



RESEARCH PAPER

Causes of the Separation of East Pakistan: A Dissection under the Federal Paradigm

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ABSTRACT

The history of freedom movement in Bengal revealed that the Bengali Muslims were neither willing to be dominated by Hindus nor did they like to share power with Muslims of other regions of India. Furthermore, they disliked the domination of Indian affairs by other provinces; they also complained about the domination of the All-India Muslim League by the non-Bengalis and their interference in the local politics of Bengal. Nevertheless, the 1947 Pakistan comprising two separate wings having only one thing in common, i.e. Islam against many other odds, certainly had a chance of establishing a viable political system, evolving a single statehood turning ultimately to a broad-based common nationhood. Various scholars suggest that the federal solution alone was best suited to the needs of the different provinces of Pakistan and could weld them into a viable and workable nation state since a common nationhood could spring from a federal system operated with care, consideration and full thought in mutual agreement among the federating units. Against that backdrop, the current work examines the causes of the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 while considering the viewpoint of Muslim leadership from United Bengal, the events and developments took place in Pakistan after partition and applying some of the key theoretical aspects of system approach under the framework of federalism and regional autonomy. It concludes that the failure to apply a federal solution properly to the constitutional and political problems of Pakistan was responsible for the events of 1971 and its consequent dismemberment. The study suggests that the resentment and unrest in the smaller provinces (except Punjab) of the present day Pakistan is again caused by an authoritarian rule of civil-military bureaucracy which can be addressed by evolving and implementing a refined and improvised formula of power-sharing among all the constituting units of Pakistan.

Keywords: East Pakistan Crisis, Disintegration of Pakistan, Problems of Federalism

Introduction

The separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971 is the most significant event in the constitutional and political history of Pakistan. After the separation of the Eastern wing of Pakistan, some scholars have even challenged the very ideological foundations of Pakistan (as it was achieved by the Muslims of the subcontinent on the basis of the two nation theory that the Muslims were a different nation to the Hindus: "Its disintegration on 16 December 1971 was a historic verdict on the ideological foundation of Pakistan. Therefore, if the residual state was to survive it was to be a new Pakistan (Kumar, 1978)." The event of the establishment of Bangladesh has been discussed and analyzed by many scholars from different angles. It is not within the domain of this study to discuss all of these perspectives as we are mainly concerned with the aspect directly related to the problem of federalism in Pakistan.

Literature Review

Jahan (1972) discusses cultural and linguistic diversities and increasing economic disparity as the main causes of the failure in national integration in Pakistan. Sayeed (1980) enlists the economic, political and cultural exploitation and domination of East Pakistan by the western zone especially the Punjab, as the primary factors responsible for disintegration whereas Ahmad (1972), too, believes that all types of exploitations of East Pakistan by the ruling junta from the western zone led to the breakup of Pakistan. Mankeker (1971) has advocated that the idea of Pakistan on the basis of two nation theory was absurd and regarded the creation of Bangladesh as a logical development. Aziz (1974) has accused the Indian armed forces for their intervention in East Pakistan, killing many people belonging to the western zone, destroying their properties and causing the dismemberment of Pakistan by sheer force and naked aggression albeit in collaboration with the Bengali rebellious force "Mukti Bahini". Besides this, one can find numerous other titles which deal with the problem from different angles but this study has no reason to go into those details as it is focused at the problem of federalism and such causes of disintegration which are directly related to it.

Material and Methods

We shall discuss the problem in its three different aspects.

The geographical and historical aspects which give the details of how a single Muslim state of Pakistan emerged in 1947, joining two separated and distanced territories against many odds. In this part, we shall explain the historical background and the different efforts to create a separate state of Bengal in the 1940s which, as it appears, had made it essential for Pakistan from the very beginning to have a confederation or a loose federation among the two zones.

The second part contains the problem of federalism and the Centre-Province relationship in Pakistan with reference to East Pakistan and explains how the political leaders of the two zones failed to find an agreed solution to maintain a United Pakistan.

The third part gives the explanation based on the process and system analysis that how the federal problem could not be solved and the political system broke down in 1971. This part contains some details about the economic, cultural and political exploitation and domination of East Pakistan by the western zone albeit with reference to the process and system analysis approach related to the maintenance of a political system.

Results and Discussion

Part One

We begin with the geographical and historical aspect of the problem and shall start from 1937 onward when the Muslims in Bengal started developing the idea of Bengali Muslim nationalism as distinct from the Muslims in other parts of the subcontinent. It is interesting to note that Iqbal had realised the idea of Bengali Muslim nationalism in 1937 though the scholars (Sayeed, 1968) in the past have not only overlooked his contribution towards the idea of separate Bengali Muslim nationhood but rather have blamed him for leaving Bengal outside his Pakistan Scheme. He wrote to Jinnah as early as June 1937 describing the Muslims of northwest India and Bengal as different nations (Pirzada, 1966:162-3). So there is no justification for criticizing Iqbal for ignoring the Muslims of Bengal when he demanded in 1930 that a separate Muslim state should be established in the northwest of India. In fact, he had the concept of a separate Muslim nation in Bengal. This idea of Iqbal might have moved Khaliquzzaman, a Muslim League leader from central India, who in 1939 had an interview with Lord Zetland, the then Secretary of State for India

and pressed him that the British Government should form one Hindu and two Muslim dominions in India (See letter from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India dated February 21, 1940, India Office Library no. MUSS-EUSF-125-9). It is worth noting that Jinnah had knowledge of this three Dominion proposal (Khaliqzaman, 1961:205).

In 1940, came the historic Lahore Resolution which demanded that the northwestern and eastern zones of India being the Muslim majority regions should be grouped to establish independent states wherein the constituent components should be self-governing and sovereign (Ahmad, 1970:382). Again in 1942, Liaquat, while speaking in the central legislative Assembly, demanded the establishment of completely independent states in those areas where the Muslims were in a majority (Gandhi, 1944:360). Lord Ismay, who was on the staff of the Viceroy, revealed that Jinnah had told him twice that he contemplated for two distinct sovereign independent states (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 264).

