



RESEARCH PAPER

Track-Two Diplomacy: A Case of Jirga in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

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ABSTRACT

Track-two diplomacy, an informal and non-governmental approach to support official diplomatic efforts, is pivotal in resolving conflicts and fostering peace. This paper delves into the specific case of Jirga, a prominent informal institution in Pashtun society, to examine its function as a track-two diplomatic tool for fostering communication, building trust, and advancing peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Using qualitative research, it emphasizes Jirga's unique traits like community involvement and consensus-building, highlighting its role in promoting dialogue and peace at local and global levels. The study reveals Jirga's potential to complement formal diplomacy by providing an alternative platform for constructive discussions on persistent issues. Jirga also influences public opinion towards resolving challenges like Afghan refugee repatriation, the Durand Line, and cross-border terrorism. It stresses the need to integrate Jirga principles into formal peace processes, leveraging its cultural significance for a more inclusive and lasting peace between the two nations.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution, Jirga, Pak-Afghan Relations, Pashtun, Track-Two Diplomacy

Introduction

Diplomatic relations between countries often involve official channels of communication and negotiations conducted by governments. However, in complex and protracted conflicts, such as the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the traditional track of diplomacy may prove insufficient to address the deep-rooted issues and foster sustainable peace. In such scenarios, alternative approaches, such as track-two diplomacy, gain significance and give valuable insight into the issues between the two states. This paper aims to explore the role that the track-two diplomacy plays, specifically through the case of the Jirga, in improving the bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Jirga, a traditional dispute resolution mechanism, represents an indigenous form of track-two diplomacy that has been utilized for centuries to resolve conflicts in the region. This study explores the theoretical foundations of track-two diplomacy and how it may be used in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. By focusing on the Jirga as a case study, the paper aims to analyze the effectiveness, limitations, and potential of this informal diplomatic process in fostering dialogue, building trust, and facilitating conflict resolution.

International relations have always been complex, especially when it comes to relationships between neighboring countries. Diplomacy has been an integral part of human society for centuries. It is a mean of managing relationships between states and resolving conflicts through peaceful means. Traditional diplomacy, also known as track-one diplomacy, involves the official channels of communication between states through their respective governments. However, this form of diplomacy has its limitations, particularly when it comes to resolving deeply entrenched conflicts between states with a history of hostility (hottinger, 2005). Track two diplomacy, also known as unofficial diplomacy, has emerged as an alternative approach to resolving conflicts between states. This form of

diplomacy involves non-governmental actors, such as civil society groups, academics, and private citizens, who engage in dialogue and negotiation with their counterparts in other states to find common ground and build trust (Montville, 2006). These informal structures usually influence public opinion and create awareness at the ground level directed to ease the tensions between the two states which ultimately help to resolve the conflict. This informal diplomacy is particularly effective in situations where traditional diplomacy has failed or where there are barriers to official communication between states (Khan, 2018).

The phrase Track-Two diplomacy was first framed by Montville (Montville, 1991). Montville defines the phrase as, “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict” (Mapendere, 2000. P:165). According to Montville, who also emphasised that Track Two diplomacy is not a substitute for Track One diplomacy, it compensates for the constraints put on leadership by the psychological demands of their people. Its main objective is to support or extend official Track One discussions. Track Two, according to Peter Jones, consists of informal discussions, usually involving two opposing parties, that are frequently mediated by an unbiased Third Party and involve people who have some connection to the respective recognised communities. The goal of these discussions is to work together to find novel solutions to conflicts arising from policy-relevant issues or to discuss novel approaches to such issues (Jones, 2015). The negotiating parties are free to express their own viewpoints on issues that affect their communities and families since they are not restricted by governmental or constitutional authority, which is one of Track Two diplomacy's advantages. People who are marginalised politically, socially, and economically are given a voice in Track Two so they may share their thoughts on how to bring about peace in their own communities or nations. People who are marginalised politically, socially, and economically are given a voice in Track Two so they may share their thoughts on how to bring about peace in their own communities or nations. In addition, Track Two Diplomacy is not without its problems. The first drawback is that the players have limited ability to influence political power structures and foreign policy since they lack political clout. In addition, it takes a while for this diplomatic route to provide the necessary outcomes (Mapendere, 2000).

