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RESEARCH PAPER

Pakistan's Domestic Political Dynamics and Need for Civil Military Cooperation

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ABSTRACT

Since its independence on August 14, 1947, the country's focus remained on strengthening single institution (military). Hence the remaining two institutions, such as; executive and judiciary; which are considered equally important in the smooth running of state remained weak. Eventually, leading to single institution emerging as the most powerful, thus the relationship between executive and military has remained strand. This study focuses on the relationship between civilian and military institutions. The study undertakes to explore the strong and weak positions of both institutions and possibilities of cooperation between them. Apart from that which political party can be most acceptable option for military institution to work with to strengthen the nation and national security? To analyze the situation, this research applied qualitative method. The findings suggest that the regional and international situation demands greater cooperation among two institutions to ensure security and survival of the country.

| **Keywords:** | Civil Military Relations, Internal Politics, Façade Of Democracy, Institutional Weakness |

Introduction

After the independence of Pakistan and apprehensions about its security situation, the leadership of country gathered all the resources around one institution to ensure country's security about survival. Resultantly, the institution became more and more strong compared to other institutions, such as; executive and judiciary. The weak and vulnerable position of these institution lead to political instability and constitutional crises. The effects of which, can still be felt today. In order to thoroughly explore the volatile nature of civil military relations, this study undertakes to focus on the two institutions (executive and military). However, this research focuses on civilian leadership and military relations. The most part of countries history, military has ruled over Pakistan. The civilian rule has been witnessed in some eras. Despite the centrality of issue there has been very little focus on Pakistani civil-military relations, the causes behind changes in the level of civilian authority remain largely unexplored. Cross-national comparisons frequently overlook minute shifts in a nation's civil-military ties over time, (Staniland, 2008).

Literature Review

Since the issue is widely under the discourse of scholar within and outside Pakistan, the political stability and strengthening civilian institutions has been the topic of research for many scholars. Currently the main stress is given to democratic institutions, therefore, understanding the relationship between civilian and military leadership can help develop better coordination. The need to develop this understanding is need of hour because most part of Pakistan's history, there has been constant competition and conflict

among two institution to gain superiority and strengthen their position, (Richter, 1978). The seasoned political analyst, finds some significance in this research and offers a detailed explanation of Pakistan's democratic transition history while taking into consideration his personal assessment of the main objectives of the Pakistani army. He considers military interests; nonetheless, the researcher looks at challenges to military core concerns as a cohesive unit, including a strong basis of popular support and unified civilian political power. The researcher also provides a thorough examination of Benazir Bhutto's government, which came after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's as the period of strongest civilian authority over the military, (Yaseen, et. al., 2021; Raza, 1997). Following the implementation of the nation's first military martial law in October 1958, Bhutto's administration marked the beginning of civilian rule. Before 1971, there was civilian command because the Pakistani military was still developing and the praetorian tradition had not yet started, (Jathol, et. al., 2024; Ishfaq, Ashfaq, &Sanam, 2022, Zahra, & Iqbal, 2021, Shah, 2014). It can be presumed that the military involvement is contingent upon the extent to which the threats and prospects are available to the armed forces. There are the 3 potential threats to military's interest commonly identified by researcher, such as; 1) the leadership and civilian political power, 2) mass support of government, 3) possibility of contradiction between civilian and military's key interests feared to shift in the civilian command structure, (Arif, 2001).

The Leadership and Civilian political power

The term condition that is used to differentiate the degree of power in the civilian government and the distribution of authority between the competing actors in the civilian system is the key factor taken in to account. The existence of a single leadership or the need for checks and balances are not always implied by the existence of a single center of civilian authority. Instead, unified political authority arises when opposing civilian actors recognize the legitimacy of the nation's elected civilian leadership or, at the very least, refrain from deliberately undermining it. The main characteristic of the opposition groups in civilian political governance is the rivalry and discard, which gives rise to many different problems for ruling party, (Kausar, et. al., 2019; Shafqat, 1988).