It was not until 1944 that Jinnah during the Gandhi-Jinnah talks, declared that he stood for a single Muslim state. Subsequently the Resolution of 1940 was amended in 1946 at the All India Muslim League Legislators' Convention held in Delhi to demand a single sovereign independent state for the Muslims (Ahmad, 1970:491). This resolution was moved by Suhrawardy who was the Chief Minister of Bengal at that time. In this convention, Abul Hashim, the Secretary of the Bengal Muslim League raised the query of the variation from "States" to "State" but Jinnah overruled the objection and said that "States" was a misprint. Khaliqzaman and Nawab Ismail (both were the members of the working Committee of the All-India Muslim League) disagree with the contention that the word States was a misprint and believe that the Lahore Resolution having become the basic creed of the League, could not possibly be modified by a subsidiary forum functioning under its constitution and this change could only have been affected at an open sitting of the League which was never called (Khaliqzaman, 1961:343). This point should not detain us here anymore.

If we analyse the constitutional development which took place between 1940 and 1946, we can understand why the word "States" was substituted for "State". It was brought home to Jinnah by the Gandhi-Jinnah talks and the famous constitutional formula known as the Rajaji Formula (C. Rajagopalacharia, a member of the All-India National Congress who had also served as Premier of Madras during 1937-39, brought out a formula known as Rajaji Formula which provided a separate Muslim State more or less the same which came into being in 1947) that if he demanded partition of India founded on the two nation theory, then the Punjab and Bengal were bound to be partitioned on the same grounds. This could be the reason that he dropped the idea of two states and demanded a single Muslim state instead. After believing that Bengal would be partitioned Jinnah might have developed two apprehensions. Firstly, the British Government might not agree to creating a separate Muslim State in northeast India, containing only the rural slums of East Bengal, as they did not consider it to be a viable country. Secondly, Jinnah apprehended that Eastern Pakistan, being a very poor country not capable of self-defense and surrounded by the territory of the Indian Union, was prone to be absorbed by it. Our analysis is supported by the subsequent events in the political and constitutional history of undivided India when, at the verge of independence in early 1947, Jinnah agreed to the proposal of an independent united Bengal, nevertheless, it was not to become a Muslim state and was to be run by the mutual agreement of Hindus and Muslims of that area. It would also be useful to mention here what the Muslims of Bengal comprehended by the idea of Pakistan.

It appears from the freedom movement in Bengal that the Bengali Muslims did not support the idea of Pakistan out of any feeling of religious insecurity; nonetheless, they desired the establishment of a national state for Muslims in eastern India which would assure them of a system of administration, economy and policy free of Hindu domination. The history of the freedom movement in Bengal reveals that whereas the Bengali Muslims

were not willing to be dominated by Hindus, neither did they like sharing power with Muslims of other regions of India. Nazimuddin, a staunch supporter of Jinnah, had no misgivings in his mind about what Pakistan meant to the Muslims of Bengal. While writing to Wavell, Casey, the then Governor of Bengal, informed how he observed Nazimuddin's mind was working towards the idea of Pakistan. Casey wrote that, since the Muslim League conference at Lahore on 28 July (1944), the executive of the Bengal Muslim League had been employing their minds on the subject and Nazimuddin informed him (Casey) a few days ago that he would soon write to Jinnah about where they stood with regard to the borders of northeastern Pakistan; they wanted Bengal (less the Burdwan Division), all of Assam and a part of Purnea district in Bihar adjacent with northwest Bengal. Nazimuddin said that the centre had always been dominated by Bombay, Madras and the UP and that those provinces controlled Indian policy, to the disadvantage of Bengal hence that reality, coupled with the distressing intolerance as demonstrated by the congress Hindu Governments towards the Muslims, had urged them to insist on getting a sovereign state in northeast India which would be independent of the rest of India (Mansergh & Moon, 1974: Vol. V: Document 13). In a subsequent letter, Casey summed up the idea of "Eastern Pakistan" independent of the rest of India, as being based on the conviction that:

- 1) Bengal was and had always been a separate region.
- 2) It never enjoyed a "fair deal" from India.
- 3) All Indian politics and administration were excessively controlled by Bombay and Madras and the neighboring provinces of Delhi.

In the said letter, Casey concluded that the Bengalis were suffering from "Centrophobia" (Mansergh & Moon, 1974: Vol. V: Document 151).

It appears from the historical documents on the freedom movement in India, that the Bengali Muslims were against not only the domination of Indian affairs by other provinces, they also complained about the domination of the All-India Muslim league by the non-Bengalis and their interference in the local politics of Bengal. During a conflict between Jinnah and Fazlul Haq (the Chief Minister of Bengal in 1941-3) on the issue of the National Defence Council formed by the Viceroy, Fazlul Haq resigned from the working committee and the council of the All-India Muslim League. In the letter of resignation, he complained that the leadership of the All-India Muslim League had no respect for the principles of democracy and autonomy and were ruling over the fortune of 33 million Muslims of Bengal who occupied the key places in Indian political affairs (Ahmad, 1970:418-9). After Fazlul Haq made this protest, he was expelled from the Muslim League which also withdrew its support for his ministry, nevertheless he succeeded in winning the support of some other members to save his government. He who moved the famous Lahore Resolution in March 1940 was dubbed a traitor to the Muslim cause in 1941. It is interesting to note here that the names of the Muslim League leaders (except Fazlul Haq) who attended the Lahore Session of 1940 are written on the Minar-e-Pakistan (a tower erected as a memorial). The protest, resignation and expulsion of Fazlul Haq from the League was the indication that in the years to come the Bengali Muslims would not submit to any domination from outside and their destiny was not to be controlled and determined by the Muslims of central and northwestern India.

Although the key political leaders from Bengal like Nazimuddin, Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim were contemplating for a separate sovereign state of Bengal (Purba Pakistan), nevertheless these efforts were frustrated by the fact that Bengal would have to be partitioned and in that case, the British government had suggested that Bengal, excluding Hindu areas, could not be a viable independent sovereign state, which was considered as an implicit refusal on the part of the British Government to concede to the demand for Eastern

(Purba) Pakistan (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 553). This development led to the amendment of the Lahore Resolution in 1946, substituting the word "State" for "States."

But, in early 1947, the most significant development in the constitutional history of India took place, when the Bengali Muslim leaders worked out a plan for a separate state of Bengal, albeit a United Bengal ruled by the Muslims and Hindus together with mutual consent and agreement. It is significant to note that in order to have a separate homeland of their own, the Bengali Muslims abandoned the idea of a Muslim State and thus separated themselves from the Muslims of other provinces. It will be useful to go into some detail of the event which took place early in 1947 just before the partition of India.

