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Arab Israel Conflict: Historical Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Since its inception, Israel has been a bone of contention in the Arab region. Several wars have been fought between Israel and Arabs that have resulted in irregularities, power dynamics and instability in the region. The wars between the Israel and the Arab world made the Israel stronger. To stop these wars, several peace agreements have also been made but in vain. All this added to make the politics of the Middle East more complex and crisis factory. Now with the changing dynamics of the modern world, the dynamics within the politics of Arab region have also changed. Multiple international actors and states are involved in Middle East politics which make more complex and difficult to solve for Palestine and other Arab states including Israel. In this article, author used the historical analysis to find the answer of Arab Israel conflict. For this purpose, secondary data and qualitative research used.

Keywords: Abraham Accord, Arab, Israel, Middle Eastern Politics, Palestine, War

Introduction

One must look at the complicated history that led to the current scenario while considering the current tensions between Israelis and Palestinians on the Jordan River and the Mediterranean territory. Some people see the initial conflict between Isaac and Ishmael, the biblical founders of the two tribes, as the rivalry of an older sibling vying for the first Abrahamic blessing. By characterizing group interactions as a political contest for territory and sovereignty, some have decreased the possibility that they have evolved during the past century.

A story begins where historical events have shaped how people see one another today. The group's collective memory explains the incident's protagonist and antagonist and provides evidence for the current course of action. Due to land's hallowed role in Jewish and Islamic religions, there is debate over its legitimacy and potential religious significance.

Abraham Accord might be utilized to establish the relationship between the two groups. However, before concentrating on what transpired following the Zionist gathering, this research will first provide a brief overview of the region's historical development under Ottoman Empire rule (Norlen & Sinai, 2020).

The organization's first Zionist Congress was held in 1897. As the beginning of a growing Jewish and Palestinian involvement in the Palestinian territories, 1897 is a suitable place to start. There are now more Jews than ever before thanks to the Zionist movement's effort to found a new Jewish state in the Palestinian regions under Ottoman rule. Other subjects relating to Jewish immigration to the Palestinian Territories, the conflict's history, and the war in Lebanon are covered in this chapter. Also discussed will be the conflict of 1967. Israel's wins and territorial gains during the conflict improved its reputation as a

Middle Eastern state that is habitable. The 1967 war is the pinnacle of that research, therefore. Over the past 45 years, nations and authorities have defended or contested the geographical lines that the conflict drew. On both sides, the legality of correspondence delivered before or after 1967 has received careful consideration from negotiators and attorneys (Fischbach, 2020).

The current relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is based on historical events that illuminate important aspects of the conflict. By looking at the historical details of each event, this chapter attempts to analyze how each group understands the important events that played a significant role in the current situation. Both the Israeli perspective and Israeli history have been studied. In order to clarify the different perspectives of the two sides, the conflicting facts and events in the Palestinian perspective will be emphasized and photographed, which are acceptable dates for both sides of the conflict. The work is also focus on the role of American and European powers in these situations and their impartiality in making important decisions. Each actor's turn, as well as the topics he has discussed before, influences the argument. With important historical events in mind, this study will then examine policy choices in the light of the citizens' beliefs and opinions in question (Hirsch & Miller, 2021).

The Creation of Israel: War of 1948

In addition to resolving the basic concerns that gave rise to the conflict between Israel and the Arab world, the founding of Israel and the conflict of 1948–1949 had historical roots. Due to its own economic issues in Palestine and the challenges it had in carrying out its colonial obligations in 1947, the British administration was compelled to acknowledge that it could not honour its commitments after World War II. It was delivered to the newly established United Nations. The General Assembly established the UNSCOP, an 11-member Special Committee on Palestine, to review the situation and offer recommendations after the United Nations was dissolved.

The group gathered information from numerous Middle Eastern groups. The recently established Palestinian Arab High Committee declined to participate in a meeting with the Jewish Agency because it considered that Arab rights were unambiguous. With Britain demanding a two-year transitional phase, the committee overwhelmingly adopted a partition proposal for the Jewish and Arab governments in the General Assembly in August 1947. Jewish sources claimed that despite the report's shortcomings, the Jewish agency recognized the majority of the land while the Arabs rejected any suggestion of a division. The UN Ad Hoc Committee presented a new partition plan to the General Assembly after 34 meetings to evaluate UNSCOP's recommendations, with around 55 percent of the Palestinian area going to Israel and 45 percent to the Arab state. The Jewish state has acknowledged Contributed Jerusalem as an international region governed by the UN (UNO, 2001).