Factor 2: Mass Support of Government

The strength of the public support base for the civilian government is the second element taken into account. Military regimes do not overthrow lawful and prosperous civilian governments. Therefore, it makes sense that the degree of military participation in policymaking may be influenced by the public support base of the civilian government. The military can only influence and intervene if they can limit or reduce the support base for civilian government.

(1) The extent to which the military is necessary for the civilian government to maintain its authority.

(2) Public eagerness to military intervention: Popular support is a measure of public affinities with specific political figures, even the democratic government. While determine the popularity and public support, the public opinion survey is considered as a viable choice.

However, past experiences suggest that the survey results were manufactured or manipulated, hence the validity and worthiness these survey is questionable, particularly such practices take place during political repression, (Nawaz, 2008).

The third factor is the degree of threat to military core interests

The degree to which military fundamental interests are threatened is the third aspect taken into account. The military's objectives include, reserving funds for defense purposes, ensuring smooth functioning of institution, and to ascertain the security and national integrity of armed forces. He further argues that these concerns of military are the sole reason active engagement in the administrative and political affairs of the state, which has led to the continuous instability of political system and weak democratic institution in the country.

The military in Europe, United States and elsewhere may hold a different perspective on significant threats to their key interests. However, Pakistan's military is exceptionally sensitive to challenges pertaining to its vital interests because of the nation's unique historical and geopolitical circumstances, as well as they have faced difficult situations and challenges, nevertheless, that honoring the military's fundamental objectives does not mean giving away policy making authority to the military, (Zahra, & Iqbal, 2021). Although facilitating military and helping them to ensure national security and survival does not mean to allow them to be part of policy making.

Nonetheless, Ziring, (2003), states that the blame lies with political parties. The constant conflict and lack of cooperation among political groups lead to weak and instable political system. On the other hand Saeed, (1967), argues that newly established states often face crises in the early stages, leading to political conflicts, civil military power struggle,. On one hand political groups strive for strengthening democratic practice and other hand military leadership strives to strengthen their roots and position in new system to gain long term benefits. The process and efforts for national integration, apart from that lack of cooperation between political groups lead to the weak political system, resultantly causing political instability and weak political institutions. Nevertheless, Johns, (1972), implores that the inefficiency of political groups to strengthen the political institutions offered opportunity to military leadership to strengthen their roots in the system. The period of 1947 and 1967 played key role in rise of military as strngest institution in the country, (Nazeer, et'al, 2023). The lack of coordination and drive to strengthen political institution resulted in strong military regime with solid base, (Askari, 1991).

It was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who established first civilian government in 1973, he ruled country with shrewdness and strong administrative skill. He faced no resistance running the state. It was in his tenure that constitution of Pakistan was developed to bring country out of constitutional crises. One of the lieutenant generals of his time stated that the 1973 constitution made it illegal to usurp the prime minister's authority and moved the nation toward a parliamentary form of government, leaving him as the only decision-maker in the nation. Bhutto was given the authority to ban political parties in 1974 after the amendment in the constitution, (Asghar, 2005).

The opposition in the parliament was feeble and weak, that never really threatened the Bhutto's law making. Considering Pakistan's political landscape, a number of groups, including religious ones like Jamaat-e-Islami, attempted to challenge the political authority of the civilian government, (Nellis, & Siddiqui, 2018). However, Bhutto's astute judgment and well-timed actions allowed him to successfully stifle political opposition throughout the majority of his term. Initially, he used political negotiating and compromise to uphold unified civilian rule. In order to preserve national stability, he later extended offers of governments to other parties in various provinces, For instance, NWFP government, (Khan, & Iqbal, 2024).

However, Bhutto's strategies of compromise soon gave way to confrontation in order to preserve a single center of civilian authority. But it's crucial to note that Bhutto disbanded the NAP and JUI's established government within a year after striking his deal with them. Stressing the perils of antinational elements, he started to exhibit dictatorial

inclinations and used the Federal Security Force (FSF) to quell political opposition. The Bhutto government's political power declined as the political opposition gained strength. His use of excessive force lead to the political unrest offering opportunity to Zia UlHaq to impose martial law.