In 1947, when Mountbatten replaced Wavell as the last Viceroy of India and it was announced by the British Government that they had planned to withdraw from India in the near future, the Muslim leaders in Bengal, as a last effort to save the unity of Bengal, approached the British authorities in the province as well as in Delhi and started negotiations with the Hindu leaders, both at the provincial and All-India level. Suhrawardy, the then Premier of Bengal, had a long discussion with the Governor and an interview with Mountbatten in the last week of April 1947. He told Mountbatten that he was trying to keep the Bengal unified on term that it would join neither Pakistan nor Hindustan (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 227). In his plan for a united Bengal separate from Pakistan and Hindustan, Suhrawardy had the blessings of both Jinnah and Gandhi. However, Nehru and Patel never approved such suggestion whereas Jinnah was out and out in favor of a united independent Bengal as recorded by Mountbatten during his interview with him (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 229).

Moreover, in the Viceroy's meeting on 1 May 1947, the future of Bengal came under discussion. The Governor of Bengal noted that the only way to achieve a united Bengal was the establishment of a strong coalition government immediately but he was unaware whether the Hindus would agree to such a coalition which would have no connection with the centre. The Viceroy proposed that Suhrawardy should be convinced to assure the joint electorates in the future, if the case of a united independent Bengal was approved. The Governor said that Suhrawardy had already agreed with this principle but was against reserving the seats (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 264).

In the succeeding three weeks of May 1947, when it was believed that the announcement of the partition plan was forthcoming in the beginning of June 1947, every effort was made by the Hindu and Muslim leaders of Bengal to keep their homeland united. In their efforts, they had the blessing and support of the British government and in the case of the Muslim leaders, they had the support of their high command as well. It was the All-India National Congress High Command (except Gandhi) who never liked the idea of a united independent Bengal. Mountbatten, during his visit to London in May 1947, cabled the Governor of Bengal that he believed that if, at that moment, Suhrawardy would renew his request for dominion status for Bengal, it might resist Congress leaders agreeing to a united Bengal while sensing that it would lessen the chances of Bengal joining the Union in future if they had independent Dominion status (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 509).

The Congress leadership from Bengal in collation with the provincial Muslim leadership tried to work out a plan for the United Sovereign Bengal and on 20th of May 1947 they agreed on some basic constitutional features of the would be "Free State of Bengal". Being cognizant to these developments, the then Governor of Bengal officially suggested the British cabinet to keep a provision for a third Dominion of Bengal while sorting out any plan for India's independence hence the papers arranged afterwards (in the end of May 1947) for the Cabinet meeting did contain a provision for three Dominions (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 553). When this development was taking place, Nehru declared that the Congress could accept the united Bengal only if it would remain within the Indian union (The News Chronicle, 27 May 1947) which was equally unacceptable to the All India Muslim

leadership and the Bengali Muslims who were against joining a Hindu dominated union, nevertheless, they were not adamant to join the Muslims of Northwestern India. Under these circumstances, the All-India Muslim League and the Bengal Muslim League announced that they did not support any such efforts which were being made for a united Bengal (See Star of India 29 May 1947, Morning News 30 May 1947. In its meeting on 28 May 1947, the working Committee of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League disowning the negotiated proposals gave Jinnah the authority to negotiate any future constitution). Even Abul Hashim declared that no one but Jinnah himself had the authority to negotiate for the Muslims of India whether they belonged to Bengal, Assam, Punjab, or Sindh (See statement of Abul Hashim in *The Statesman*, 28 May 1947). While carefully observing the situation from London, Mountbatten informed the Cabinet in its meeting held on 28 May 1947, that he had abandoned hope for a united independent Bengal (Mansergh & Moon, 1981: Vol. X: Document 553). Thus, the chapter of an independent united Bengal was closed and the Bengali Muslims now either had to join Pakistan along with the northwestern provinces or to join the Indian union but since they feared the latter more than the former hence they chose to join Pakistan, albeit with some reservations that they had their distinct culture, economy, language and social traditions in comparison with their western counterparts. Even as pro-Pakistan leader as Nazimuddin did not have any misgivings in his mind about it, when he issued a statement to the effect that the establishment of an independent sovereign Bengal was the ultimate aim of Bengal Muslims. It is important to note here that even after the partition of India, Suhrawardy stayed back in Calcutta still negotiating with the Hindu leaders about the possibility of an independent united Bengal (Khaliquzzaman, 1961:378).

Part Two

All this discussion does not aim to suggest that Pakistan in 1947 with two separated wings having only one thing in common, i.e. Islam against many other odds, did not stand a chance of being a viable political system, could not evolve a single statehood and ultimately a broad-based common nationhood. By discussing all these developments, we only intend to suggest that it could be the Federal solution alone which was best suited to the needs of the different provinces of Pakistan and could help them weld themselves into a viable and workable nation state. If in Europe, several countries (many of them had been at war with one another) can sit together and find some agreeable solution to their common problems, there is no reason why the five provinces of Pakistan which opted to form a sovereign state (albeit with some reservations) could not agree to some basic principles to form a national government while reserving some of their individual rights to themselves. But this could be done only in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation which guaranteed an acceptable measure of participation in the decision making process, and a political system free from the domination of one province by another.

Now we shall discuss how the political elite of the different provinces responded to the problem of federalism in Pakistan during 1947-71 and how they failed to find an agreeable solution to such problems which ultimately resulted in the separation of East Pakistan.

In the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, East Pakistan had a majority of seats in proportion to its larger population hence the members of the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan had greater responsibility regarding the framing of the constitution which would be widely acceptable to the other provinces, especially the much smaller provinces of Balochistan, NWFP and Sindh. It appears that the East Pakistanis failed to appreciate the situation, and did not realize how to fulfil the responsibility of being the largest unit in the would be federation of Pakistan. There is strong evidence in the constitutional history of Pakistan to support what has been said above in this paragraph. The first instance when this fact was brought home to the smaller provinces was the announcement of the first report of the Basic Principles Committee when the East Pakistani political elite and intelligentsia on

a large scale reacted against the proposals made by the committee. We do not suggest that the first report of the committee did not have any shortcomings and needed no improvement, but the basic and main objection made by the East Pakistanis was regarding its provision of equal representation to all the provinces in the Upper House and equal powers for both houses. They objected that their majority was to be reduced into a minority if the four smaller provinces of the Western zone were given representation in the Upper House equal to theirs, nevertheless, they had been given a majority in the Lower House in proportion to their larger population. The only genuine protest from them was regarding the recognition of the Bengali language as one of the official languages of Pakistan. After the first report was rejected by the East Pakistanis and withdrawn by the central government in 1950, another report known as the second report was produced by the committee in 1952.