Regarding the practical manifestation of track-two diplomacy in International relations, several examples can be put on. This informal diplomacy played an essential role in Oslo Accord between that aimed to bring peace between Israel and Palestine through a Norwegian mediator. The Oslo process between Israel and the Palestinians began as Track Two, changed to Track 1.5 as some officials were brought into the conversation, and eventually became Track One (Khan, 2018). Moreover, the track-two diplomacy has also occurred many times between Pakistan and India.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are two neighbouring countries that have had a tumultuous relationship for several decades. Despite several attempts at traditional diplomacy, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has remained strained, with both countries accusing each other of supporting insurgent groups within their respective borders. The track-two diplomacy between the two countries in the form of Jirga is an effective way to resolve the issues. In this context, the Jirga has emerged as a significant form of track-two diplomacy between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Jirga is a traditional tribal assembly that has been used for centuries to resolve disputes among Pashtun tribes in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Shah, 2010). In recent years, the Jirga has been used as a forum for informal dialogue between representatives of the two countries to address issues such as border security, trade, and the repatriation of Afghan refugees. The use of Jirga as a tool of informal diplomacy can be effectively used in the context of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations because, the ethnic Pashtun resides on the both sides of the Durand line border, and in case of any conflict or border skirmishes between the two states, it is first

the Pashtun who are directly impacted by the conflict. Consequently, the appropriate layout to resolve the issues between the two states are through the Pashtun traditional informal structure; Jirga (Mahmood et.al 2018).

This paper suggests a way out of the transition from track-two diplomacy to Track-1.5 and then Track One diplomacy through the process of Jirga. The Jirga in Track two diplomacy includes the local tribal leaders from both sides that would build consensus and ground for Track 1.5 diplomacy including both diplomats and tribal leaders (Masharan). This step can further lead to drawing consensus and understanding creating the ground for official track-one diplomacy. It would help in peacefully solving many bilateral issues. This paper does not claim that every problem and conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan can be solved through Jirga immediately as it does traditionally, but Jirga is a way through which both states can end the deadlock and initiate the process of formal negotiation.

The qualitative technique has been used to perform this study. To analyse the study topic, literature is gathered from secondary sources such as newspapers, magazines, books, journals, and internet data bases. Qualitative, analytical, historical, descriptive, and exploratory research is being conducted here. When analysing data, the deductive approach is applied. Moreover, a case study approach is adopted, focusing on specific instances of Jirga initiatives and their impact on bilateral relations. The theoretical framework used in this paper is "Track-two Diplomacy". The role of Jirga in Pak- Afghan relations has been analyzed within the framework of Track-two diplomacy.

Literature Review

The phrase "track-two diplomacy" was first framed by Joseph Montville in the early 1980s. In the 1980s, Montville started promoting the use of non-governmental, unofficial channels of contact in addition to official diplomatic initiatives, and he coined the term "track-two diplomacy" to describe this approach (Montville, 2006). Regarding the challenge of defining the concept of track-two diplomacy, Peter Jones asserts that a balanced approach that considers both flexibility and empirical rigor may be necessary to advance the field (Jones, 2015). Moreover, in his other work, Peter Jones explains the features of track-two diplomacy. He asserts that over the past six decades, fundamental lessons have emerged and must be observed by those working in the field. Although it is often acknowledged that inclusion, promoting local ownership, and transformational initiatives are important, each discussion is different, thus a one-size-fits-all strategy is not appropriate for all of them. Finally, the discourse field is dynamic and always evolving. In the future, what is deemed best practice now could not be so (Jones, 2020).

Track-two diplomacy can help break down psychological barriers between parties, promote mutual understanding of the issues, produce fresh ideas for resolution, and develop psychological maturity for a negotiated agreement, according to Yilmaz and Kaye's analysis of the practice's advantages and disadvantages (Yilmaz, 2004; Kaye, 2007). Moreover, Hottinger explores the relationship between Track One and Track Two diplomacy. He argues that Track Two diplomacy can complement and enhance Track One diplomacy, as it can provide a more relaxed environment for dialogue and encourage more open and honest communication. However, he also explains that the potential drawbacks of Track Two diplomacy, such as the lack of official authority and the potential for it to be used as a tool for propaganda or manipulation (Hottinger, 2005). Track two is more feasible in drawing the armed groups to the negotiating table and can assist the process of understanding and analyzing armed groups (Lieberfeld, 2002).