Material and MEthods

This study used qualitative approach and reviewed sources, such as; Articles, magazines, books and reports. The content analysis method is used to identify themes and trends from the available literature. The research critically analyzes, how political dynamics in Pakistan is shifting and creating pathways for civil military cooperation, which is needed in present times.

Results and Discussion

Strong Popular Support Base

More political support was available to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto than to any other civil-serving politician included in this research. In Pakistan's history, few leaders, either civilian or military have enjoyed popular public support, clear mandate and introduced variety of social and economic reform as Bhutto's PPP. The followers of PPP included lower, middle and upper class of the society, even businessmen and intellectuals, (Adams &Sabiha, 1970). At first, the working classes greatly favored him due to his socialist economic policies. When popular discontent did start to surface, Bhutto put a stop to it, just as he had done with political opposition. Although Bhutto's political strength and his strict policies, his popularity and graph of public support kept rising, as noted by Pakistani General K.M. Arif. Bhutto had lost a lot of the popular backing that had given him power by the time he was overthrown in 1977. PPP secretary general MubashirHasan resigned as a result of his growing unpopularity with both big and small business owners who belonged to Bhutto's own party's upper echelons harmed by his nationalization of the economic initiatives. Liberal intellectuals finally stopped supporting Bhutto because of his authoritarian. However, real popular upheaval did not surface until after the 1977 elections, which were purportedly rigged. There was discontent within the party, (Ahmad, & Akbar, 2019).

Threats to the military's key interest

Although Bhutto was able to effectively consolidate his power in the 1970s while reducing, while offering early retirement to senior general in the Pakistan army. Including those he believed had assisted in his ascent to power and constantly meddling in the military's internal matters. But even as Bhutto used the army's weakness after the 1971 war to strengthen his hold on power, he was cautious not to take any steps that would incite a military reaction. Army officers accepted Bhutto's taking over of the military's command structure and curtail its powers.

By maintaining the army as an institution and boosting military spending, Bhutto also countered his meddling in areas of military autonomy. According to Haqqani, (1991), Bhutto made sure the military got its 'fair share of the pie,' and over time, both the military's size and associated spending increased. He started a nuclear weapons program, increased the nation's capacity to produce weapons, and imported military hardware. He ensured that military should be equipped with advanced war machine and skills to perform their professional responsibilities effectively.

Modern Civilian Control Examples: Indirect, Limited Regimes

During Muhtarma Benazir Bhutto second tenure (1993-1996), although military refrained from direct engagement in the policy making of her regime; however they exercised their influence in different situations. Apparently, the relationship between civilian and military leadership was evolving, replacing mistrust with trust, non-interference and tolerance, (Nasr, 2004). Military openly supported her government at different occasions. Although there was least interference from military, however, concerning policies related to Kashmir and Afghanistan, she had to consider military leadership's opinion and policy perspective. However, the relations between two institutions worsened, when military refused act on behalf of government during strife in NWFP in the late 1994. The military top leadership, since then grew distant and sceptic of her government. When President Farooq Ahmed Laghari dismissed her elected government in 1996, military assisted him in the decision, (Azeem, et'al, 2018). She unlike her father was unable wield political power effectively, especial facing Muslim league Nawaz and religious groups, (Fareed, et'al, 2019, Rashid, 1994). She somehow managed argumentative state, when PML (N) blamed her of supporting India in Punjab insurgency. This conflicting state between political parties leads to increased military influence in political affairs, (Shafaqat, 1997, Khan, B., Khan, A., & Khan, I. 2019). The PML (N) opposition and propaganda had already weakened her government. Further that the President Laghari, who was from her party, during her first tenure he supported he but in second term their relations became sour, particularly during the selection of chief justice and chief of army staff. Her already shaky position was further weakened. Sharif' effort concentrated on consolidating his position against the PPP, (Mumtaz, Zahoor, &Yasin, 2024, Malik, Yaseen, &Muzaffar, 2023, Khan, & Amin, 2017). He also collaborated his position through alliance with MuhajirQaumi Movement (MQM) in Sindh to join hands against PPP government and he even went for legal options against her government, (Rizvi, 1991). He (Nawaz sharif) further undermined her authority through alliances with National peoples party (NPP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). Additionally, in comparison to MuhtarmaBenanzir Bhutto, President Ishaq had more commonality of interest with Nawaz Sharif over the issues, such as; Kashmir. Apart from that President Ishaq was pro establishment. When Nawaz sharif took over power, the president Ishaq was less confrontational towards him but later on the rivelery began between President and prime minister on one hand and COAS and PM on other hand; however the president took the side of COAS against Nawaz government and the rivalry intensified. The sharif government not enough majority to to overturn the eight amendment in Assembly and reduced the powers of president. The president attempted to remove sharif from the power but the move was declared illegal by the Court. It was during this heated conflict that military advised both of them to take retirement.