In order to eradicate the remaining elements and secure the continuation of Zionism and Palestinian Arabism, he suggested revoking the UN partition resolution. Palestinian militias attacked Jewish cities, towns, and villages as the ALA began its offensive. Argan and Hagna had an unpleasant feeling. The fight against terrorism started in the major towns and quickly moved to the countryside. Each side reacted to the other's moves, protecting itself, as the series of assaults and counterattacks got underway (UNO, 2001).

In reaction, it was stated that "both sides gave little heed to non-combatants or women and children implicated in terrorism and atrocities." 300,000 Arabs had left their homes and neighbourhoods as of May 15. Both sides perpetrated atrocities in April 1948 that will be remembered for their heinousness: The Arab retribution against a group of Jewish doctors and nurses on Mount Scoops and the attack on Arabs by a Jewish organisation and hardline gang in Der Yassin. Despite being beyond the boundaries of the Jewish state, Dir Yassin was a vital halt on the journey to Jerusalem. On April 9, 132 members of the organ and stern gang massacred roughly 254 men, women, and children in the village of Dir Yassin.

He also tore numerous more ladies to pieces in addition to raping them. Although the Hagna High Command denounced the massacre, the guilty leaders were never held accountable. The Arabs then surrounded a convoy of Jewish medical personnel (Hussain, 2018).

By purchasing guns from the Czechoslovak Republic, he broke the arms embargo. When Egypt and Syria declined to prolong the pact to bolster their resistance to the Jews, fighting broke out. They were unsuccessful in their task, and as soon as the Israelis pushed closer to Jerusalem, they seized the strongholds, taking the port of Haifa with them. Israel controlled the majority of West Galilee, including a portion of the Arab split, until the United Nations imposed a new ceasefire.

Jerusalem was classified as a worldwide metropolis under a recent geographic accord that Bernadotte suggested in September, while the Arabs were given the Negev and Israel the Galilee. The Israeli Stern Gang murdered the UN mediator the following day. He thought that the Stern group had been caught and banished by Ben Gurion. Early in 1949, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan all participated in negotiations for a cease-fire. The agreements, which more than doubled Israel's territorial seas, were negotiated by the new UN arbiter, Ralph Bench of the United States. Israel currently controls 80% of the area that was formerly governed by the Palestinians as a result of the war (Bar, 2008).

Bonch acknowledged that he and Bernadette had erroneously believed that members of the commission would work freely and that delegates would be represented by countries when the group was unable to handle the refugee issue and did not feel empowered. They won't be won over (AFSC, 2010).

The War of 1967: Six-Day War

The 1967 war perpetuated long-standing complaints while describing the geographical, political, economic, and cultural circumstances that have characterized the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict for the past 45 years. In less than six days, the Israeli army directly grabbed the bulk of Palestinians, annihilated the Arab armed forces, tightened its grip on the ground. Israel is no longer the common, vulnerable David taking on the powerful Arab Goliath. The Israeli army became the strongest in the region as a result of this conflict. As potential sources for the freedom of the Palestinians, the Arab nations were also mocked.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in the early 1970s, and Hamas, founded in the late 1980s, were two of the numerous Palestinian resistance organizations that rose to prominence in the local community after the conflict. Happened 1956 saw no significant wars between the Suez-Sinai conflict and the war of 1967. Israel achieved strides in the political, military, economic, and military arenas. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt took use of the opportunity to promote the Pan-Arab notion across the Middle East and bring Arabs together around a shared identity. The Arab leadership, however, has varying opinions on socialism and communism. Both Egypt and Syria have accepted significant social and economic transformation while rejecting Western duties to the world.

Russische Föderation Syria and Egypt also strengthened their cooperation and influence in the region by founding the United Arab Republic in January 1958 in response to parliamentary demands for a federal alliance between the two regions. Both parties were given promises, and future problems with Israel were connected to the partnership.