In this section of the literature review, this paper will discuss Jirga as an informal institution and its role as a conflict resolution body. In their work titled "Informal Institution and comparative politics: A research agenda", the authors Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky define informal institutions as being socially shared regulations that are of an

unwritten character and are developed and enforced outside of official channels (Gretchen&Levitsky, 2004). While Douglas North characterises informal institutions as unwritten codes that are followed and that complement and underpins formal rules and institutions, these unwritten codes are what make up informal institutions (North, 1991). Scholars have also evaluated the effectiveness of Jirga in conflict resolution methods in the tribal areas. In tribal regions with little government, the Jirga system functions as a body for resolving disputes in the absence of a formal legal or justice system (Mehmood et al., 2018). Moreover, Ahmed and yousaf asserts for the use of Jirga in Pak-Afghan relations as a source of multi-track diplomacy. They promote the inclusion of Jirgas, a Pashtun-traditioned method of resolving disputes, in peace negotiations between the two nations (Ahmed &Yousaf, 2018).

It is cleared from the above literature review that limited scholarly attention has been given to the specific application of Jirga as a form of track-two diplomacy in the context of Pak-Afghan relations. Moreover, there is a paucity of studies especially examining the function and results of Jirga in fostering communication, fostering trust, and advancing peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Analyzing track-two process

Track-two diplomacy mainly includes the track-two processes that are stakeholder engagement, dialogue and communication, mediation and facilitation, agenda setting and trust-building measures. It can investigate how the Jirga participants engage in dialogue, build trust, and work towards consensus. This analysis can provide insights into the effectiveness and limitations of informal diplomacy in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.




Figure 1: Track two Processes

Examples of Track-two diplomacy in International Relations:

A useful perspective on the composition and operation of this model of diplomacy and conflict resolution techniques may be gained from the example of track-two diplomacy between different governments. The Oslo Accords, which aimed to bring Israel and Palestine to a state of peace, serve as an example of how track-two diplomacy operates. The

Oslo Accords were greatly facilitated by track-two diplomacy. Away from the public's eye and official diplomatic channels, the conversations were started in secret and carried out through backchannels. Participants in the track-two negotiations that resulted in the Oslo Accords included diplomats and academics from Norway who served as mediators and arbitrators for both the Israeli and Palestinian parties. The Norwegian mediators established a climate of trust and confidence-building through a series of secret meetings known as the "Oslo channel," allowing Israeli and Palestinian representatives to have frank discussions on delicate issues like the status of Jerusalem, borders, security, and the establishment of Palestinian self-governance (Nohra, 2022).

Similar to this, track-two diplomacy has been applied to the relationship between Pakistan and India. The Neemrana Dialogue and the Belusa Dialogue, two track-two initiatives between the two nations, have gathered people from different backgrounds, including former diplomats, military officials, journalists, and academics, to engage in informal discussions and look into possibilities for collaboration and conflict resolution (Mohran, 2018). Similarly, the track-two initiatives also play its role in Pak-Afghan relation through the process initiated in the form of Jirga. Hence, it is obvious that the promotion of peace and stability in bilateral ties is facilitated by track-two diplomacy, which works to handle complicated problems, seek original solutions, and create bridges between states (Safi, 2008). From the above examples, trust, mediation and conflict resolution are the extracted variables that are applied in the context of Jirga in Pakistan- Afghanistan relations.

A Case of Jirga in Pak-Afghan Relations

The utilization of Jirga in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations has been a longstanding practice. Acting as a form of Track-two diplomacy, Jirga proves effective in this context, as the tribes along the border view this informal institution as a significant and revered mechanism for resolving conflicts. Functioning as a track-two diplomatic tool, Jirga serves as a valuable and efficient means to settle disputes, foster communication, and establish peace in the region. Its importance is profoundly ingrained in Pashtun society's traditional and cultural fabric in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Shah, 2010).