Modest Popular Support Base

With a sizable base of support, Benazir Bhutto took office in 1993. Although Bhutto defeated her opponents, she lacked a clear mandate. Soon, major civil unrest in Karachi, Sindh, and the NWFP's Malakand division threatened even this meager level of assistance. Political protests and conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups are common in Pakistan, but the level of public discontent that surfaced during Bhutto's second term was unexpectedly high Inflation, unemployment, and economic stagnation hit the average person hard increasing his frustration with the government at the same time. Public discontent was only exacerbated by accusations of official wrongdoing. By 1996, both Bhutto's personal support base and her party's popular base had been severely damaged by her perceived mishandling of the nation. Nawaz Sharif's first term was marked by a somewhat higher level of popularity than Benazir Bhutto's second term. With the potential to establish governments in all four provinces and 105 out of 216 members in the National Assembly, Sharif's IJI alliance emerged victorious in the 1990 national elections. Sharif's privatization and investment programs quickly garnered him more support from Pakistan's business sector, (Yasmeen, 1994). The nation is clearly disillusioned and

cynical, according to one observer who noted the following year that the common public feels betrayed by the elite section of the society, (Khan 1992). Eventually President Ishaq toppled the Sharif government in 1993.

Military Core Interests Restrained Concerns

Benazir Bhutto sought to reduce risks to the fundamental objectives of the armed forces during her second tenure. In contrast to her previous term, Bhutto understood that her government and the nation would benefit from a more careful and gentle approach to relations with the military forces. She worked to with military to meet the defense need and persuaded the US government to provide military equipment kept under suspension through pressler. She specifically protected military interests with relation to resources.

Following Bhutto's official visit to the United States in 1995, Pakistan struck an agreement to buy many planes, missiles, and other military hardware. Threats to the military's independence and dignity were also avoided by Bhutto. While Bhutto was largely successful in reducing threats to military key interests; her achievements were not without setbacks. Considering Benazir Bhutto's background and the political party she led, the Pakistani Supreme Court eventually ruled that the National Assembly should be dissolved, suggesting that people were prone to see her government as a threat. Nonetheless, worsening economic downturn and domestic turmoil put the nation in perils.

The army began to feel worried about the nation's worsening security position by late 1994. The degree of threats to military survival or cohesion was never as high as it was during the last days of Nawaz Sharif's second government. However, Benazir Bhutto was never able to take advantage of minor threats to military fundamental interests, unlike either Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. Nawaz Sharif also tried to downplay challenges to fundamental military interests between 1991 and 1993. The prime minister recognized the importance of military autonomy, just like the majority of public and politican and addressed their concerns by meeting defense and financial needs, (Shah, & Khan, 2022, Sharif 2010). According to one analyst, Sharif was always cautious to avoid overtly challenging the military's or the Chief of Staff's authority.

The simplest way to characterize Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's first term in office is as an indirect total rule. Although the Civil-Military relationship was initially generous during her first term, she had very little liberty to build her own policy agenda. This assumption may be empirical. During the initial days of the Pakistani power triangle, the Chief of Staff played a significant role in determining both the international and domestic defense policies. In reality, Bhutto would allegedly later assert that she had been left out of crucial conversations about Pakistan's nuclear development. The assertion that at the outset the Bhutto government operated against the backdrop of a hostile Military establishment, that was prepared to use any opportunity to remove her from power, (Yasmeen, 1995). Even though the government was technically led by civilians, it is clear that the army had significant political sway and had a big say in how policies were made. Benazir Bhutto's first cabinet exemplified the challenge of highly divided political authority.