According to this report, the Lower house had an equal membership of 200 from East Pakistan and 200 from the four provinces of the western zone while in the Upper House, East Pakistan being a single unit as compared to the several units from the western zone, had equal membership of 60 against all of them combined. Under this scheme, the East Pakistanis had to surrender 6% of their representation in the Lower House as they constituted 56% of the total population of Pakistan but in the Upper House they being only one unit of the would be federation against several units from the western zone, were given equal membership. Moreover, the Upper House according to these proposals had little power as the real authority was vested in the Lower House, thus creating a majority controlled central government dominated by the East Pakistanis. This report was welcomed by the East Pakistanis but created a considerable resentment in the Punjab and other smaller provinces, which objected that in the Upper House they had been treated as equal against a single unit of East Pakistan and moreover, the Upper House had no real powers. To them, this was a clear negation of the federal principle which was bound to form the basis of the constitution. For practical reasons, the Punjab feared that East Pakistan being a single and homogeneous unit having 50% membership in either house could get anything through the legislature winning a couple of members from the western zone, while the different units of the western zone were heterogeneous and could not combine in the legislature as a united group. In East Pakistan, the second report had a favourable reaction which made the smaller provinces of the western zone believe that East Pakistanis wanted to dominate the central government under the future constitutional arrangement. One thing appears from the constitutional history of Pakistan that the political elite from East Pakistan demanded contradictory constitutional arrangements. On the one hand, they wanted an unprecedented amount of provincial autonomy for their province (right from 1947 up to 1971 when Bangladesh came into being, the Bengalis advocated for a constitutional arrangement which provided only defence and foreign affairs for the federal govt., securing all the residuary powers for the provinces. For details, refer to the "Six Points" advocated by Mujib) while on the other hand they desired their majority rule on the central level which was incompatible with the principles of federalism. The constitutional problem in 1971 was the continuation of this contradiction and will be discussed later in this study. As a result of the resentment against the second report in the Punjab, the task of constitution making was postponed for the second time.

It will be interesting to mention here a peculiar development which changed the political situation in the country when the civil-military coalition tempted by the indecisiveness of the political elite and their failure to agree to a constitutional arrangement in 6 years decided to give the country a constitutional order of their own which could facilitate their assertion in the decision making structure. The civil and military bureaucracy was overwhelmingly dominated by the Punjabis and the Muhajirs from central India who had cast their lot with the people of the western zone. In 1947, out of 133 Muslim officers belonging to the Indian civil service and Indian political service who opted for Pakistan there was only one officer from East Pakistan (Sayeed, 1967:132) and by 1955 in the central

government West Pakistan had 19 officers at the Secretary level while East Pakistan had none. Moreover, West Pakistan had 38 Joint Secretaries in the central government against 3 from East Pakistan. As far as the military elite was concerned there was a little representation from East Pakistan. In 1955, East Pakistan had 14 senior army officers as against 894 from West Pakistan, while in the Navy and Air Force East Pakistanis had 7 and 60 officers respectively as against 593 and 640 officers from West Pakistan (for the figures of the top rank civil servants see Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates Vol.1, January 17, 1956, P.1844 and for the figures of military elite see the Daily Dawn, Karachi, January 8, 1955). It is interesting to note here that till 1971 there was only one East Pakistani officer who could become a Lt. General in the Pakistan army. In the absence of a constitution when the country was being ruled under the Government of India Act of 1935 and the independence act of 1947, it was the Governor General who had the real power and this post was captured by the bureaucracy after the death of Liaquat when Ghulam Muhammad, a bureaucrat, was appointed as the Governor General of Pakistan. It was obvious for the West Pakistani bureaucracy and military elite that only under a Viceregal system could they manage to keep the balance of power on their side and thus they could make the majority of East Pakistan ineffective by creating an administrative state instead of a political state. The military and civil bureaucracy remained overwhelmingly dominated by West Pakistanis, nevertheless, the number of officers from East Pakistan had increased during the years but being more junior in the services, they did not hold any key positions and were ineffective in the services which were highly centralised and the decision making power was vested in the officers at the top. One cannot rule out the possibility that the political elite from the Punjab were taken into confidence by the civil and military coalition to establish a system dominated by the civil and military bureaucracy as the Punjabis were not prepared to accept majority rule by the East Pakistanis.

The first encounter between the East Pakistan political elite and the Punjabi bureaucrat came in 1953 when Ghulam Muhammad, the then Governor General supported by the Army Chief, General Ayub, dismissed the Bengali Prime Minister, Nazimuddin, who had recently got his budget through the legislature. The East Pakistani members of the legislature (who had a majority) did not resist the act of the Governor General by rejecting his appointed Prime Minister and did not save Nazimuddin by expressing their confidence in him as the leader of the House. The new Prime Minister Bogra was the Ambassador in the USA until his new assignment and was not even a member of the legislature. The East Pakistani Parliamentary majority supported the new Prime Minister and many of them who were serving in the Nazimuddin cabinet joined the new Cabinet under Bogra. Apparently it was Nazimuddin who had lost his job, but in fact it was the political elite who had lost their power to the clique of military and civil bureaucracy which was destined to give the country a Viceregal system (Ayub Khan has confessed that the Governor General had his blessing in dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954. See Khan, M.A. (1967) *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography*. Lahore: Oxford University Press. In the subsequent Cabinet, Ayub held a portfolio in spite of his being the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army) which would keep the balance of power on their side while the people and political elite had the least participation under such a system.