Jirga's role as a track-two diplomatic instrument is underscored by its acknowledgment and respect for regional cultural traditions and values. Recognized elders, possessing power and authority within their communities, ensure that the dispute settlement process remains locally owned (Ahmed & Yousaf, 2018). Furthermore, Jirga plays a crucial role in fostering understanding and laying the groundwork for official diplomacy. While the tribal structure and workings of Jirga may not directly translate into international track-two diplomacy, the essence and trust in Jirga remain consistent, earning recognition from both parties involved in the dispute resolution process.

In the specific context of Pakistan and Afghanistan relations, the format of Jirga's operation undergoes some modifications. Initially, the Jirga comprises tribal, religious, and local influential figures, fostering understanding and paving the way for official negotiations. At this stage, Jirga acts purely as Track-two diplomacy. As the process evolves, it transforms into a track one and a half diplomacy by involving both official representations and tribal leaders. As the parties deepen their understanding and trust, official diplomacy (Track-one) comes into play, giving shape to the established understanding as an actual agreement (Khalil et al., 2015). In this manner, Jirga effectively functions as a track-two diplomacy tool in the realm of international relations.

Afghan-Pakistan joint peace Jirga (2007)

The presidents of the Islamic Republics of Afghanistan and Pakistan met in Kabul, Afghanistan, from August 9 to 12, 2007, in a key step towards the start of a peace process. The ensuing joint peace jirga serves as evidence of the parties' determination to create an

all-encompassing and transparent process for political cooperation and discussion. The peace talks included 700 representatives from both nations' legislatures, political parties, religious leaders, tribal elders, provincial governments, people from civil society, and the business community (Ahmed & Yousaf, 2018a). The suggestions covered everything from forming a more compact Jirga with 25 representatives from each nation to guaranteeing that negotiations and peacemaking with opposition parties would continue undisturbed. In their dealings, the two countries also promised to maintain the principles of noninterference, respect for one another, and peaceful coexistence. The participants of the jirga agreed that poppies and other illegal narcotics should be denounced, as well as their manufacture, processing, and trafficking (RFI, 2012).

As per a report by the Afghan news agency Pajhwok, during negotiations, Pakistani representatives suggested closing two out of the four Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Pakistan has consistently argued that India's establishment of four consulates in Afghanistan goes beyond fostering good relations and is more about asserting dominance. Specifically, Pakistan claimed that the Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar should be shut down, as they were believed to be contributing to tribal unrest in Baluchistan and Waziristan. Pakistan sees these Indian consulates as sources of trouble, allegedly playing a role in creating unrest in certain regions. However, Afghan delegates objected, arguing that such demands violated agreed-upon principles of non-interference in each other's internal matters. The disagreement centers on differing views about the purpose of India's consulates in Afghanistan, with Pakistan expressing concerns about their alleged involvement in destabilizing activities in Pakistani territories (Muralidharan, 2007).

However, there were certain flaws and loopholes in the Pak-Afghan Joint Peace Jirga declaration which ultimately impacted its results and could not comprehend the acquired results.

- Talibans and other mujahideen groups were not included in the deliberation process.
- Resistance from Pashtun communities on both sides of the frontier. Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), a Pashtun opposition group in Afghanistan led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, declared that it would only back the jirga if foreign forces departed and the Afghan people were allowed to elect their own leaders. HIA claims that the unified peace jirga did not adhere to traditional jirga protocols. (Hamim & Shah, 2007).
- Days prior to the jirga's start, elders from FATA declared they would boycott it on the grounds that by excluding opposition groups, the united jirga would be useless.
- There were many accusations and mistrust as the peace talks got underway in Islamabad and Kabul. During the talks, the subject of Pakistan's encouragement of Islamic extremism as a tool of foreign policy in Afghanistan came up.
- The question of how decisions made in the jirga would be implemented is raised by the absence of international delegates. There are worries that some of the choices made would not be carried out since no enforcement mechanism has been developed and no provision has been made for an international monitoring committee (Shah, 2007).

