



RESEARCH PAPER

Resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan: Implications For Pakistan Foreign Policy

¹Sarwat Choudhary* ²Erum Hanif ²Sidra Awan

1. Ph. D Scholar, Department of Political Science, GC Women University Sialkot, Punjab, Pakistan
2. Ph. D Scholar, Department of Political Science, GC Women University Sialkot, Punjab, Pakistan
3. Ph. D Scholar, Department of Political Science, GC Women University Sialkot, Punjab, Pakistan

***Corresponding Author** sarwatchoudhary02@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the historical, conflictual and re-insurgence status of Taliban and Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Throughout history, Afghanistan has both gained and suffered because of her strategic location. For this reason, regional and major world powers wanted to control, neutralize rival plans, or claim their own influence over the country. Over the last three decades, foreign interventions have played a critical role in transforming Afghan society and integrating it into global politics. This study is qualitative in nature. Sharing cultural, ethnic and religious ties, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have always been close, yet conflicts over the Durand line, the Soviet Afghan war, Pakistan's support to the Taliban regime, the role of Pakistan in the War on Terror and the growing cross-border militancy has strained relations between the two countries. Afghans deserve a future far better than their experiences of the past years. One can only way that high level of officials engaged directly rather than solely to maintain relations and to achieve national interest on both side. Include influential pashtoon representation, plan to manage controversy and disputes, acknowledge core issues, focus bilateral topics, regularize military to military engagement, single good faith through domestic polices, cooperate on post conflict reconstruction, build momentum through confidence –building measures like trade , people to people exchange, investment.

Keywords: Durand Line, Pakistan Foreign Policy, Taliban Resurgence, US Withdrawal

Introduction

The Taliban religious extremists group was formed in the early 1990s by afghan mujahedeen or Islamic guerrilla fighters, who had resisted the soviet occupation (1979-1989) with the cover backing of CIA and its Pakistani counterpart. Ethnic Pashtun Taliban emerged as a political force in 1996 when they took control of the capital Kabul and changed the name of the country from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their rule was character by the near total exclusion of women from public life and strict application of Islamic law. In December 2001 the Taliban were ousted from government by coalition of afghan parties supported by US. United States of America invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion was in response to 9/11 attacks. However Taliban insurgency against US and NATO forces continued (Shahrani, 2008). Instead the Taliban held talk with US with the help of Pakistan in 2018 and culminating a peace agreement in 2020. On August 31, 2021, the US government marked the end of its 20-year-long war in Afghanistan. As a result, Taliban and its allies took over the country's nearly-full control, initiating the process of completion of US withdrawal from Afghanistan. On 15 August 2021 Taliban entered the Afghanistan capital of Kabul, completing a rapid take over the country with a speed that surprize many afghan and American alike. (Muzaffar, Yasee, & Afzal, 2021); (Muzaffar, Nawab, & Yaseen 2021).

Afghanistan, were thinking about how the nation will do under a Taliban system. Then, at that point, the Taliban declared a 33-members caretaker cabinet, which had no ladies and consisted of mostly Pashtun Taliban and Haqqani veterans, hardliners and followers; with just 2 Tajiks and 1 Uzbek, and no Hazaras, named in the cabinet. Regardless, with this conventional set-up, regional political and diplomatic commitment with the Taliban started, with China offering USD 31 million in aid and Pakistan - frequently denounced on implicitly backing the Taliban and facilitating the Haqqani Network on its domain - arranging a pastoral level gathering (went to by Foreign Ministers of China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) on Afghanistan. (Yousaf & Jabarkhail, 2021)

Afghanistan and Pakistan have a long history of tense relations characterized by five repeating drivers: sway concerns, security interests, international elements, cross-line ties, and network and exchange. Together, these elements will shape future possibilities for steadiness in Afghanistan and the more extensive area. Under such conditions, a positive relationship with Pakistan could go quite far in encouraging dependability and advancement. (Husain, 2016) This study has objectives to find out the policy options of Pakistan after the return of the Taliban in Kabul. The possible return of the Taliban in Kabul will affect the relations of regional players including Pakistan's with Afghanistan depending upon the role of the Taliban in Kabul.