The new Prime Minister Bogra attempted to solve the constitutional problem. His proposals known as the "Muhammad Ali Formula" were presented to the Constituent Assembly in October 1953 and were adopted by it. The Formula provided for two houses with equal powers. The Lower House was to be elected by the people on the basis of one man one vote i.e. East Pakistan had 165 members in the house of 300, thus acknowledging their majority of the population. The Upper House had fifty members who were divided in the following manner:

- | | |
|-----------------|----|
| 1) East, Bengal | 10 |
| 2) Punjab | 10 |

3) Northwest Frontier Province, Frontier States and Tribal Areas.	10
4) Sindh and Khairpur State.	10
5) Balochistan and Balochistan States Union.	3
6) Capital of Federation (Karachi)	3
7) State of Bahawalpur.	4
	50

We have some original criticisms of the Formula. Firstly, under this Formula, Balochistan did not have equal representation in the Upper House, having only 3 seats out of 50. On the other hand, the Punjab and Sindh had 14 and 13 seats respectively as Bahawalpur State nonetheless being a part of the Punjab was given 4 seats from the quota of Balochistan and similarly Karachi being a part of Sindh had an additional 3 seats as the capital of the federation at the cost of the representation from Balochistan. If this anomaly had been done away with, this Formula was still not an improvement on the first report of BPC which had been rejected by the East Pakistanis in 1950. The only difference between the two was that the Bogra Formula fixed the strength of the two houses while BPC report did not.

Secondly, the Formula was presented and known as a 'Parity Formula' between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. This was again an attempt by the East Pakistanis to deny the separate identity of the different units of West Pakistan and treat them as a single block against East Pakistan. Simply, this was a federal formula and an arrangement which offered the majority of the representation to East Pakistan in the Lower House and equal representation to all the provinces in the Upper House. The Upper House had equal powers to that of the Lower House which guaranteed that the interests of the smaller units would be safeguarded. In fact, this was a real federal arrangement acceptable to all the units; nevertheless, if both the Houses were combined, East Pakistan had equal representation to that of all the units of West Pakistan but there was no point in stressing that it brought parity between West Pakistan and East Pakistan, because West Pakistan had 9 units and they had their own different interests and priorities. Our criticism of the expression of parity in the formula is supported by the subsequent events, which took place in the constitutional and political history of Pakistan.

Its first repercussion was that by an act of the legislature, the separate identity of the different units of West Pakistan was done away with and a single province of West Pakistan was established to be dominated by the Punjabis who constituted the 2/3 majority of the new province. So, as far as West Pakistan was concerned, Pakistan became a unitary state after the establishment of the one unit. Secondly, its most significant repercussion was that in 1956 when the first Constitution was framed and passed by the Constituent Assembly, the provision of the Upper House was dropped and a unicameral legislature consisting of equal members from East Pakistan and West Pakistan was established and thus Pakistan instead of having a federal constitution, moved towards a unitary form of government. The constitution of 1956 denied East Pakistan their right of being a majority province and it denied the different units of West Pakistan their separate identity and were amalgamated into a single administrative system.

We can analyse why the East Pakistanis accepted this unicameral legislature in which they had only 50% representation. In fact, they were apprehensive from the very beginning of the weightage of the representation of the 9 units of West Pakistan in the Upper

House under a real federal arrangement. The civil military coalition which wanted to create a system of its own, took full advantage of the apprehensions of East Pakistanis. When Bogra formula was adopted by the constituent Assembly as a guideline for the constitution and the constitution was coming forthwith, the ruling elite found themselves in an unfavourable situation and the movement and passage of a bill in the legislature to curtail the powers of the Governor General proved to be the last shock for the civil military coalition. Their answer came in the shape of another autocratic and arbitrary act by the Governor General and that was to dissolve the First Constituent Assembly in October 1954 which was the only elected and sovereign body in the country. This stopped the process of constitution making in Pakistan on the basis of the said formula. It appears that if the first report of the BPC had been accepted in its improved version, it would have led the country to a different political and constitutional path, but it was too late in 1954 when the civil-military coalition had established itself and did not want to transfer the power to the political elite of the country in general and of East Pakistan in particular. Afterwards, the ruling Junta first tried to establish the province of West Pakistan by an executive decree and when stopped by the Federal court, got it done through the act of the legislature which nevertheless had a majority of members from East Pakistan. The East Pakistanis were divided into two rival groups and the executive exploited this and both of them supported the plans of the executive i.e. the establishment of the one unit in West Pakistan and the passage of the 1956 constitution and in return got nothing and thus they lost their power to the civil military coalition which was colonial in its structure and nature and desired to establish a Viceregal system. This history of exploitation of the East Pakistanis by the then ruling Junta has been revealed by Rashidi in July-November 1985 in his elaborated article of how Fazlul Haq, who was a candidate for the Presidency under the 1956 constitution, was offered the temptation that if he withdrew and supported Sikander Mirza (of the army elite) for that post, he should get the Governorship of East Pakistan and his party would be invited to form the ministry in the province (See Ali Muhammad Rashidi's Series of Articles "Mujeeb did not insist on disintegrating Pakistan" appearing in the Daily Jang (Urdu) London, dated June 13, June 25, July 10, July 22, July 27, August 2, August 30, September 19, October 13 and Oct. 31, 1985).

Under the 1956 constitution which was approved by the majority of the members from East Pakistan, a strong central government was established in which the President appointed the Prime Minister, could dismiss him and could dissolve the legislature. Moreover, he appointed the Governors in the Provinces who acted on his behalf and they had the power to appoint and dismiss the Chief Ministers and could dissolve the provincial legislatures under the instructions of the President. From 1956 to 1958 the central Government dismissed and formed as many provincial governments as they desired and many times the President bargained with the Bengali members of the central legislature that if they supported his appointed government in the centre, he could appoint a Chief Minister of their choice in East Pakistan. This happened when the Suhrawardy group supported the central government and in return, had their man as Chief Minister in East Pakistan.

When the political elite realised this situation that they had no real role to play in the decision making process and were just playing into the hands of the executive, they took two steps. Firstly, they passed a resolution against the establishment of the one unit in West Pakistan and prepared a draft proposal to amend the constitution according to the new situation thus curtailing the powers of the President. The first general elections were scheduled to be held in 1959 and the civil military coalition could foresee that after the general elections were held, they would be ousted from power as the political elite had decided to replace Iskander Mirza and elect a politician as the new President, albeit with lesser powers. As a last resort, the President proclaimed a state of emergency in the country, Kalat State was accused of launching a separatist movement and armed forces were sent there and ultimately in October 1958, the armed forces which had been neglected during the last couple of years as a shareholder in the power structure, stepped in while proclaiming to be the sole distributors of goods among the frustrated and quarrelling

politicians and managed to impose martial law in the country through the civilian President in the name of the solidarity and integrity of Pakistan. Soon afterwards, Iskander Mirza was ousted by General Ayub who accused the politicians of corruption and of creating instability and chaos in the country. In fact, the politicians had no power to create stability or instability, chaos or order. They were rather exploited and corrupted by the civil military coalition who wanted at any cost to retain their power which they had managed to gain through the years.