Pakistan-Afghanistan Peace Jirga, 2011

Nawabzada Malik Amad Khan, the state minister for international affairs, had a meeting with a delegation of the 25-member High Council for Peace in Afghanistan, which was headed by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. The team received an invitation to visit Pakistan from Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani (Voa, 2011). Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani declared that the Afghan people will never forget the crucial assistance Pakistan provided during the 1980s foreign occupation, particularly providing after 5 million Afghan refugees upon its own (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). In order to restart stalled discussions with the insurgents, Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently

broached the notion of building an Afghan Taliban representation office in Turkey, according to Basit. "We have no problem with that if Afghanistan and Turkey agree. We agree with any effort made by the Afghan government to bring peace," said Basit. "The two countries are looking forward to closer cooperation that can favour peace and stability in the region," he added (Dawn, Jan 6, 2011).

The joint efforts for peace between Pakistan and Afghanistan could not reach to the final and comprehensive declaration and way out because there was a level of mistrust between the two countries. Moreover, the questions were also raised on the legal and constitutional status of high peace council. Perhaps more significantly, the Afghan High Peace Council lacks the authority to negotiate agreements or make commitments on behalf of Kabul. Because of this, its purpose in Islamabad is limited to enhancing public and government trust in Kabul's outreach initiatives rather than pursuing accords (Rondeaux, 2011). The Afghan parliamentarian had raised serious apprehension over the legal and constitutional status of high peace council. An Afghan parliamentarian Muhammad DaudSultanzoy said, "In the presence of other legal institutions in this country that have the legislative and executive muscle, this council lacks both" (Rondeaux, 2011, P:1).

It is obvious that Jirga, as an extension of Track-two diplomacy played an effective role between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Not only Jirga played its role between the state actors, but also it played its role in drawing an understanding with Non-state actors like TTP. In case of negotiations with TTP, the Jirga at initial stage which comprised of tribal and religious leaders, was representing track-two diplomacy (Tribune, 2022). However, after the proceedings, it was technically transformed to Track one and a half diplomacy because both the official and tribal leaders were included in the delegation of Jirga. Hence, one can obviously argue that Jirga as a case of track two diplomacy can play an efficient role in creating understanding, generating public opinion and drawing a ground for better understanding between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Table 1
Jirga between Pakistan and Afghanistan

Jirga Between Pakistan and Afghanistan	Jirga 2007 (9-12 Aug, 2007) Held in Kabul	Jirga 2011 Held in Islamabad
Parties	700 members comprised of members of Parliaments, political parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, provincial councils, civil society and Business Community.	Nawabzada Malik Ahmad khan and team met with 25 members of high peace council under leadership of BurhanuddinRabbani.
Issues	Taliban, terrorism and Narcotics trade in the region	Terrorism and cross-border drug trade,
Outcomes	Created a ground to discuss the long-standing issues. Made recommendations: 25 member Jirga from each country, agreed to non-interference in internal matter of each country, cultivation, export and trading of poppy must be denounced.	No greater outcomes of the peace Jirga because of the mistrust, allegation and suspicion of each other.
Loopholes	Mistrust between the parties, lack of authority to implement the recommendations made, Taliban and mujahideen were not invited to the deliberation process, Boycott of tribal elders. Abstain of Pakistan Leadership.	Mistrust No Third Party mediator Questions were raised in Afgahnistan over the constitutional role of High Peace Council. The sitting governments had lackadaisical approach in solving problems.

Strength and Weaknesses of Jirga in Pak-Afghan Relations

Jirga, as a tool of track-two diplomacy, possesses several key strengths that make it an effective mechanism for conflict resolution, dialogue facilitation, and peace building. In

contrast to conventional diplomatic conversations, Jirga is flexible and informal. This enables candid communication, unrestricted speech, and direct interaction between the parties. The absence of strict procedures and administrative restrictions fosters an atmosphere that is favorable to candid and free discussion. Without the restrictions of official positions or diplomatic formalities, participants may talk more openly, voice their concerns, and participate in discourse (Wardak, 2003).

Jirga also excels in fostering harmony and building trust. Jirga promotes interpersonal connections, trust-building, and community healing by offering a venue for in-person conversations. Participants have the opportunity to express their complaints, discuss past conflicts, and look for common ground throughout the dialogue and negotiation process (Shah, 2010). Along with, the other strength is that Jirga complements official diplomatic channels. It provides an additional avenue for dialogue and peacebuilding, generating trust and confidence-building measures that may eventually pave the way for formal negotiations (Taizi, 2007).