Literature Review

Afghanistan is situated at the cross junction of West, South, and Central Asia. Through all its history, it has both gained and suffered due to its strategic location. Due to this reason, regional and major international supremacies have long sought after to control, defuse competing plans, or proclaim their own impact and influence on Afghanistan. Afghanistan has had a long history of internal and external conflicts, including two wars with the United Kingdom in the 1800s and an invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979 during the last thirty years, foreign interferences have played a critical and negative role in transforming and recreating the Afghan culture and fitting it into world politics. Amongst the countries torn apart into multiple pieces by assaults and civil wars, Afghanistan is the only country be moulded by direct military occupation in the hands of both Cold War global forces and superpowers (Roy, 1995). For almost 18 of the past 30 years, external armies and political powers controlled the Afghan politics. Only 12 years after the exit of Soviet Union in 1989 and the arrival of the Americans and their cronies came in 2001. But even during this difficult period of civil war, regional authorities, joined by a host of global entities, from al-Qaida to energy corporations and aid agencies, mediated the contest for power within the borders of Afghanistan.

Islamist associations that turned into the core of the opposition - and aggregately became known as the jihad warriors or mujahidin - based themselves in Pakistan. Considering the contention to be a virus war milestone, the United States and Saudi Arabia, specifically, offered huge help for the obstruction, essentially every last bit of it channeled through Pakistan. The arms pipeline enabled Pakistan to reinforce parties in Afghanistan that would serve its own advantages. Joining the opposition powers were great many Muslim extremists from the Middle East, North Africa and other Muslim nations. Generally battled with Pashtun groups that had the most grounded help from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Hizb-I Islami of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ittihad-I Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Among them was Osama receptacle Laden, who came to Pakistan in the mid-1980s and fabricated preparation offices for these unfamiliar volunteers inside Afghanistan.

In 1997, the Taliban renamed the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan; Mullah Omar accepted the title amir-ul-momineen (commandant of the dedicated). In regions under their influence, Taliban specialists implemented their rendition of Islamic regulation, ordering strategies restricting ladies from working external the home in exercises other than

medical services, and requiring beating for those sentenced for specific violations. They disallowed ladies from going to colleges and shut young ladies' schools in Kabul and a few different urban communities, albeit grade schools for young ladies kept on working in numerous different region of the country under Taliban control. The Taliban additionally implemented a severe clothing standard for ladies, and expected men to have whiskers and to avoid Western hair styles or dress. (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 2000)

In August 1998, the United States sent off air strikes against receptacle Laden's rumored instructional courses close to the Pakistan line. The strikes came following the bombings of the U.S. consulates in Nairobi and Dar as-Salaam. In October 1999 the U.N. forced assents on the Taliban to turn over canister Laden, restricting Taliban-controlled airplane from departure and landing and freezing the Taliban's resources abroad. The Taliban's inability to surrender canister Laden prompted a development of the assents system on December 19, 2000, including an arms ban on the Taliban, a prohibition on movement outside Afghanistan by Taliban authorities of representative clerical position, and the end of Taliban workplaces abroad. Through 2000 and 2001, battling proceeded in the upper east between Massoud's powers and the Taliban, with the Taliban assuming responsibility for Taloqan in September 2000, and driving the United Front further east to Faizabad. Battling nearby, joined with the impacts of an extreme dry season the nation over, drove huge number of regular folks into help camps and into Pakistan.(Rashid, 2010)

American interest began when anti-Taliban war against terrorism Psychological oppressor assault on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. Osama Bin Laden was distinguished just like the head of a psychological oppressor association with base camp in Afghanistan that arranged the assault. Unique target to catch Osama Bin Laden, Taliban government appeared to be holding onto Osama Bin Laden and his psychological militant partners. U.S. offered the Taliban chances to turn over Bin Laden or collaborate in catching him. Whenever the Taliban didn't go along, the U.S. objective extended to likewise emanating the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. U.S. helped the Northern Alliance rebels (who at times battle among themselves). The U.S. government charges that Osama canister Laden heads a worldwide psychological militant organization called "Al Qaeda," an Arabic word signifying 'the base.' People escaping US activity 2001, Fleeing Kabul using any and all means conceivable(AZ Hilali, 2017).