General Ayub ruled the country under Martial law for about four years (1958-1962) when he imposed a unitary presidential system under the 1962 constitution. Under this constitution, the President was all powerful and was not responsible to the legislature. He could not be removed by the legislature on political grounds but could dissolve it. The Governors and the Ministers were his personal agents and were not responsible to any elected body. The Governor, though being an agent of the President, was as powerful in the province as the President at the centre which led to the autocratic rule by the President alone (Sayeed, 1967:101-26; also see Sayeed, K. B. "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy" in *Pacific Affairs* no.36 (Winters 1963-64) pp. 365-77). This constitution introduced an indirect system of elections called the Basic Democracy System. The members elected as Basic Democrats constituted the electoral college for the provincial and national Assemblies and the President.

The country was governed under this autocratic, unitary system for about 11 years till 1969 which created a high degree of tension, frustration and resentment among the Bengalis. The Ayub regime used military and civil bureaucracy as its power bastion and as the Bengalis were the least represented in these services, they felt so much deprived of their right to participate in the country's affairs that it amounted to being the same for them as the continuation of the Viceregal colonial rule (David Dunbar has called it internal colonial system. See his paper "Pakistan, The Failure of Political negotiations "in *Asian Survey*, Vol. XII, No.5 May 1972. Also see Raunaq Jahan, "Bangladesh in 1972 Nation Building in a new State" in *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII No.2, February, 1973), albeit by their own countrymen from the other zone. The Bengali members in the National Assembly made lengthy speeches and complained about their lack of participation in the country's affairs and in response, Ayub Khan suggested that East Pakistan should secede (Munir, 1980:92-3; also see above referred Ali Muhammad Rashidi) but the proposal was not accepted by the East Pakistanis.

This was the period when the Awami League of Mujib formulated its "Six Points Scheme". It was alleged by the Government that the scheme had come from India and some Hindu philosophers were working against the unity of Pakistan, but there is no reliable evidence to suggest that; rather if we go through the freedom movement in India, we find little difference between the Six Points and the terms of offer for the acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by Jinnah in 1946 (Ahmad, 1970:507-14). The only difference between the two is that the Six Points provided a paramilitary force for the provinces which Jinnah's statement did not. Mujib was arrested and convicted for a conspiracy known as the Agartala conspiracy for advocating the secession of East Pakistan in 1966 and his Six Points were dubbed as a charter for the dismemberment of Pakistan (it is believed that these Six Points were prepared by the Ayub regime and handed over to Mujib. See an article in the daily *Jang* (Urdu) London dated 21 Oct. 1985 by a retired senior military officer, Brig. Shamsul Haq. Also see above-referred Ali Muhammad Rashidi). Mujib was detained until the end of 1968 when the people of West Pakistan as well as East Pakistan lost their patience and a countrywide agitation and protest against the autocracy and dictatorship of the Ayub regime was launched. The people demanded the restoration of a parliamentary federal system with maximum autonomy for the provinces.

During this period, the opposition political parties formed a front known as the United Democratic Front (UDF) which demanded the dismemberment of the one unit in West Pakistan and the restoration of the old units. Moreover, they demanded the abolition

of the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan and the establishment of a federal parliamentary form of government. However, one should not ignore the demand of Mujib's Awami League during this period as it led to the constitutional and political crisis after the general elections of 1970.

When Ayub Khan was holding a Round Table Conference with the UDF, the Awami League issued a constitutional formula which provided for the federal government the subjects of defence, foreign affairs, currency and a nominal state bank. The formula provided further for two autonomous states in East and West Pakistan with a unicameral legislature at the centre. According to the formula, the amendments in the constitution were to be done by a simple majority (see the Pakistan Times Rawalpindi, 25 March 1969. For details also see Zafar, S.M. (1970). *Through the Crisis*. Lahore: Book Centre). The most significant of the Six Points of the Awami League was that it did not provide the federal government with the power to raise any funds by means of taxation which was not compatible with the federal principle. Under a federal system, the constitution marks the boundaries of jurisdiction both of the federal and provincial governments and each of them possesses authority to perform certain activities. An arrangement whereby the federal government has the authority to maintain certain institutions but without the ability to raise the necessary resources to do the same is inconceivable. Such a constitutional arrangement is in fact a confederation which may receive some funds from the member states.

Ayub Khan did not concede to the demands of the UDF and stepped down after transferring power to the armed forces proclaiming Martial Law. Yahya Khan, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, promised a free and fair election in the near future and he admitted that East Pakistan and the smaller units of West Pakistan had genuine grievances about exploitation and lack of participation in the decision making process. He either lacked vision and was ignorant of political and constitutional problems and their background, or otherwise, made several logical and technical mistakes. This study is not concerned with why he made such mistakes-- we just have to analyse how his policies under the Legal Framework Order (LFO) created a constitutional and political crisis which was exploited by the political elite of the East and West Pakistan alike and how he presided over the dismemberment of Pakistan. We do not suggest that had he not made these mistakes, Pakistan would have been saved from disintegration and the possibility cannot be ruled out that what happened in 1971 could have happened in 1970 albeit in a different manner then.

The LFO of Yahya which in fact was the constitutional order at that time, suffered from many lacunae. It laid down that the constitution framed by the constituent Assembly which would come into existence after the general elections, should guarantee the integrity and solidarity of Pakistan and must preserve the Islamic concept of the state. This was an ambiguous and debatable condition. Further, he reserved the power of authentication of the constitution to himself while he was not public representative and he himself proclaimed that he was a caretaker and his government was a stopgap arrangement. Moreover, he dissolved the one unit in West Pakistan restoring the old four provinces and declared that the next elections would be held on the basis of one man, one vote.