Shipping rights in the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal were significant issues during the Suez Crisis of 1956. Israel controlled the Sinai Peninsula during the fighting, but in 1957, Egypt took control of it after President Eisenhower put pressure on Israel to do so. By putting a naval blockade on Israeli trade in May 1967, Egypt broke the conditions of the agreement. After the Suez crisis, Nasser urged the UN to deploy 100,000 troops to the Sinai non-military buffer zone and request that observers leave. Additionally, 1,000 tanks are positioned close to the Tiran Strait, which separates the Sinai from the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel

claims that Nasser's extremism in the Sinai Peninsula and the Tiran Strait blockage are to blame for conflict.

Syria was taken over by the military in 1966 at the behest of left-wing fundamentalist and Ba'athist general Salah Jadeed. He was blatantly anti-Western and anti-Israel. When the Syrian army started pounding Israeli farmland from the Golan Heights, Israeli Fatah members attacked an Israeli patrol north of the Sea of Galilee. The 1949 armistice split the shoreline of the Galilee between Syria and Israel. In locations with a lack of water, control of the sea was crucial. In order to reroute the Jordan River's headwaters, which are situated on Syrian territory, Syria constructed canals in 1966. Nasser cancelled the proposal, though, after declining to back it because of the anticipated Israeli response. In April 1967, border confrontations between Israel and Syria persisted, costing both sides tanks and aircraft.

Israeli jets touched down in the surrounding area after shooting down six Syrian aircraft. General Jadeed gave the order for the Egyptian army to move after seeking Nasser for assistance in Damascus. Israel launched an unexpected attack against Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian forces on June 5 in reaction to the movement of Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. The Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Sheba Farms in Lebanon were all taken by the Israeli army. Israel started the conflict by ground-attacking the Egyptian air force and destroying 300 of the 450 Egyptian aircraft.

Later that day, Israel attacked the air forces of Jordan, Syria and Iraq. By the end of the day, Israel had gained control of the airspace and destroyed 416 Arab planes. The Israeli ground forces took full advantage of this air superiority after the air strikes. In four days, Israeli ground forces defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai and reached the Suez Canal with the help of paratroopers. Israel has had similar successes in the West Bank. Recent events have forced Jordan's King Hussein to stage a domestic uprising and decide to join Egypt, Syria and Israel, jeopardizing Israeli retaliation. He has the power to seize their throne.

On May 30th, it and Egypt agreed to a bilateral defense agreement, and Egypt assumed command of its forces. Despite receiving erroneous information about Egypt's early gains from Nasser, Jordanian troops struck Israel on June 5 and shelled Tel Aviv, Netanyahu, and West Jerusalem. The following day, Israeli troops joined Jordanian forces in battle in the West Bank after the latter took control of several areas of West Jerusalem. This nightfall, the Israeli army surrounded Jerusalem but had not yet invaded the city. Israeli soldiers entered the historic city the following day and took control of the mountain and the western wall of the temple during a tough battle.

The West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem are crucial strategic locations. In this astounding display of Israeli military might, which embarrassed Arab countries, more than 21,000 Arab soldiers were killed and 45,000 were injured. Israel, on the other hand, suffered less than 2,500 injuries and lost fewer than 1,000 soldiers. According to Israelis, the fundamental causes of the conflict, which also involves countries in Europe, are the Arabs' desire to accept or reject the Jewish people's democratic sovereignty in Israel as well as their intention to inflict revenge on the Israelis for previous defeats and humiliations. Israel ignored its 1956 military reaction, as did France and Britain. This allowed Nasser to gain power and nourished his pan-Arab worldview, ultimately motivating Nasser's actions in 1967.

Israelis saw the Arab armies encircling their country in 1967, led by Nasser, and concluded that the only way to win was to fight first in a full-fledged war. Despite the US's warning to Israel to avoid hostilities, President Johnson was astonished to learn of the incident and "regretted that Israel decided to act now." In a statement issued on Friday, Egypt and Syria refuted the allegations, saying that "similar, false charges alleging Israeli

aggression have been made more than once." Johnson wanted Israel to avoid fighting, but he saw the rationale behind the strategy that justified such a course of action.

The Arabs believe the conflict was caused by Israel's aggressive behavior, severe response, and determination to maintain its "hook" and hegemony. Nasser was legally entitled to request the removal of UN soldiers from the Sinai Peninsula, but the decision was wrong because of the consequences. Since only 5% of Israel's imports came through the Eilat Strait port, the Strait's closure had no immediate negative effects on the country's economy. The goal of the US to stay out of conflict is justifiable. Nasser was aware that his actions might compromise military participation given Israel's aggressive response to the Suez crisis.