Early 2002Taliban crushed, Shaky alliance government framed. Osama Ben Laden actually free or potentially dead. Squeezing plan reconstruct the nation, recuperate individuals, accomplish steady and inner harmony. Head of the state Hamid Karzai, Deputy Premier Dr. Sima Samar - one of two ladies in the public authority (Rashid, 2013).

Since taliban takeover in 2021, and in their media proclamations, the Taliban have exhibited a 'new' side to their political philosophy and informing. A significant shift is that the Taliba n of 2021 are politically mindful and proactive. The gathering's political office in Doha (Qatar), laid out in 2013, may have furnished the gathering with the openness, preparing and the potential chance to take part in the craft of political arrangement and strategy (Muzaffar, Shah, & Karamat, 2020).

Zabiullah Mujahid, the Taliban's true representative, had recently ceased from showing up in broad daylight (video) interviews. However, not long after the gathering's takeover, he showed up in his very first open media collaboration in Kabul on August 18, 2021. For some's purposes, the appearance was both amazing and sagaciously organized. Mujahid not just took inquiries from virtually all neighbourhood and global columnists, however he ceased from remarking on issues that were of significant worry to nearby and worldwide common freedoms gatherings. For example, his answer to an inquiry on the Afghan ladies' future in the neighbourhood work market was, pretty much, unclear. He

demonstrated that the gathering would allow ladies to work, nonetheless, his explanation likewise conveyed a proviso; ladies would just be permitted to work under the extent of Sharia.

In this manner, the 'Talib of 2021' (individual from the Taliban), isn't somebody who, as broadly saw in the West, has necessarily considered and prepared in a strict theological school (madrassa). They appear to be a gathering now past the madrassas that utilized current media including online media widely. The Taliban chiefs are effectively seen on public and worldwide media; something intriguing during their first system 1996-2001 in Afghanistan. This, to put it plainly, is what the Taliban of 2021 is about: a technically knowledgeable, PR-weighty multi-lingual assailant bunch that, in the beyond twenty years, took in the subtleties of media informing, purposeful publicity, political moving and account control. (Threlkeld & Easterly, 2021)

Implication for Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan

Sharing social, ethnic and strict ties, Pakistan and Afghanistan relations have forever been close, yet clashes over the Durand line, the Soviet Afghan conflict, Pakistan's help to the Taliban system, the job of Pakistan in the War on Terror and the developing cross-line hostility has stressed relations between the two nations (Khan, 2007).

At the hour of Pakistan's freedom, Kabul was supportive of an autonomous North West Frontier Province, known as 'Pashtunistan', holding onto the possibility that this state would be in the long run retained into Afghanistan. In September 1947, Afghanistan was the main country to go against Pakistan's enrollment to UN, referring to the Pashtunistan debate. The Durand Line settlement on the boondocks between the two nations, acquired from the British Raj, has never been officially acknowledged by Afghanistan as the global boundary, which has prompted doubt and intermittent pressure on the two sides, albeit no outfitted clash has at any point followed between the two states. After the assaults on US soil in September 2001, General Musharraf's administration rethought Pakistan's relations with the Taliban, and concluded that Pakistan would uphold the US in the War against Terror (Hilali, 2005).