When the general elections under the said LFO were held in December 1970, the Awami League contested 162 (total seats) seats from East Pakistan and 7 from West Pakistan and they won 160 seats but all from East Pakistan. The most significant point is that the Awami League contested this election on the manifesto of its Six Points. In West Pakistan's four provinces, out of a total of 138 seats, the Pakistan Peoples Party of Bhutto won 81 seats, thus forming the second largest group in the constituent assembly. As soon as the elections were over, Mujib as the leader of the victorious Awami League, declared that the future constitution of Pakistan be on the basis of his Six Points. He regarded his victory in the elections as a referendum on the Six Points and declared that there was no room for compromise and adjustment in this regard (See the Pakistan Times, 4 January 1971). He said that the Awami League had the mandate to give its constitution to the country, being

the majority party, and added that the constitution had already been drafted by the Awami League and it should be presented in the National Assembly and would be passed by it as his party had 167 members (160 general seats and 7 women seats) out of a total membership of 313.

At this point, Mujib ignored the fact that he was the leader of a majority party in the National Assembly which had to frame a constitution not for a unitary form of government, but a federal one, and thus showed a total disregard for the consent and acceptance of such a constitution by the other federating units. He took advantage of the lacuna in the LFO which was silent about the procedure of the framing of the constitution; neither did it provide for a second house, nor did it specify that the constitution must be framed with the consent of all the federating units.

It seems desirable that the chief martial law administrator should have put the condition that no constitution could be framed unless it was acceptable to all the federating units instead of reserving the power of the authentication for himself which was arbitrary and questionable. We can offer an explanation why Yahya did so. It seems that keeping in view the previous party politics and their fragmentation, he supposed that the forthcoming constituent assembly would be a hotchpotch of different opposing groups with none of them having a substantial representation in the said assembly enabling him (Yahya) to preside over such a constitution making body which would not reach any agreement in 120 days which was his specified period of constitution making and failing to do so, he would dissolve the constituent assembly and then would give his own constitution as he attempted to do during the period of constitutional deadlock from March 1971 to December 1971 when he had to quit. But his estimate went awry as out of the total membership of the body i.e. 313, the Awami League had 167 and the PPP had 87 members, leaving behind only 59 seats which were won by other political parties and the independent candidates. Keeping in view the federal principle, even if these two political parties had agreed on a constitution, such a constitution would not have been workable as neither of these two parties had any representation in two of the five federating units, i.e. Balochistan and the NWFP unless the representatives from these two provinces had given their consent to any such constitution.

But what happened was quite different. The Awami League in the absence of any agreed basic principles for constitution making exploited the situation and insisted on giving their own constitution when they had not even a single representative from the four federating units of the western zone. The Awami League was talking of two opposites. A federation with unprecedented autonomy for the provinces but, at the same time, imposition of its framed constitution over the four minority provinces, thus establishing its majority rule on the central level. Bhutto seemed to be quite justified when he complained about the uncompromising attitude of Mujib and protested against the domination of the provinces of the western zone by East Pakistan. He wrote that his party wanted a true federation but Sheikh Mujibur Rehman rejected even the idea of a second House, irrespective of its powers, notwithstanding that there was no federation in the world without a second House (Bhutto, 1971:18).

How the Yahya regime responded to the situation of this constitutional deadlock between the two major political parties (one representing East Pakistan and the other representing the Punjab and Sind) does not come within the scope of this study which is related to the federal solution only and not to other solutions. As far as the federal solution is concerned it appears that in 1971 once again, as in the early 1950s, the Bengalis made it difficult for the other federating units to accept a constitution which established Bengali majority rule at the central level; nevertheless, their proposed constitutional arrangement offered maximum provincial autonomy to the provinces. The deadlock was not solved and the Yahya regime went for an army action in East Pakistan and ultimately in December 1971, Pakistan after 24 years of its existence, split into two independent states of Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Part Three

Sociologists and political scientists have mentioned the process, modes and means of integration in different societies as well as the causes of how and why these societies and nations disintegrate. From Aristotle to David Easton, Almond and Powell, Pye and Huntington, every political scientist has mentioned the causes of failure of a political system and disintegration of nations. What Aristotle called the causes of revolutions, David Easton has named as failure of the output system. What made the acceptance of the federal solution difficult in 1971 and made the Bengalis adopt an uncompromising and inflexible attitude was the result of the failure of the output function in Pakistan's social and political system for the last 24 years; nevertheless, it was no one else but the Bengali elite themselves who had helped certain forces from the western zone to dominate the power structure and ultimately exploit the Bengalis and the smaller units in the western zone to their own advantage (the Parliamentary majority of the Bengalis appointed a bureaucrat as the Governor General. Then they accepted the dismissal of Nazimuddin and accepted a Prime Minister who was imposed by the Governor General. Then the Bengali Prime Minister signed the order to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and Suhrawardy as the Law Minister appeared before the Federal Court to justify the act of the Governor General to dissolve the Assembly which was challenged by the Speaker. Then the Bengali Parliamentary group elected Iskander Mirza as the President under the 1956 constitution. They supported the One Unit Scheme in West Pakistan and introduced the parity system and thus established a powerful central government which facilitated the autocratic rule of the civil military bureaucracy).

The succeeding paragraphs aim to study the system, process and policy approach regarding the problem of national integration in Pakistan and its ultimate dismemberment. Almond and Powell have mentioned five types of political outputs in a political system. They are the Extractive, Regulative, Distributive, Symbolic and Responsive capabilities or performances of the political system in the domestic and international environments. Now we have to discuss the working of the political system in Pakistan with reference to these capabilities as applied to East Pakistan as a part of this political system from 1947-71.

The Extractive performance of the political system can be measured by the kinds of objects extracted, by the amount extracted, and by the groups affected by such extraction (Almond & Powell, 1987:286). In this type of performance in the case of East Pakistan, the political system in Pakistan was quite efficient right from the beginning and it was East Pakistan which was affected by the extractive performance more than any other province at the hands of the central government which earned the largest part of its revenue and foreign exchange from the jute and tea crops of East Pakistan. Until 1969, East Pakistan had exported goods worth Rs.1650 crores and had imported goods worth 1210 crores while West Pakistan had exported goods worth Rs.1337 crores and imported goods worth Rs.3109 crores (See Mujibur Rehman's speech in the Round Table Conference held by Ayub Khan (Feb-March 1969) on 10 March 1969, Published in the Pakistan Times 11 March 1969; also see Zafar, 1970). The policy of the central government meant that they extracted more revenue from East Pakistan but spent less on it as compared to its due share in the revenue collected by the central government.