Israel reclaimed control of more than a million Arab houses after the fighting. Israel may talk with Arab nations as a big power. The initial action of the government was the annexation of East Jerusalem and the surrounding territory. The cabinet then made the decision to take part in peace negotiations with Egypt in return for Egyptian access to the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Tiran Strait. The opportunity to move around without restriction is available.

On the other hand, the government may experience demographic ramifications for the "Jewish" nation if 1.3 million Arab districts are combined. To avoid domestic or international criticism of its stance, the administration chose not to pursue the matter. The Jordan River was finally accepted as Israel's eastern border due to "facts on earth" and major attempts to create a Jewish presence in the West Bank and Jerusalem. The Israelis attempted to establish settlements in the region under the guise of ensuring Israeli security, despite breaking some international and Israeli regulations.

Israel's efforts to keep the recently annexed districts are primarily motivated by the fact that the West Bank, which the Palestinians can legitimately claim, is not regarded as an occupied region. In denying a request for the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel's military advocate general, Colonel Meyer Shamgar, referred to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "controversial" as opposed to "occupied" following the conflict of 1967.

Israel did not create homes for the natives as it extended its territory. Throughout the conflict, the Palestinians were incredibly polite, and the West Bank was occupied for hours without a shot being fired. Soon after the conflict ended, senior Israeli intelligence officers were briefed by Palestinian leaders that they were prepared to create a civilian Palestinian state in the West Bank and sign a peace treaty with Israel. But the cabinet never received the request. He had the choice to turn down any and all interactions with Palestinians via the Arab world.

US President Johnson proposed a truce when the sides were unable to come to an agreement. The Arabs, on the other hand, thought that it had displayed anti-Israel bias during the crisis and refrained from exerting pressure on Israel to cease operations while expressing its opinions on a potential resolution in its statement. Johnson utilized diplomacy to stop Arab countries from gaining land to restore Israel's interests, in contrast to Eisenhower's belief in 1956 when he forced Israel to back from pre-war lines. The United States has failed to embrace international movements at the UN that denounce Israel's occupation and has opposed UN resolutions calling on Israel to give up any newly acquired area.

A UN resolution that Johnson wrote featured US requests and justifications from both sides of the conflict. Unanimously, UN Resolution 242 was approved. To sum up, both parties had to adapt and take action. It requested that the Arab neighbours of Israel and the populace of the occupied territories acknowledge Israel's right to exist. Although the Security Council members agreed with these points, it was unclear if they applied to the entire region or just a portion of it, making it challenging to put them into practice.

Furthermore, the accords did not outline the course of action, including whether or not Israel should cede territory to the Arabs. Both sides fell short of properly observing 242's standards. Peace conferences between 1948 and 1967 have concentrated on finding solutions since the 1970s. Given this fundamental structure, the following chapter will concentrate on the main players in this topic.

War of 1973: Yom Kippur

Until the 1973 war broke the deadlock and a protracted, sporadic effort was allowed to turn the potential of the 1967 Six-Day War into peace talks, there was no way to terminate the conflict between Israel and the Arab world. It was simple to switch from violence to diplomacy because of the nebulous repercussions of the 1973 war, which concluded with Israeli troops on the Syrian and Egyptian banks of the Suez Canal, 100 kilometers from Cairo. Without forceful US diplomatic action, Egypt would have been militarily annihilated. On the other side, Egypt was able to cross the Suez Canal with its army and reach the Sinai Peninsula. Before going back to Damascus, Syria already had the Golan Heights under its control. Political errors and intelligence lapses brought on by a bureaucratic culture first overwhelmed the Israeli military forces.

The main effects of the fight include the significant number of Israeli losses, the requirement for US backing, and the ensuing US presence. The best performance came when it was restored. Take out the important element. Many Israelis felt empowered by the war's defeat and suffering, which had a huge impact on internal politics and national security policies. This feeling had been growing since Israel's victory in 1967. It was accomplished in 1977, fifty years after the workers' revolution defeated the state and an independent Israel. In 1974 and 1975, the public supported the foreign policy compromises made by Prime Minister Mir and his successor, Yitzhak Robin, on the grounds of a desire for peace and a weariness with assassinations.