Afghans establish the biggest single evacuee populace on the planet with an expected 6 million individuals or 30% of the worldwide outcast populace. The populace has been incredibly impacted by a displaced person issue for a really long time. Huge quantities of Afghans are outcasts in Pakistan. Pakistan has given asylum to one of the world's biggest extended outcast populaces - in excess of 5 million Afghan displaced people have been living in Pakistan since 1979. Proceeded with viciousness and political and financial disturbance in Afghanistan have deterred evacuees to return and brought about proceeded with flood of Afghan outcasts into Pakistan. Starting around 2002, 3.8 million evacuees have gotten back to Afghanistan. Right now, there are 3 million enlisted and unregistered Afghan exiles, in any case, the quantity of unregistered displaced people is accepted to be far more noteworthy since development across the Pak-Afghan line has generally occurred under an unregulated and unmonitored framework, in this manner making it near difficult to give an exact number of unregistered evacuees. Therefore, Pakistan's has been the most weak country to mass development, assailants, dealing of medications and arms from Afghanistan. Throughout the course of recent many years or thereabouts, Afghan outcasts find lived in relative harmony in Pakistan. For greater part of the Afghan exiles who escaped from Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan turned into their super durable home. A large portion of the outcasts that came to Pakistan were ignorant and had no funds by any stretch of the imagination - in any case, when settled they had the option to look for a decent job and procure. While many have accomplished Pakistani citizenship through unlawful means, others have kept on living in Pakistan with no type of segregation. Dissimilar to in Iran, which limited the development of displaced people to camps and kept them from enjoying legislative issues, Afghan outcasts

in Pakistan have like every Pakistani public, been given admittance to training, wellbeing and the option to work. Pakistan furnished them with a better of life than in Afghanistan. Indeed, even after over thirty years, similar remains constant. Nonetheless, due to declining giver help, homegrown requirements, feeble economy, evacuee weakness, and the developing danger of psychological warfare, exiles have turned into a significant issue of worry for Pakistan.(Tariq, 2018)

Endeavors to stop the Afghan conflict have focused largely on the interests of three gatherings the Afghan government, the Taliban, and the United States. All three are straightforwardly engaged with the contention and have an immediate stake in its indictment and extreme resolution. Ahead of the August 31, 2021, withdrawal of US and worldwide soldiers, vulnerability encompasses the question of Afghanistan's future dependability and possibilities for the slowed down harmony process. Central to both is a fourth entertainer, Pakistan, which has played a key, if less obvious, job in the contention from its position on Afghanistan's eastern boundary. Previous US President Donald Trump apparently mentioned Pakistan's assistance in offering the Taliban that might be of some value in 2018, and praised Pakistan's job in "propelling the Afghanistan harmony process" when intra-Afghan dealings started mid two years late.(Barve, 2021)

This effort features Pakistan's profound connections to the Taliban, to which it has given place of refuge and backing for a significant part of the beyond twenty years. Numerous senior Taliban stay situated in Pakistan, where their families live, they own property and organizations, and harmed warriors get clinical care.(Anwar, Hassan, & Kakar, 2021)

Policy Implications

The common language and culture of Pashtuns on the two sides of the Durand Line presents a chance for trust building. Worries inside Pakistan's security foundation over Pashtun patriotism can restrict the positive effect of remembering such voices for dealings, however. To deal with these worries, talks to incorporate compelling Pashtun delegates with connections to standard ideological groups and security offices, including individuals from the decision Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. These members could use cross-line binds and jobs inside Pakistan's vital foundations to interface the two sides while limiting separatist concerns. Given enemy of Pakistan feeling in Afghanistan, the consideration of Pashtun delegates could likewise give over to Afghan legislators to lock in.

Talks can succeed provided that members cultivate a climate of open discourse and lay out ahead of time a component to determine conflicts. Members should vow to keep conversations hidden, stay away from spills in the media, and try to restrict provocative articulations from those in their legislatures went against to exchange. Albeit some wanderer voltage is inescapable, the two sides ought to deny those sees freely to keep up with space for exchange. Rather than taking a chance with conflicts wrecking talks, the two sides could likewise consent to follow the debate goal instrument created in 2018 under APAPPS with commitment at an adequately senior level to stay away from delays from administrative formality. Considering that impetuses to pander to home-grown electorates with disruptive way of talking will fill with regards to expanded flimsiness, this suggestion will be key in such circumstances.