On the other hand, Jirga also have some weaknesses. Due to the Jirga's informal and unstructured nature and the absence of a clear institutional framework, judgments may be inconsistently applied or difficult to enforce. The development of a standardized approach to dispute resolution may be hampered by the absence of explicit standards of process. Jirga often faces limitations in terms of gender and minority representation. Women and members of marginalized groups frequently miss out on or have very minimal meaningful involvement in Jirga procedures, which have historically been presided over by male tribal elders (Shah, 2007). The concepts of inclusion are undermined by this exclusion, which sometimes also fail to appropriately address the worries and viewpoints of all parties involved in the conflict.

Jirga is subject to outside forces that can undermine its objectivity and efficiency. Jirga proceedings may be manipulated or influenced by political organizations, armed groups, or outside parties in an effort to achieve their own objectives. Jirga's scope for tackling systemic problems is another area where it falls short. While it succeeds in settling acute conflicts at the local level, it might not have the ability to handle more systemic problems that call for structural or institutional changes (Safi, 2008). In short, it is essential to recognize and address the weaknesses of Jirga as a tool of track-two diplomacy in Pakistan and Afghanistan relations. By addressing these issues, Jirga will become more effective and inclusive as a tool for fostering peace and resolving disputes in the area.

Findings

Following are some of the findings of this research.

- Jirga, as an informal institution, play an important role in Pashtun society especially in conflict resolution mechanism and in generating public opinion. It has the potential to regulate the life of people in Pashtun society. However, the workings of Jirga changes when it comes to be used between the two states. The typical tribal working model of the Jirga follows its fluid nature and is accommodated according to the context between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Pakistan and Afghanistan have considerable long standing issues that have contributed to the lack of trust and understanding between both the states. These long standing issues mainly include cross border terrorism, Durand line issues, Afghanistan support to Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan, Afghan refuge problems and many other issues. These issues required the innovative approach in diplomacy, other than the track one or official diplomacy, to create an understanding between the countries over these issues.

- The working of track-two diplomacy with the case of Jirga between Pakistan and Afghanistan is that Jirga, as a form of track-two, create a level of understanding and paves the way for track one and a half. At this level the Jirga includes tribal, religious and official members of both the states. At this level certain understandings are made and are then followed by the official diplomacy.
- Recognition of the impartial third party is essential to draw consensus among the two contestant parties and also to make arrangements for the implementation of these consensus.

Conclusion

In conclusion, track-two diplomacy serves as an essential and alternative avenue to official diplomatic channels. Jirga, deeply ingrained in Pashtun culture, significantly influences Pakistan-Afghanistan relations by fostering communication and understanding. Through historical and cultural analysis, this article underscores Jirga's effectiveness in promoting peace between the two nations. Acting as a supplementary platform to formal diplomacy, Jirga facilitates open discussions and problem-solving, involving diverse stakeholders like tribal leaders and civil society representatives. Similar track-two initiatives, such as the Oslo Accords and dialogues between Pakistan and India, illustrate the potential of informal diplomacy in conflict resolution. In the context of Pakistan and Afghanistan, revitalizing Jirga discussions could address longstanding issues like cross-border terrorism and refugee problems, fostering mutual understanding and positive public opinion. Despite past challenges and mistrust, involving locally respected negotiators in inclusive Jirgas presents a credible path towards sustainable peace and reconciliation. This approach encourages dialogue, understanding, and negotiation among all stakeholders, ensuring a comprehensive and authentic resolution to bilateral disputes.

Recommendations

- Recognize and integrate the principles and practices of jirga into formal diplomatic negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This can involve including non-state actors, community leaders, and tribal representatives in peace talks to enhance their legitimacy and effectiveness. The formal peace procedures can become more inclusive, representative, and lasting by embracing jirga concepts, such as consensus-building and community involvement.
- Addressing the gender gap in the Jirga process and the track-two initiative is essential to ensure the inclusivity and the participation of the most deprived class, women.
- An impartial and neutral third party, that can be an international organization, regional or extra regional state, is required to draw consensus between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the long standing issues.
- To resolve the long-standing issues between Pakistan-Afghanistan, it is important that both states have the political will with the real intention to resolve matter peacefully.
- The lack of trust and blame gaming over the cross border terrorism and drug trafficking need to be stopped because such an environment is hinder Jirgas to operate and communicate freely.

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