The Arab states were defeated by the adversary. Many Arabs became disenchanted with the pact with Israel as a result of the early military successes of the Egyptian and Syrian armies as well as the expanding economic and political influence of the Arab world. The Arabs had a good reason to believe that Israel's international support base would dwindle throughout the Arab Decade (1973–1982), at which time the rest of the world sought Arab oil and money. Different Arabs were more or less cautious. If it can't be as cautious as it was in 1973, why wait to attack Israel again? From this vantage point, it was pointless to keep trying to make Israel look weaker because negotiations might result in big concessions.

When Sadat withdrew Soviet military advisors from Egypt and fully reintegrated Egypt into American orbit following the October conflict, he finished the job he started in 1972. Henry Kissinger, a fellow member of the change, said that ending the Arab-Israeli issue rather than preventing a new war was the real goal of the Israeli-Arab peace process. This change in loyalty is being facilitated by reassuring Arab oil producers. One of the most significant successes for the United States during the Cold War was the execution of this program. Kissinger tried to use the same concept in Syria, but his efforts largely failed. Assad began talks with the United States and agreed to a military withdrawal with Israel, but later backtracked.

After the October war, negotiations between General Abdul Ghani al-Ghamasi and the establishment bearing his name, Haroon Yarev, at a distance of 101 kilometers, allowed Egypt and Israel to interact openly with the assistance of the United States. Cairo has vanished. Although the discussions suggested a potential for deeper friendship between the two nations, they ultimately supported Washington's action. With US support, Egypt and Israel negotiated a variety of accords, and Israel's military forces were dismantled in January 1974. The accord called for Israel to leave Egyptian territory and stabilized the situation, opening the door for peace negotiations along the Suez Canal's shores. Therefore, Egypt

gained its first real victory from the war, and Israel may reconsider its next move, believing that the evacuation of the Suez Canal had started the peace process.

The conversations took a lot of time and were difficult. Although Syria's bargaining position was weak in comparison to Egypt's, Assad insisted on a fair agreement and backed up his diplomacy with a small-scale conflict. A final deal agreed in May 1974 required Israel to vacate the Golan Heights and the province capital, Quneitra, by October 1973. Like Sadat, Assad reclaimed some of his country's lost territory in 1967. The post-war secession agreement in Egypt was simply the beginning of a multi-stage process. The final stages of the Israel-Syria deal from May 1974 were being completed. Early in 1974, it was evident that Egypt and Israel were prepared to continue the negotiations, but a tactic obscured the fundamental issues.

There will be a large domestic argument as a result. Robin was a 1990s politician who lacked wisdom. Instead, he was a brand-new team member who was strengthened during a trying moment. As a result, Robin turned down Kissinger's offer. Shortly after, Jordan's West Bank claim was publicly rejected by Arab nations as agreed upon at the Rabat meeting. Israel may ask for a withdrawal from the historic Palestinian territory in future negotiations, but the PLO is "the single legal representative of the Palestinian people" and the rightful owner of it. Egypt made the decision to carry on its own independent talks with Israel as a result. After more than a year of challenging discussions on the Sinai Peninsula, a temporary compromise was struck in September 1975: Egypt received its oil resources back and deemed them important (Alroey, 2021).

The United States and Israel also improved their strategic and diplomatic collaboration through a memorandum of understanding. The short-term deal represented Kissinger's expanding diplomacy and marked its conclusion. Although it was uncertain whether Sadat would be able to join the battle against the enraged Arab armies commanded by Syria, it was evident that the Sinai Peninsula would see at least one more stage of conflict.

Kissinger gave senior State Department official Harald Saunders permission to emphasize that the Palestinian issue was "at the heart of the dilemma" during a congressional hearing in November 1975. This made his ambiguity plain. The agreements that weren't taken into account would have no meaning if that happened. However, the Ford administration effectively put a stop to Middle East diplomacy by concentrating on the 1975–1976 Lebanese civil war and the November 1976 presidential election.

War of 1982 (Lebanon War)

Israel attacked Lebanon from two angles in June 1982. The problems brought on by the dissolution of the Lebanese state during the 1975–1976 civil war were one of the issues that needed long-term solutions. A extremely ambitious attempt to bring about considerable change in the region is military strategy. Ariel Sharon, who started the conflict, thought that by severely punishing the PLO and Syria and installing an Israeli-friendly government in Lebanon, Israel might alter the regional currency. This poor strategy fell short of achieving both objectives. The Lebanon problem continues to be difficult, and Israel's regional strategy has not changed.