The president of Pakistan was given ultimate authority in the administration, as stated in the 8th Amendment of the 1973 constitution. Even though there were no immediate evidence of animosity between the prime minister and president during Bhutto's presidency, rival centers of civil authority were there from the start. Ishaq and the military establishment postponed Benazir Bhutto's takeover of power and the president demanded that she must consult with him in all the decisions, even when that fell outside of his legal purview, once Bhutto took office. The relationship was regarded as being so bad that party leaders started anticipating Ishaq's dissolution of the National Assembly well in advance of it actually happening.

During Benazir Bhutto's first administration, opposition political parties also mounted a particularly strong fight. After winning majority seats in the Punjab assembly, Sharif was appointed chief minister of that sizable and strategically significant province. In an attempt to lessen Sharif's political power, Muhtarma Bhutto initiated vote of no confidence against Sharif in Punjab Assembly. The confrontation between them offered opportunity to military additional leverage to influence domestic politics.

Weak Popular Support Base

Due to her widespread popularity, Benazir Bhutto was able to win the 1988 general elections and take office as Pakistan's prime minister. Nonetheless, her base of public support was significantly smaller than that of Nawaz Sharif in 1997 or Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1971. Bhutto's PPP had won a "narrow victory" over Sharif's Islamic Alliance in the 1988 elections. Bhutto therefore lacked a genuine mandate. Even in the exuberant mood that followed the end of military control, Bhutto soon discovered that she was having serious political problems. After three months in office, she was met with large-scale protests against her government. The prime minister barely avoided a motion of no confidence in the National Assembly in November 1989 (Ziring, 1991). But in 1990, following a domestic and political crisis that included widespread strikes and escalating violence that had engulfed many of Pakistan's largest cities, she was ultimately fired.

Important Threats to Core Military Interests

The second term of Muhtarma Benazir was widely believed as anti state and anti army by military leadership due to past experience. She was also considered as a national security threat. Therefore, she frequently mate and engaged to address military's concerns related to defense needs and funding issues to reduce the gap between two institutions and resolve misunderstanding, (Shafqat, 1996). However, she further increased the apprehensions and anxieties, when she appointed head of ISI and COAS. The Pakistani army was deeply offended by her apparent disrespect for internal military procedures and organizational norms. The Prime Minister also made demands that gravely jeopardized military unity as Bhutto's first term went on. When the army was sent to Sindh province in 1989 and 1990, its involvement in internal security and law enforcement reached a record high.

As tensions between Bhutto's government and the MQM rise in Sindh. The army was compelled to intercede and quickly lost patience. Even though the Pakistani army has previously engaged in internal operations, its deployment in Sindh went above and beyond their official military responsibilities. The Army then believed that it was being utilized to further the political party's (the PPP's) objectives. The military's national security interests were also threatened by the growing internal instability and the administration of Bhutto's seeming apathy to Afghanistan and Kashmir (Arif 1995). Bhutto's government, like the three that would come after it, made an effort to appease the military by giving it more resources (Siddiqa, 2007).

However, Bhutto's compromises on fiscal matters were insufficient to counteract the substantial and persistent risks she posed to the unity and autonomy of the armed forces. In contrast to her father, who skillfully weighed compromises and threats, Benazir Bhutto took a more combative stance. The army's mistrust of her eventually grew, and she was unable to restore the civil-military relationship by upholding military fundamental interests.

The Civil-Military connection is continually adjusted to account for a variety of changing factors. In situations where robust institutions and norms of civilian control are lacking, the degree of civilian control may be very flexible. Long-term civilian control of the military is nearly never assured, even though it might be strong at any particular time. As a

result, the Pakistani Military's inability to maintain civilian command does not imply that control has never been attained. Certain readers may contend that the degree of civilian authority over the Pakistani military has been dictated by particular personalities, (Hassan. 2009).