But one cannot ignore the fact that extractive and distributive performances are interdependent and interrelated more than any other two types of performances. In the case of East Pakistan, there was a considerable gap between these two types of performances. The political system was very efficient in its extractive capability while its performance in distributive capability was very poor in East Pakistan, as what was extracted from the Bengalis was being distributed among others (Saeed, 1980: 65-82). For instance, during the year 1959-60 per capita income in West Pakistan was Rs.355 as against Rs.269 in East Pakistan and the ratio of disparity came to 1.32 while in the year 1969-70 it was Rs.504 and 314 respectively increasing the ratio of disparity from 1.32 to 1.61 in ten years' time

(Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, report of the Panel of Economists on the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75, Islamabad, May 1970, P.2). The reason was that the bulk of expenditure of the central budget i.e. 70% went on defence and civil administration, and as the major part of the armed forces and other agencies of the central government were stationed in West Pakistan, the central government spent most of its budget in West Pakistan, thus ignoring the welfare of the Bengalis. As regards the foreign aid, the central government utilized 80% of it in West Pakistan, the major part of it being spent on the armed forces, civil administration and industrial projects in West Pakistan. The annual report on disparity for the year 1968 placed before the national assembly recorded that the disparity had continued to increase. By 1969, power generating capacity in West Pakistan was 5 to 6 times higher than East Pakistan; the number of beds in West Pakistan's hospitals estimated at 26,200 as against 6000 in East Pakistan and East Pakistan had only 18 polytechnic institutions as against 48 in West Pakistan (see the above-referred speech of Mujibur Rehman in Round-Table Conference of March 1969). The distributive performance in the system was controlled and dominated by the civil and military bureaucracy belonging to West Pakistan which always preferred West Pakistan for development and progress (Wilson & Dalton, 1982:111-130; Sayeed, 1980:65-82).

This created grievances among the Bengalis against the central government and East Pakistan, being already a rural slum, remained far behind the other provinces in the western zone. The disparity which had been inherited from the British Raj increased to a substantial level in two decades. The British Government had admitted its failure regarding the distributive performance in Bengal before they left the subcontinent (we can quote here two documents from the record of the British Government: 1-See Wavell to HM the King Emperor dated 4 January 1944. India Office Library no. MSS/EUR D/977/1, and 2- Mansergh & Moon, 1974: Vol. V: 637-42).

After the creation of Pakistan, the ruling elite did not appreciate how important it was to cope with this problem in Bengal, rather they adopted such policies which made the situation worse. Distributive performance is also related to other values, such as status, prestige or sense of community and safety. As far as the status, or the prestige is concerned, the ruling elite had badly failed in such distribution; the Bengalis generally believed that the West Pakistani elite had a very low opinion of them (see Aatur Rehman Khan's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, C.A. Debates, Vol. I, 1955, P.530).

The distributive performance also relates to the sense of community and safety among the people. In this regard, the ruling elite failed as well because the war of 1965 between India and Pakistan brought home to the Bengalis that the Islamabad Government had no capability to defend East Pakistan against any foreign aggression which caused resentment and frustration among the Bengalis. As far as the regulative performance of the political system was concerned, the Bengalis found the central government very efficient. The major portion of the administration came from the western zone and any type of agitation or protest was dealt with by coercive means. It leads us to the conclusion that the system was not responsive to the demands of East Pakistan and failed in properly responding to the demands of East Pakistan. Whenever there was a protest or complaint, it was not responded to, and was met with an iron hand by the central government.

The last type of performance is symbolic which refers to political speech, political rite and ritual and political iconography. Much of the speech of political leaders takes the form of appeals to historical memory, the courage, boldness, wisdom and magnanimity embodied in the nation's past, or to ideological values like equality, liberty and community (Almond & Powell, 1987:286). There was a total failure on the part of the ruling elite in the case of symbolic performance. They considered the Bengalis inferior, not good Muslims and speaking a Hindu language. During the Ayub regime, the broadcast of Tagore's songs or poems was banned over Dacca Radio and the importation of Bengali books from Calcutta was prevented. This hatred of Bengali culture, language and values by the ruling elite

created a counter-hatred among the Bengalis as they were very sensitive about their cultural and social values (Sen, 1976:179).

It appears from this analysis that whereas the political system of Pakistan succeeded in its extractive and regulative performances extra-efficiently and up to the resentment and grievances of the Bengalis, it utterly failed in its distributive, responsive and symbolic performances which amounted to realization of internal colonialism among the Bengalis by the ruling elite of West Pakistan which ultimately resulted in the dismemberment of the country in 1971.

Conclusion

Though these steps were just in accordance with the popular demand, but had he studied the constitutional history of Pakistan, he would not have acceded to these demands in an unqualified manner. He should have realised that the same five provinces from 1947-54 had a disagreement about the proportion of their representation in the Upper House and the powers of the Upper House, whereas the Awami League from East Pakistan was determined to have a unicameral legislature which simply amounted to the principle of the rule of majority in the future constitutional arrangement. Had he believed as he said that Pakistan's problems needed a federal solution and desired that this problem be solved, he should have taken the following measures.

- 1) He should have negotiated with the Awami League to amend its Six Points to suit a federal form of government and otherwise should not have allowed it to contest the election on the basis of these Six Points as its manifesto.
- 2) He must have provided for the election of a bicameral constituent assembly/legislature with the Upper House having equal representation from every province as it was agreed upon according to the Muhammad Ali Formula.
- 3) As he knew that on the basis of one man one vote, East Pakistan would have the majority in the National Assembly, he must have put a condition that no constitution could be framed and passed unless at least 75% of the members from every province in each house had voted for any such constitution.

Had he taken all these measures, there could be two possibilities. Either the Awami League would have amended its Six Points according to the principles of federalism and would have accepted the right of the smaller provinces to give their consent to the future constitution. If the Awami League and the other parties had contested the elections on the conditions mentioned above, there would have been no arguments and fights outside the Assembly as happened after the elections and Bhutto would have no excuse not to enter the Assembly and create a mess outside. On the other hand, if the Awami League would have refused to amend its Six Points and to contest the elections on the basis of the proposed conditions, there were ample chances that, in the case of boycotting the elections, the Awami League would not have enjoyed the popular support of the Bengalis especially of those who believed in reason and via media for solving the political problem as it did after contesting and winning the election on the basis of the six points. Moreover, the political elite of Balochistan and NWFP who were supporting Mujib after the election would have realised that Mujib's constitution was destined to impose East Pakistan's majority on the smaller provinces of Pakistan.

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