Conflicts between the Shiite community in Lebanon and the two Shiite militias, Amal and Hezbollah, have taken the place of disputes with the PLO. The latter is a militia influenced by Tehran that is also a political movement and a terrorist group. During and following the Israeli-American conflict of 1982–1984, Syrian authority over Lebanon was established. Syria's strategic partnership with Iran has allowed Tehran access to the Shiite minority in Lebanon and control over Hezbollah, although there are some limitations on Tehran's activities. Modern Middle Eastern history was altered by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which installed Ayatollah Khomeini and his revolutionary regime.

A region containing Iran, a conservative monarchy, and Iraq, a radical republic, as well as other affluent but impotent republics, has long had trouble maintaining order. Iran was where the old monarchy originally emerged. The equilibrium was disrupted by revolutionary clergy, and in 1980 a war between Iran and Iraq that lasted more than eight years was started. Weak Arab states in the Gulf region were drawn to the conflict, but once the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, ties between the countries shifted. In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, this took place. The conservative Arab countries that produce oil have dramatically altered their plans and objectives throughout this time.

The Arab-Israeli conflict and how it affected his tactics in the 1960s and 1970s strongly disturbed him. By the 1980s, a number of Iranian and Iraqi threats had started to materialise, provoking conflict with Israel and a change in people's perspectives on the peace process.

Threats to existence allayed Israel's fears. Ronald Reagan did not possess the fervour, conviction, and persistence of his two predecessors throughout his eight years as president of the United States to address the issues in the Middle East (and ultimately his successor). Reagan supported Israel, but lacked the passion necessary to sustain the Camp David Accords, giving his rival a decisive advantage. It lacked the fervor for Christianity that the Carter administration displayed in its attempts to end the Middle East conflict.

The Reagan administration's foreign policy has been seriously harmed by a string of unfavourable events in the Middle East, including the Lebanon crisis, the Iranian Contra scandal, and the Reagan Plan's quick rejection. The main dispute with the Soviet Union has mostly changed. Particularly in 1987 and 1988, Secretary of State George Schultz put a lot of time and effort into trying to relaunch the Arab-Israeli peace process, but he lacked the authority and power to do so. Despite the 1988 Israel-Jordan Agreement and the PLO's 1987 London Agreement, they were unable to find a mutually agreeable negotiating partner.

Labor deposed the Second National Coalition government in 1990 because it thought Likud was blocking Secretary of State James A. Baker III from launching peace negotiations. People and organisations not on the PLO's list backed the Palestinian intifada when it started in 1987. After several rounds of negotiations with the United States and the two-state solution, the PLO eventually took control of the political capital the intifada had produced in 1988. Start a dialogue. After vilifying the PLO as a terrorist group, the discussion was finally ended by their false support following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in Iraq (VALBJØRN & BANK, 2011).

Conclusion

The recent dynamical change in Arab politics because of collaboration with Israel shows that a significant transformation in the Arabs' political system is not out of the question. Israel has undeniably grown into a significant regional force in the Middle East, one whose economy and cutting-edge technology capabilities have the potential to alter the political landscape of the Arab world. Putting aside the Palestinian conflict, Israel has developed a number of relationships with significant regional nations. Palestine's main problem can also be appropriately remedied. Palestine, refugees, and holy place Jerusalem issues can be addressed directly by negotiating between Israel and the Arab governments, and it would be more straightforward. Progress might be hampered by more settlements in the West Bank and Netanyahu's plan to occupy another Jordan Valley. It must thus be overcome since, according to the Palestinians, doing so would amount to actual annexation and rule out any chance of a two-state solution. It's feasible that a similar action wouldn't preclude Israelis and Arabs from working together in the commercial world. This might, however, impede progress and undermine public support for further collaboration. It would be erroneous to believe that the Arabs' decision to collaborate would allow for the eradication of Israel's Satanism, which has persisted in the region for nearly 75 years. The research shows that factors like science, culture, business, economy and security concerns

have contributed a lot to bringing the Israelis and Arabs close together, from a great animosity to cooperation with each other.

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