One might study Pakistan's political-military history and conclude that there has never been real civilian authority over the armed forces. It appears as though the Pakistani military enters and exits policymaking at will. It may be argued that civilian control is a mirage because the military has the power to overthrow or replace the civilian administration whenever it pleases. It is untrue; nevertheless, that civilian rule must necessarily involve the military being forced to submit to the civilian administration. Indeed, achieving civilian rule frequently necessitates the cooperation of the military and civilian agencies.

Though not all of them could successfully rule once in power, the majority of militias possess the physical might require to overthrow the government. However, militaries ruled by civilians decide against getting involved in the formulation of public policy, either because the political fallout from their actions is too great or because doing so would be met with strong opposition.

The Civil-Military connection is continually adjusted to account for a variety of changing factors. In situations where robust institutions and norms of civilian control are lacking, the degree of civilian control may be very flexible. Long-term civilian control of the military is nearly never assured, even though it might be strong at any particular time. As a result, the Pakistani Military's inability to maintain civilian command does not imply that control has never been attained. Certain readers may contend that the degree of civilian authority over the Pakistani military has been dictated by particular personalities. Indeed, Pakistan's civil-military interactions have been significantly shaped by the individual participants' personal beliefs and goals. For instance, General Asif Nawaz's lack of personal political ambition was unexpected. Opportunities for military action and threats against military interests developed significantly while Nawaz was the army chief, but he resisted becoming politicized. Similarly, there is no denying that GhulamIshaq Khan, the president of Benazir Bhutto, and General Baig, the COAS, were tainted by Ishaq's and Baig's personal connections to President Zia, the man who had put Bhutto's father to death. Although it is evident that certain individuals' behaviors and personalities have influenced the development of civil-military relations, this does not adequately account for the changes that have been seen.

Begins is rumored to have had personal political aspirations, although he never made an effort to overthrow the civilian administration. On the other hand, General Zia, who would go on to stage a coup against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was specifically picked due to his perceived quiet and adaptability. Both military and civilian administrations have operated within a larger framework of threats and possibilities, as this analysis has attempted to show.

Thus, only when these possibilities and risks are considered can the proximate causes of oscillations in the civil-military interaction to be understood. What Samuel P. Huntington, (2020), refers to as military professionalism is one of the most enduring justifications for civilian leadership of the military. According to Huntington, a professional military member possesses knowledge, social responsibility, and corporate character. This argument says that the military's professionalism prevents it from becoming involved in policymaking. However, modifications to the standards and culture of the Military should be anticipated to take years or even decades rather than months, much as modifications to the standards and culture of a community.

Furthermore, significant cultural shifts would probably coincide with an overall trend. Therefore, it seems improbable that justifications grounded in organizational culture could explain the abrupt shifts in Pakistan's Civil-Military interaction. Huntington's explanations are problematic as well since periods of strong and weak civilian authority can be explained by military professionalism. Professional armies, such as the Pakistani army, place a high priority on the nation state; highlight the significance of external threats, and work to safeguard military hardware.

It is understandable that if there are serious dangers to such priorities, they could feel obliged to step in and take action. According to Akhtar, (2017), the military may perceive itself as the state's servants rather than the ruling government because of their awareness of themselves as a vocation.

Imran Khan's Government

Imran Khan's government played a significant role in reshaping Pakistan's political landscape. Upon assuming office in 2018, Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), prioritized anti-corruption efforts, aiming to bring transparency and accountability to the government. They launched high-profile investigations against political figures accused of corruption, which had a considerable impact on the country's political dynamics, (Sheikh, 2018).

Khan's administration also focused on economic reforms, seeking to stabilize the economy through measures such as securing loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), promoting exports, and implementing austerity measures. Additionally, the government launched several social welfare programs, including the Ehsaas Program, which aimed to reduce poverty and support the underprivileged, (Bibi, &Rizwan, 2022).

On the international front, Imran Khan's government sought to improve Pakistan's diplomatic relations, especially with neighboring countries. He played a mediatory role in regional conflicts, notably between the United States and the Taliban, facilitating peace talks in Afghanistan. Domestically, Khan's tenure witnessed significant political challenges, including opposition from major political parties and public protests. Despite these hurdles, his government remained committed to its vision of a Naya Pakistan (New Pakistan), striving to create a more just, equitable, and transparent society (Akram, 2023)..