For a really long time, two-sided relations have been held prisoner to the security and sway worries that drive question. Rather than either side lining troublesome issues with at least some expectations of initial structure force through certainty building measures (CBMs) or endeavouring to determine them straightforwardly at the start, the different sides should track down a centre ground of affirmation without assumptions. Similarly however significant as the actual issues seem to be the well-established feelings of disdain that have

created throughout recent many years. Conversations zeroed in on building understanding and creating compassion could help lay the preparation for progress without quick strain to track down goals, particularly until soundness gets to the next level. On April 4, 2020, Afghan civil labourers arranged tents for the first Covid quarantine camp for Afghan exiles utilizing the Torkham line intersection to get back from Pakistan.

Albeit as yet testing, conversations on respective issues that don't promptly include Pakistan's provincial competition with India are bound to prove to be fruitful. Points incorporate the common effects of environmental change; the opiates exchange; and the status, likely regularization, and planned return of Afghan outcasts in Pakistan. Confining beginning conversations to themes that don't straightforwardly challenge either state's power or security concerns could assist with gathering speed. These discussions could work with the arrival of certain displaced people and regularization of others, coordination on drug ban, and cross-line collaboration on moderating environment impacts. Such discussions are additionally bound to succeed whenever attempted in a climate of expanded soundness. The standard way of thinking holds that the Durand Line is a third rail in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations that, whenever raised, will close down exchange. Afghanistan is assailed with different difficulties and keeps up with its irredentist asserts fundamentally as influence against its all the more impressive neighbour and for home grown political utilization. Were Afghanistan to offer its private, defacto affirmation of the Durand Line in return for a responsibility from Pakistan to restrict its help of intermediaries, work with travel, and work toward a conditioning of the boundary, the different sides could start to lessen the notability of the Durand Line and sway strains in the relationship. Given the awareness of this issue, it is best sought after assuming an opening for arrangements arises rather than with regards to expanded shakiness. (Yaseen, Jathol, & Muzaffar, 2016).

Respective security coordination has been for the most part at the strategic level, not stretching out to vital conversations. Gatherings will quite often happen in light of boundary occurrences rather than on a normal, formal premise. Despite the fact that Afghanistan's security powers miss the mark on transfer speed to match Pakistan's power arrangement along the Durand Line, the significance of the line to the two sides' security advantages justifies more standard, organized contacts. These discussions would be hard to keep up with should unsteadiness increment in any case, would give a significant channel to deconfliction and emergency de-acceleration.

Given the doubt between the different sides' insight administrations, knowledge sharing has hitherto been restricted. Albeit a proposed insight reminder of comprehension in 2015 incited public kickback, the November 2020 Joint Vision Document called for "recharging" knowledge sharing on "foes of peace."⁹⁰ Both sides could likewise finish their 2018 responsibility under APAPPS to lay out Ground Coordination Centers along the line for knowledge sharing. Such trades would be more difficult should unsteadiness increment, however they could take into account conversation of common dangers including Islamic State-Khorasan Province.

Pakistan's brutal treatment of its Pashtun populace along the Durand Line both excites the feelings of those inside Afghanistan thoughtful to Pashtun patriotism and raises questions about its genuineness in two-sided outreach. Considering that this dynamic is unsafe to Afghanistan - Pakistan relations and that the suppression of Pashtun privileges in Pakistan is unsettling voluntarily and could cultivate precariousness, Islamabad should cease from such ponderous strategies. Any excessive limitations on approaching Afghan outcasts ought to in like manner be kept away from for a similar explanation.

Pakistan, thus, sees articulations of help for gatherings, for example, PTM from Afghanistan as instances of its neighbour's undermining obstruction in its homegrown issues. In light of a legitimate concern for empowering worked on reciprocal relations,

Afghan pioneers should be limited in such remarks notwithstanding their homegrown political utility. These proposals apply similarly with regards to either relative dependability or insecurity, however execution will be more difficult should the security circumstance further break down.

