bengali domination of the Muslim Freedom Movement. Then it records and analyses evidence that Bengal was never conceived as part of a single Muslim State until 1946 and even after the amendment in 1946 in the Lahore Resolution it was not taken seriously until the time of the partition as the alternate arrangements were discussed and agreed upon by Jinnah and the Bengali elite after the arrival of Mountbatten in India in 1947 but were rejected by the Congress leadership. We believe that a different explanation to the problem of regionalism in Bengal after 1947 would have to be offered and it would rather be analyzed with reference to the policy system analysis approach presented by Almond and Powell (For Details See Almond, G. A. & Powell, G. B. Jr. (1978). *Comparative Politics: System, Process and Policy* (2nd and Reprint). Lahore, Ferozsons, 1978).

Conclusion

Very few states in the world started with greater handicaps and difficulties than Pakistan did on 14 August 1947. Pakistan was absolutely a new state which did not exist prior to the date and was created by an Act of the British Parliament. The new state lacked an existing political, economic and social infrastructure and was to be built anew. Pakistan, like many other newly emergent countries of Asia and Africa, had a long history of colonial domination, a plural society and a traditional socio-economic political structure, albeit different in the five provinces which constituted the state, thus lacking any common structure to start with. The factors which posed a different and delicate challenge to the survival of Pakistan as a new state as compared to the other new states were the geographical separation of the two zones constituting Pakistan and the influx of refugees from other parts of the Indian subcontinent. These factors made Pakistan a typical of the new states and added additional difficulties to the problems of state building and nation building in Pakistan.

The tasks of state building and nation building in the new states where neither a state nor a nation existed seem to be quite difficult and hard and require political vision and skill on the part of the ruling elite. The problem becomes even more difficult and delicate in those states which have plural societies consisting of several subnational groups with different cultural, linguistic, ethnic, social, economic and political backgrounds. These subnational groups in many states have different levels of political, social and economic modernization which represent a substantial economic and political disparity among these groups. In such cases, a certain group or a coalition of groups which have earlier exposure to social, economic and political modernization manage to become the ruling elite, thus capturing the state power and assuming the function of delivering the goods to other groups which they may or may not fulfil. In these circumstances, it is imperative that the ruling elite must perform the complementary tasks of state building and nation building simultaneously. While state building seems to require the creation and concentration of authority and emphasis on the role of government in the social, political and economic process, nation building, especially, in state with several subnational groups, requires dispersal of power and an emphasis on responsiveness in the political process.

It appears from the study of the processes of state building and nation building in these states, that the prime necessity of the state's survival as an independent international entity combined with a desire of the governing elite to acquire more power and retain it, often pushes them (the elite) to concentrate on state building at the cost of nation building, over emphasizing the need for the concentration of authority and underestimating the need to nourish and strengthen the political process. Most ruling elites in these new states find it difficult to share power, enter into a political dialogue with the subnational groups and

respond to their demands in order to develop a national ideology and above all to tolerate an acceptable level of instability in the political system which, according to Almond & Verba, helps develop a mixed political culture that buttresses a democratic polity. It is desirable that a balance be maintained between the two complementary processes, otherwise they work at cross purposes and undermine each other.

We have concluded from the case study of Pakistan that, in 1947, Pakistan was composed of different subnational groups, i.e. the Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs and Pashtoons, which had quite different levels of social, political and cultural modernization. The Bengalis, Sindhis, Balochs and Pashtoon subnational groups were apprehensive of their domination by the Punjabis and the migrants from northern and western parts of India, and thus were reluctant to join Pakistan. In 1947, the five provinces of Pakistan lacked the feelings of a common Pakistani nationalism. If the different theories of nationalism would be analyzed, one may conclude that the nationalism is a product of common culture and a recognition of each other as belonging to the same nation by fellow members of a society. When Pakistan came into being, the five provinces of Pakistan neither shared a common culture nor had they an unqualified will to stay together, nevertheless, they started in the hope that a common culture and a will could be developed by a peaceful co-existence of different subnational groups. But this hope was frustrated by the ruling elite and the Bengali subnational group had abandoned any such hope in the late 1960s, while smaller subnational groups in post-1971 Pakistan had to abandon the hope during the authoritative regime of Bhutto and the succeeding suppressive martial law regimes under Zia and Musharraf hence the contemporary Pakistan is confronting with the issues of nation building and national integration whereas the federalism could not resolve these problems.

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