The difficult Situation for Government of Zardari

The president Zardari took over power in 2008. His government was surrounded by challenges, such as; opposition parties and civil military relations. The apex court's decision that Sharif brothers cannot hold public office addressed his first challenge. The court's decision helped him to reduce oppositions power (Perlez, 2009). However, Nawaz supporter came to challenge him when his government removed IftakharChowdhry, (Wilkinson, 2009). He restored the chowdhry as a step to reduce tension between two parties, (Perlez, 2009). Another challenge faced by Zardari was the rumors of dissension in the party calming that there is tension between Zardari and Gillani over the mismanagement and corruption, (Cohen, 2011). The survey conducted in 2009 suggested that more than sixty percent public was dissatisfied with Zardari's government. Additionally, the military also showed its dissatisfaction and concern over defense related issue during Zardari's government, (Wilkinson, 2009). The Zardari government continued its working, managing national security and formulating foreign policy, nonetheless, the Kashmir, Indian affairs, financial management and nuclear program were looked after by the military, (Jan, 2010). Although opposition parties and military strived to weaken Zardari's government but he manged to complete his tenure in the office

Conclusion

The study findings conclude that the civil military relations in Pakistan have experienced rocky path. The fact that Pakistan's security needs and apprehension about its survival forced the leaders to strengthen it military, which in turn will ensure the security of its borders. In this quest, they (Political leadership) focused all their efforts and energies to strengthen military institution, whereas, two other institutions, such as executive and judiciary were given lip service. Resultantly, one institution become powerful, leaving the remaining two weak and vulnerable.

The first ever effort was made by Civilian leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after coming in to power. First time any leader tried to strengthen political institutions and control the command and structure of military. He took full advantage of military weakness after 1971 war. Since then consecutive efforts have been made to strengthen executive and judiciary. Muhtarma Benazir Bhutto coming to power made an effort to continue her father's legacy and then Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif strived to strengthen political institutions.

The reason that Pakistan's political leadership has failed to improve civil military relations and strengthen political and judicial institutions is the conflicting and competitive approach of the political groups in country. Instead of focusing on cooperative culture and strengthen political institutions, they have been busy in leg pulling of each other. This attitude of political parties has given opportunity to military leadership to continue exercising their influence in political affairs and domestic politics. However, during Zardari Period between 2008 and 2013, something unprecedented happened that had never been practiced in Pakistan before. He brought all political actors and military leadership to sit on the same table to manage national affairs and formulate policies in the best interest of the nation. His was the first civilian government to continue in the office for five years. What is need needed today is the Zardari's approach to collective rule the state and progress economically, politically, socially and militarily and strengthen National pillars of power, such as; Executive, Judiciary, and military to bring peace and stability in the country. This in turn will ensure national security, political stability and rule of law with the state, which can lead to development and prosperity to the country.

Recommendations

Institutional Imbalance Pakistan's most significant issue is institutional imbalance that cause political instability in the country. Some institutions are more powerful than the others as civilian institutions like legislature are weaker than the military bureaucracy. Since independence due to institutional imbalance Pakistan has been facing political instability. It is suggested that Political parties like peoples party must make situation viable for stable political conditions.

Military interventions Military intervention is one of the vital issues in the politics of Pakistan. A long military rule in Pakistan has always weakened the civilian institution. The pressing need to stabilize the country is to stop military interventions. People's party always tried to stabilize the politics of the country. Military interventions can be stop through judiciary and legislature. When military come into power judiciary legitimize its powers. After judicial activism in 2007 somehow direct military interventions are stopped but indirectly it intervenes into politics.

Role of Political Parties The role of political party is very crucial in stable political situation in the country. Parties like Muslim league, People's party and Pakistan TehreekInsaaf have established enmity with each other. State institutions manipulated the

situation and exploit the parties. It is recommended that all political parties must sit and sign reconciliation and sign chatter of democracy in which no party must be part of establishment and   must ward off from political destabilization.

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