Pashtun larger part areas of Pakistan including Swat and the previous FATA have suffered shakiness throughout the course of recent many years, and neighbourhood government authorities and common society individuals have acquired experience overseeing and recuperating from a large group of related difficulties. These people could share illustrations learned with their neighbourhood partners in Afghanistan on issues including deradicalization and reintegration along with security-area, land, and other administration changes that will be needed as Afghanistan starts its recuperation from many years of contention. Such a drive would be opportune should relative steadiness be accomplished, however cross-line partners could draw in on nearby refereeing with regards to expanded insecurity.

Synchronous to these more touchy discussions, both sides ought to consider acquainting a scope of CBMs with both create trust and drive interest for future commitment. Without a doubt, the Pakistan-Afghanistan Parliamentary Friendship Group-a promising drive that has developed useful working connections at the two-sided level-has effectively fostered a scope of initiatives. Although testing with regards to expanded clash, they ought to be kept up with to the degree conceivable to keep lines of correspondence open.

- Trade. The two sides should run after facilitating contacts on merchants working inside their nations and facilitating access to third-country markets. Switching the limitations on products passing past passage focuses in the two nations would be a valuable initial step, as would eliminating superfluous tax collection and administrative work that merchants are expected to show past APTTA prerequisites. Both could likewise focus on restricting one-sided line terminations and utilizing notice systems under APTTA should conclusion be required. In the quick term, the new Taliban takeover of the Afghan side of the Chaman line crossing makes respective commitment on exchange considerably more testing however no less essential for coordination at residual intersection points.
- Investment. To work with venture, Islamabad could additionally smooth out the financial backer visa application process, acquaint arrangements permitting Afghans with open Pakistani ledgers and access credit, and attempt to recognize cross-line speculation activities to guarantee benefits stream in the two headings. It could likewise set out venture open doors for people in the Afghan exile local area, a significant number of whom currently own organizations yet face administrative obstacles in light of their migration status. Kabul, moreover, could find ways to work on its administrative climate to energize speculation, especially on the off chance that the security circumstance improves and reciprocal exchange drives expanded interest.

Pakistan can find various ways to encourage people-to-people ties, including proceeded with upgrades to its visa help process, extended visa-on-appearance handling, electronic rahdari cards to Pashtun line networks, and extra grants for Afghan understudies. Despite the fact that interest for make a trip by Pakistanis to Afghanistan is restricted, Afghanistan could respond as security moves along. The two sides could organize and develop a games discretion drive to, for instance, hold matches between cricket crews in both countries. Cultural trades through joint exhibitions by Afghan and Pakistani specialists and cross-line strict commitment could like-wise assistance securitize the relationship and encourage shared arrangement (Muzaffar, Khan, & Yaseen, (2019).

Pakistan's military could both reestablish its proposal to have Afghan assistance individuals in its institutes and staff schools and extend valuable open doors for customary military-to-military commitment through preparing programs and exercises. This could

incorporate interest by Pakistan's police and line security authorities (especially the Frontier Corps), who are knowledgeable about counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tasks following quite a while of activities in the previous FATA.

Conclusion

To conclude we may say that, historically Pak-Afghan leadership is the primary reason behind the tensed ties between the two nations. Keeping in view the history of their conflicts and geopolitical interests, both countries have a hard mission ahead if they want to improve bilateral relations. After the takeover of Taliban, both sides have managed to improve the productive potential of bilateral ties as well as the trade and mutual connectivity linkages. This is being anticipated that the extensive disastrous conflict will possibly come to an end after this groundwork. This will be a fruitful for both sides to improve the regional connectivity and economic development. The United States and others must support this process to stay alive and any unnecessary external involvement can be counterproductive. Stronger ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan are necessary for regional stability and to improvement of livelihood of people of two countries at both sides of border. Pakistan can resolve the Durand Line issue and control the activities of TTP through a process of dialog with the help of Taliban's Government.

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